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ABSTRACT 
 
Online-based attacks have become prevalent and continue to be on the rise as technology 
advances. The complexity of the internet has posed a cybersecurity concern across various 
online channels. As a result, online social engineering has become an important information 
aspect of security in the usage of the internet. Young adults, mainly students, who have the 
necessary social engineering knowledge to protect their personally identifiable information 
(PII) are less likely to fall victim. Therefore, social engineering awareness is seen as an 
important defense mechanism that enables students to protect their PII. Due to the lack of social 
engineering awareness initiatives conducted in higher academic institutions, social engineers 
succeed in luring students.  
 
This study applied the quantitative research approach through distributing 379 questionnaires 
to both female and male students. The questionnaire tested both male and female students on 
their social engineering knowledge, information security attitudes, social engineering 
perceptions and online behaviour. The results of this study showed that there is a gender 
difference in online behaviour in reacting to online social engineering. The male students’ 
responses revealed that they have more social engineering knowledge compared to their female 
counterparts. The findings also provided an indication of the online behaviours that potentially 
increase the students’ susceptibility. The findings validate the need for social engineering 
awareness initiatives that address students on how to improve their online social engineering 
identification and information security. The study concludes by recommending attainable 
solutions to increasing the awareness levels of social engineering knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The internet has grown rapidly, and has brought about changes in the ways in which people 
interact, browse for information, shop, and the way in which they spend their time (Curran, 
Fenton, & Freedman, 2016; Musingafi, Mapuranga, Chiwanza, & Zebron, 2015). Almost two 
thirds of adults participate on social network sites, as compared to 2005 where only 7% of 
adults were active users (Perrin, 2015). The internet’s size, complexity and increasing number 
of connected devices has brought about the need for security for data storage and 
communication purposes (Cabaj, Grochowski, & Gawkowski, 2015). The frequent cyberattack 
events that currently occur on the internet are symbolic of the security weaknesses in the 
growing internet. Information security therefore becomes a challenge, since cloud technologies 
have introduced virtual connections of wireless networks subjecting online sites to greater 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.  
 
Technology is an essential aspect of modern society. The ‘internet of things’ (Cabaj et al., 
2015) makes it possible for objects in our physical world to connect with the virtual world, 
allowing the objects to share information with members of that particular network, usually 
through the use of the same internet protocol (Halevi, Lewis, & Memon, 2013) connecting the 
internet (Drucker, 2015). The internet provides online social networking and social media 
platforms which create stimulating environments for internet users, enabling real time 
communication, socialisation and entrepreneurial activities. However, within the population of 
all internet users are malicious users, including social engineers, who exploit all possible 
vulnerabilities. Social engineering (SE), in the context of information security, is a term used 
when internet users are deceived and misled by attackers into exposing valuable personal and 
corporate information (Algarni, Xu, & Chan, 2016). Such information is then used by the 
attackers to perform fraudulent activities. As shown in Figure 1.1, SE occurs in various forms. 
 
Fig. 1.1 is explained as follows, in an anti-clockwise direction: 
There are two communication entry points that a SE attack may exploit: direct and indirect 
communication. Direct communication refers to instances when the social engineer directly 
communicates with the potential victim. For example, vishing attacks occur when the attacker 
converses with the targeted victim over the telephone. Indirect communication implies the use 
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of a communication medium, where the social engineer does not interact with the attacker. For 
instance, the potential victim logs into a web page that is created by a social engineer.  
 
 
Fig. 1.1: Ontological model of a SE attack (Mouton, Malan, Leenen, & Venter, 2014, p. 2) 
 
Techniques: The diagram illustrates how social engineering has multiple techniques that can 
be used for a single attack. For instance, a phishing technique message may consist of a baiting 
technique in order to lure individuals. Therefore, the communication method used would be 
dependent on the technique that the social engineer uses. 
Compliance principles: For the target to comply, the social engineer uses social engineering 
principles to make the individual trust that the act is harmless. The compliance principles are 
mechanisms that assist in getting the victim’s trust. As illustrated in Fig.1.1, a social 
engineering attack may use more than one compliance principle to bait the target. For instance, 
the attacker may use authority and liking principles. The social engineer may act as the target’s 
manager with whom the target has a favourable relationship, friendship. 
Target: A planned social engineering attack can have only one target. The target can either be 
an individual or an organisation. For instance, a phishing attack can be directed to the victim, 
in order to get the victim’s personal details. On the other hand, the phishing attack can be 
directed to an individual in an organisation in order to get unauthorised access into the 
organisation’s network.  
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Social engineer: An attack is constructed by a group of individuals or by an individual social 
engineer.  
Medium: There are several mediums that a single attack can use. However, one social 
engineering attack can only use one medium. The medium is dependent on the technique used. 
For instance, if the social engineer uses the phishing technique, the e-mail medium is the most 
appropriate medium to use in order to achieve the intended objective. 
Goal: The entire purpose of one social engineering attack is for one benefit. This means that 
the attack is conducted to either gain unauthorised access, to cause service disruption, or for a 
financial gain. The communication, techniques, compliance principles, target, social engineer 
and medium are all chosen to achieve the intended goal.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, SE is a process whereby the attacker initialises communication 
with the potential victim in order to achieve the set objective. Prior to committing the attack, 
the social engineer would have gathered enough relevant information about the targeted 
individual or organisation (Bezuidenhout, Mouton, & Venter, 2010). The social engineer 
would then decide on the best technique to use to reach out to the target. A target is more 
willing to comply with the attacker’s message, based on the compliance principle with which 
the attacker has chosen to lure the individual (Mouton, Leenen, & Venter, 2016). However, the 
attacker would also disguise him/herself as someone whom the individual knows, for example 
an authoritative figure or a friend. Amongst the various SE attack techniques, phishing and 
baiting are the most common forms to lure victims (Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). The difference 
between the two is that phishing is mainly used for exploiting the targeted individual’s trust in 
order to get the individual’s private information (Dakpa & Augustine, 2017). On the other hand, 
baiting is based on the greed of the targeted individuals, and the individuals would be required 
to carry out certain tasks in the belief that they would be rewarded, financially or otherwise 
(Fan, Lwakatare, & Rong, 2017). The attacker can then decide which medium to use, which 
would then lead to the actual online attack in which the target either succumbs, or does not. 
 
Social engineering research and awareness are both critical in reducing the success rate of SE 
attacks, as well as neutralising the attackers (Hassan, 2019). According to Aldawood and 
Skinner (2018), there is a lack of knowledge on the differing gender response rates to the social 
engineering threats that are prevalent on online sites. This research investigates whether there 
is a difference in the way in which males and females respond to social engineering.  
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Nowadays, it has become almost impossible to achieve an information security level using only 
technological countermeasures, since modern cyberattacks have the capabilities to bypass all 
the defense layers. Therefore, education programmes improving user awareness of social 
engineering threats are important. The importance of awareness and education about social 
engineering attacks cannot be emphasised enough, considering the likelihood of every 
individual becoming a victim (Junger, Montoya, & Overink, 2017). Moreover, educating 
individuals can minimise the number of successful attacks (Krombholz, Hobel, Huber, & 
Weippl, 2015). 
 
1.2 Background of the study 
Online social media users are often active on multiple platforms. This allows social engineers 
to attack users through increasingly complex methods utilising emerging technologies and 
multiple attack vectors (Al-Jabri, Sohail, & Ndubisi, 2015). South African users are not 
immune to these attacks (Harrison, 2013). Regardless of the implementation of security settings 
on online platforms, users fall victim to online social engineering (OSE) due to insufficient 
information security and social engineering knowledge (Hinson, 2008). In recent years, studies 
have shown that students fall victim to various forms of online social engineering due to 
inadequate control of their online behaviour. However, there have also been apparent gender 
differences in online behavioural patterns (Malandrino, Petta, Scarano, Serra, Spinelli, & 
Krishnamurthy, 2013). This suggests that there may also be a gender difference with regards 
to information security awareness and response. In this study, the researcher investigated 
whether there is a different gender response to online social engineering using a sample of 379 
Pietermaritzburg (PMB) students from Umgungundlovu FET College and the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
1.3 Research problem 
Users are vulnerable to social engineering attacks (Mouton et al., 2016) and are the weakest 
link in any cybersecurity regimen. Although previous studies have been conducted to 
understand human behaviour, there have been no information systems created to determine 
human decision-making processes (Noureddine, Keefe, Sanders, & Bashir, 2015). It is only 
recently that researchers have started to consider conducting research that examines the factors 
that cause humans to respond to online social engineering attacks. The recent human studies 
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have been conducted to assist with generating possible social engineering defense mechanisms 
(Halevi et al., 2013). 
 
Gender is perceived to be embedded with numerous characteristics based on an individual’s 
cultural beliefs (Hudson, 2005). Generally, males are considered more dominant than females 
(Kachel, Steffens, & Niedlich, 2016). This is due to them being considered as the heads of their 
households (Wolf, 2000). Therefore, they are usually tasked with security matters, both in the 
workplace and in their households. Among young adults, gender inequalities, as inherited from 
previous generations, are still in existence. Technology alone, as seen on the internet, is 
somehow gendered like the traditional household hierarchies, where males are dominant. 
Transferring that mindset onto the internet, males tend to be more self-confident in their 
computer skills; as they would be when facing security tasks in the real world (Zhang, Tran, 
Hinh, Nguyen, Tho, Latkin, & Ho, 2017). Females are more submissive, even in online 
domains, as they would be in households due to the cultural hierarchy structure (Bashir, 
Mahmood, & Shafique, 2016). In a study conducted by Helsper (2010), it was evident that 
internet usage by all individuals is affected by factors that exist in the physical world. 
Therefore, an understanding of gender differences in responses to OSE attacks will enable 
future researchers to better design security interventions in cybersecurity. 
 
Security issues pertaining to online social networks have been extensively studied (Liben‐
Nowell & Kleinberg, 2007), but the role of gender in the success of OSE attacks amongst young 
adults in South Africa requires further investigation. This leads to the following key questions 
to be answered by this research. 
 
1.4 Research questions 
The study’s research questions are as follows: 
Primary Research Question 
To what extent is there a gender-dependent response to online social engineering attacks 
amongst young South African adults? 
Research Sub-Questions 
1. How aware are young South African adults of online social engineering? 
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a. Do the genders have different awareness levels of the different types of online 
social engineering attacks?  
2. What is the attitude of young adults in South Africa to online social engineering? 
a. To what extent is a gender difference apparent? 
3. To what extent are young adults’ responses to online social engineering adequate to 
protect them?  
1.5 Research objectives 
1. to determine whether there is a gender difference in the response of tertiary students to 
online social engineering;  
2. to identify students’ knowledge about online social engineering from a gender 
perspective; 
3. to determine if there is a gender difference in online information security among young 
adult students. 
1.6 Significance of the study 
There has been no previous research that has investigated the difference in responses to OSE 
attacks amongst the South African youth from a gender perspective. Therefore, it is important 
to better understand the different gender responses of young adults to existing OSE attacks. If 
gender differences are apparent, preventative measures can be appropriately designed.  
 
1.7 Justification  
Literature has shown that young adults are heavy users of online social networks. It is important 
to understand this usage from all perspectives. Gender is one such perspective. This study 
provides a foundation for researchers who wish to expand upon the ideas explored here in 
broader contexts. The outcomes of this study may also be of interest to researchers in gender 
studies.  
 
1.8 Theoretical framework 
This research implemented two theoretical frameworks to direct the study in distinguishing the 
gender responses to online social engineering. The adopted frameworks are Gender and 
International Security, Feminist Theory and the Theory of Reasoned Action. The following 
section discusses these theories and highlights their significance in relation to this research. 
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1.8.1 Gender and International Security, Feminist Theory 
This theory was first formulated in 1988 as the Women and International Relations Theory and 
was later recognised to be the beginning of the feminist methods in international relations (IR) 
research programmes (Sjoberg, 2009). Discussions involving IR scholars, feminist theorists 
and others expanded to include the security aspects of online platforms (Wibben, 2010). The 
discussions do not only show women’s importance in international security, but also the 
significance of gender as a fundamental factor in attaining comprehensive knowledge and 
addressing security issues.  
 
The Gender and International Security, Feminist Theory argues that gender is not a section of 
security studies (Sjoberg, 2009). It is argued that gender is theoretically vital in studying 
international security. It uses gender as the lens of the study. In agreement, Trauth (2013) stated 
that for gendered IS research, a gender theory is used as the lens to assist in the gathering and 
interpretation of the raw data. The primary objective would be to look at the study through 
gendered lenses, concentrating on gender as a way to understand universal processes (Sjoberg, 
2009). Furthermore, in agreement, Trauth (2013) stated that having a gendered theory helps in 
giving the study a sense of direction in understanding the gender phenomenon. In this theory, 
gender is described as a system that creates social hierarchies associated with the attributes of 
femininity and masculinity (Tickner, 1992).  
 
Gendered social hierarchies are considered as a social construction since gender is expressed 
differently across cultures, organisations, languages and individuals. Therefore, feminism is 
considered to be not just about women, but mainly about changing means of existence (Sjoberg, 
2009). Tickner (1992) argued in the same vein, affirming that the term ‘gender’ does not only 
refer to the biological aspect of male and female, but rather the established differences between 
the sexes. Moreover, gender cannot be measured as a male or female question, but rather as a 
complex symbolic construction. Researchers that look through gender lenses mainly ask about 
the assumptions associated with gender in order to make meaningfully precise statements 
(Sjoberg, 2009). Feminist theorists have noted that gender is significant in what we research. 
Furthermore, feminist theorists’ contributions in security studies have been explored and 
analysed to draw attention to new or disregarded subjects by seriously taking gender into 
consideration (Kennedy & Dingli, 2018; Sjoberg, 2009). The first subject matter of the feminist 
theory is to broadly consider and understand what is measured as a security subject. The 
theory’s second theme is to recognise the gendered nature in the domain of international 
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studies. It is believed that gender adds different contexts into security studies, in as much as 
gender is an external force in security scholarship and the framework of security generally 
(Sjoberg, 2009). If security is to be re-envisioned from an individual female’s perspective, then 
it would alter what security is known to be, and how security is conceptualised, acted on and 
operationalised. According to Blanchard (2003), the term security has been interpreted in 
contradictory ways, and it is only in recent years that gender has been considered in the 
information security discipline. 
 
In societies, gender is a salient social category, which is seen as a fundamental source of human 
diversity (Bussey & Bandura, 1999; Maccoby, 1998). In the same vein, Spence and Helmreich 
(1980) stated that universally, gender roles differ across human societies. The ubiquitous social 
reputation that gender has adopted (Bussey & Bandura, 1999) serves as the reasoning for 
adopting feminist theory in understanding the gender aspect of the study. However, this study 
is an IS study that incorporates the gender element. Therefore, the gender lenses will be used 
in this research to touch on attitude and subjective norms, found in the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA) theory, since attitude is considered a way of thinking learned from an 
individual’s early childhood (Maccoby, 1998). The TRA mainly focuses on individual aspects 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) rather than human societies, since the researcher used the feminist 
theory in determining two of the four TRA constructs. Also, masculinity and femininity are at 
the heart of a culture’s value system and cultural teaching, because an individual’s normative 
belief acts as a guideline to taking any particular action, due to the adopted parent-child 
behavioural patterns (Spence & Helmreich, 1980). 
 
1.8.2 Theory of Reasoned Action 
The Theory of Reasoned Action TRA (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) lies within the discipline of 
information studies. The first adopted theory, Gender and International Security, Feminist 
Theory only covers the gender aspect of security in general. Fishbein first introduced the TRA 
in 1967 and it was then developed, after failing repeatedly to predict behaviour from outdated 
measures of attitude (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). The main assumption of the TRA is the belief 
that an individual reasons in a particular manner due to the individual’s acquired knowledge. 
Individuals assess the state of a situation and thereafter decide whether or not to perform in a 
certain way, based on their perspective (Ajzen, 1985). Therefore, the most immediate 
behavioural determinant is behavioural intention.  
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The TRA focuses on understanding an individual’s underlying reasons for acting in a particular 
way (Glanz, Rimer, & Viswanath, 2015). Arguing in the same vein, Montano and Kasprzyk 
(2015) claim that the TRA clearly identifies relationships that exist within the framework’s 
constructs, namely attitude, beliefs and behaviour. Furthermore, the TRA is based primarily on 
the concept of an individual’s overall behaviour, which is determined by the individual’s 
intention to behave in a particular way. Additionally, the model proposes that the main reason 
an individual behaves in a particular way is solely determined by the individual’s intention 
(Cooke, Dahdah, Norman, & French, 2016). 
 
In this study, the TRA was used to determine the individual’s intention, attitude and behaviour 
and the motive behind their response towards the online threats, through a gender lens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.2: The TRA model (Montano & Kasprzyk, 2015) 
 
Attitude: According to Cooke et al. (2016), attitudes are an individual’s perception of 
behaviour. In this study, this construct was aligned with determining the positive or negative 
evaluations that young adults have about online social engineering. Literature on social 
psychology has recognised attitude as a major factor that predicts an individual’s behaviour 
(Mostafa, 2007). The behavioural intention of an individual is considered as a factor that gives 
an explanation to the individual’s conducted behaviour. According to Chang (2013), attitude 
is explained to be a general feeling of approval or disapproval of a particular behaviour.  
 
Subjective Norm: Normative beliefs are external factors and include individual normative 
beliefs, such as approval or disapproval from referent individuals, along with the individual’s 
motivation to comply with the given instruction (Montano & Kasprzyk, 2015). In the context 
Attitude 
Subjective 
Norm 
Behavioural 
Intention 
Behaviour 
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of this study, subjective norms were determined by evaluating whether the individual responds 
to online social engineering messages if instructed to do so by a known party.  
 
Behavioural Intention: In a definition given by Calisir, Gumussoy, Bayraktaroglu, and 
Karaali (2014), behavioural intention is an individual’s intuition as to whether or not they want 
to perform a particular task. In addition, motivational factors are captured in an individual’s 
intention. Therefore, this study seeks to discover the motivational factors that lead to the 
participants’ responses to SE. 
 
Behaviour: What drives the individual’s decision to act (Montano & Kasprzyk, 2015)? In the 
context of this study, the factors that lure the individual to respond to online social engineering 
messages were determined.  
 
1.9 Limitations of the study 
This study was carried out in one geographical location, Pietermaritzburg. Thus, care should 
be taken if the results are generalised to the whole of South Africa. Additionally, the sample 
consisted only of higher education students, which may not be representative of young adults 
in general.  
 
1.10 Outline of the Dissertation 
This study consists of six chapters which are arranged as follows:  
 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the dissertation. The chapter presents a discussion of online 
social engineering and the form of attacks associated with it. Furthermore, the chapter explains 
the significance of the study and the research questions that were asked. The chapter also 
presents the two frameworks that were adopted and used to guide this study.  
 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature that has been conducted on social engineering. 
The chapter introduces various forms of social engineering, the information security triad, 
gender and the vulnerability of young adult students.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the adopted methodology. The chapter explains the research design and 
approach implemented. It also provides explanations on the sampling and survey method used. 
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Chapter 4 presents the findings, data analysis and interpretations of the collected data. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion of the research findings in relation to the research 
objectives. 
 
Chapter 6 concludes the study and provides recommendations for future research. 
 
1.11 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the study and presented a high-level overview. The research problem 
was introduced, and the research questions and objectives presented. Furthermore, the two 
theories guiding this study were discussed. The next chapter presents the literature review 
underpinning this study. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The internet has grown rapidly and has brought about changes in the way individuals interact, 
browse for information and shop; and the way in which they spend their time (Curran et al., 
2016; Musingafi et al., 2015). Almost two thirds of adults use social network sites today, as 
compared to 2005 when only 7% of adults were active users (Coyne, Padilla‐Walker, 
Holmgren, & Stockdale, 2019). The internet’s size and complexity has increased the need for 
security for data storage and for communication purposes (Cabaj et al., 2015). The frequent 
cyberattacks are symptomatic of the prevalent security weaknesses inherent in the structure of 
the internet. In a recent study, it was discovered that cyberattacks have targeted 131 universities 
in 16 countries (CreamerMedia, 2018). South African universities are amongst the most 
targeted, and attackers have tried to obtain staff and students’ credentials.  
 
There is no fully secure online environment. Cyberattacks bypass technological defense layers 
such as antiviruses and firewalls (Sharma, 2012) and also use humans as their entry point to 
achieve security breaches. Therefore, humans need to be involved in security defense strategies 
The importance of awareness and education about social engineering attacks cannot be 
emphasised enough, due to the likelihood of every individual becoming a victim (Junger et al., 
2017). Moreover, educating users can minimize the number of successful attacks, as 
individuals would then be aware of the necessary precautions that they need to take 
(Krombholz et al., 2015). 
 
This chapter presents a review of the literature on social engineering, information security 
principles, gender, and social engineering (SE). In the social engineering section, the literature 
reviews social engineering and the most prevalent types of social engineering. The social 
engineering section also presents the compliance mechanism that attackers use as a technique 
to convince the victims to innocently comply with a social engineering attack.  Information 
security principles are included in the literature, to understand how social engineering breaches 
these security principles. The section also references how online platforms are trying to ensure 
that they uphold basic security principles. Furthermore, the literature provides an outline of the 
different views of gender and the prevalent gender differences known to society as a result of 
the traditional gender norms. The chapter ends by presenting literature on young adults and the 
reasoning behind why young adults are the primary target group for social engineers.  
 
13 
 
2.2 Social engineering 
Social engineering is defined as the art of deceiving an individual into giving out his personal 
information. Similarly, Algarni, Xu, Chan, and Tian (2014) explain social engineering as the 
persuasion of an unsuspecting user into conducting a certain action that breaches security 
principles. These actions are interpreted as deception, conducted by the attacker, in acquiring 
the needed information (Krombholz et al., 2015). The attackers seek information such as a 
password from an individual instead of breaking into a system. To achieve this, the attacker 
employs different forms of social interaction to obtain information about the potential victim. 
In online social engineering, the targeted victim does not distinguish between a genuine 
message and a deceptive message of the social engineer. 
 
In research conducted by Bullée, Montoya, Pieters, Junger, and Hartel (2015), the six principles 
of persuasion were explained. These researchers explained that attackers use persuasive 
mechanisms to increase their success rate, namely, conformity, partial liking, reciprocity and 
assurance. Essentially, these four principles are used to influence an individual to comply, in 
the full belief that what they are complying with is harmless and legitimate. In a more recent 
study conducted by Fan et al. (2017), social engineering was further described as the disclosure 
of personal information to a malicious actor. In relation to information security, social 
engineering is also defined as misleading an individual into disclosing sensitive information, 
by exploiting the individual’s cognitive and unsuspecting thinking. 
 
In the same vein, Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Moore, Mundie, and Cowley (2014) explained how 
persuasion occurs through means of electronic communication. They explained that the 
objective of persuasion is to make the user act in a manner that will jeopardise their personally 
identifiable information (PII). In order for social engineering to succeed, it requires certain 
mechanisms that help the attacker gain the required information, which are usually based on 
the attacking technique that will be applied. In most reported cases of social engineering, the 
common attack methods used are malicious online messages, links and pop-up messages 
(Wüest, 2010). Accordingly, the attacker uses social engineering as a tool to get the necessary 
information, regardless of the security defense tools.  
 
Nowadays, the evolution in technology has provisioned criminals with online platforms such 
as the Dark Web, which is explained as an online market place where social engineers purchase 
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stolen credentials and malicious malware (Chertoff & Simon, 2015). Traditionally, scammers 
travelled to deceive consumers with get-rich-quick schemes and miraculous cures. Ever since 
the emergence of the internet, social engineering has radically evolved in complexity. Ivaturi 
and Janczewski (2011) affirmed that social engineering attacks can be deemed older than the 
internet, since there is no difference in the types of offenses committed, but rather in the 
complexity in the way that the attacks are committed. The difference is that for online attacks, 
the victim and the attacker have no physical encounter (Okesola, Onashoga, & Ogunbanwo, 
2016). The attacker lures the user over the diversified online platforms such as emails, social 
media and online shopping sites.  
 
The attacker or social engineer plays a crucial role in a social engineering attack. He is regarded 
as the regulator of an online social engineering attack because he controls the attacking process 
(Algarni, Xu, Chan, & Tian, 2013). The strategy used by the attackers consists of an attack 
system which starts from understanding the potential victim and ends with either a financial or 
information gain. As part of the starting phase, the social engineer tries to determine ways in 
which he can gain the targeted victim’s trust. Thus, the social engineer works towards 
identifying the online behavioural patterns of the targeted user in order to find exploitable 
vulnerabilities. In most instances, online behavioural patterns are collected through social 
network posts and e-commerce sites, due to the amount of personally identifiable information 
users openly disclose (Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). For instance, when a social engineer has gained 
information such as names of close friends of the targeted victim, the information becomes 
useful in determining ways to entice the victim through techniques such as ‘identify theft’ and 
‘impersonation’.  
 
The plan of attack is based on the gathered information because the information is used to 
develop a plan that consists of a personalised strategy for each target. The social engineers 
ensure that the plan is believable so that the targeted individual has no suspicions of the 
conveyed message. Thereafter, the social engineers strategise on the suitable time to execute 
the attack, which is then followed by the actual attack (Algarni et al., 2014). In South Africa, 
the most common forms of attack consist of emails or direct messages which are sent to the 
victim without creating obvious errors that would raise suspicions (Wakama, 2014). However, 
victims are usually drawn to responding due to the level of attacking skills the social engineers 
use (Algarni et al., 2013). The reason for responding is because the social engineers present the 
message as if it comes from a known and reliable source. Therefore, it becomes challenging 
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for the victim to identify the non-credibility of the message, as compared to in a face-to-face 
interaction. In agreement, Kvedar, Nettis, and Fulton (2010) stated that, irrespective of an 
individual’s knowledge about social engineering attacks, a well-executed attack has 
possibilities of being successful. This is due to the attacker’s level of professionalism and 
skillsets (Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst, 2006). 
 
The internet allows the attackers to use various platforms to execute the attack (Krombholz et 
al., 2015). The most common form is an email message that requests an individual to conduct 
a certain task, such as clicking on an email link or providing certain details. This SE technique 
is amongst several other attacking approaches used to exploit discovered vulnerabilities 
(Kumar, Chaudhary, & Kumar, 2015). Also, the attacker uses different forms of 
communication and technological devices based on the nature of the attack (Mouton et al., 
2016). The communication techniques are either direct or indirect. Direct communication is in 
the form of a verbal conversation such as a telephone call; whereas indirect communication is 
based on sending a message over the internet or via Short Messaging Service (SMS) 
(Chaudhry, Chaudhry, Rittenhouse, 2016). Given the different types of communication 
channels used by social engineers, the most frequent forms of social engineering attacks are 
identified hereunder. 
 
2.2.1 Phishing attacks 
Phishing is defined by Huang, Ma, and Chen (2011) as a SE technique that uses an indirect 
form of communication to obtain an individual’s sensitive information. In another definition 
given by Garera, Provos, Chew, and Rubin (2007), phishing is described as a form of identity 
theft. In the context of phishing attacks, the phisher who is the social engineer, seeks personal 
information from users through indirect communication. In most instances, the phisher seeks 
information such as PII or banking details. This is generally achieved through distributing an 
email message to a pool of internet users. In a sample of more than 13 million emails, an 
estimated 12 percent of the emails contain malicious content (Alazab & Broadhurst, 2016). The 
modern phishing email messages contain instructions that guide the potential victim to click 
on certain links provided on the email (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006). In South Africa, 
university students frequently receive phishing emails that consist of fake links that lead to 
spoofed web pages (Broadhurst, Skinner, Sifniotis, Matamoros-Macias, & Ipsen, 2019). This 
is because phishing hyperlinks are an easier technique to bait recipients of the phishing email 
messages. Phishing also allows the social engineers to target a large number of users. Also, due 
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to the sophistication of the phishing emails, the targeted victims have a desire to click on the 
hyperlinks. Other phishing emails consist of attachments that, when downloaded, run malicious 
software on the user’s workstation. As stated by Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, and McCormac 
(2016), when a link redirects the user to a malicious website, it is regarded as a pharming attack. 
Typical phishing attacks consist of three key components (Chiew, Yong, & Tan, 2018) :  
• The bait is an email message that appears to be from a trusted source, such as banks 
and universities. The message contains a malicious link that is provided by the fake 
URL.  
• The hook is the mimicked website. The hook deceives the users into providing their 
confidential information, believing that the website is legitimate.  
• The catch consists of the phisher using the collected information for illegal activities.  
 
In 2013, it was estimated that six billion of the 183 billion emails sent out daily contain 
malicious attachments (Broadhurst, Grabosky, Alazab, & Chon, 2014). Hong (2012) 
emphasised that phishing attacks have been on the rise and have become the most occurring 
online threat. This online risk is associated with the lack of safety of internet users’ personal 
and confidential information. In 2014, SA was declared to be the second most phishing-targeted 
country, from a global context (Wakama, 2014). Also, according to the South African Banking 
Risk Information Centre (SABRIC), SA citizens lose an estimated R2.2 billion as a result of 
cyberattacks (BusinessMediaMAGS, 2018). This shows that the phishing phenomenon 
definitely exists in SA, making every South African individual a possible victim. Kennedy and 
Dingli (2018) advance that to lessen the number of successful phishing attacks, awareness 
programmes need to be considered. It is believed that the success of the phishing attacks rely 
on the level of knowledge the user holds (Florencio & Herley, 2010). Jakobsson and Myers 
(2006) explained that in phishing attacks, the victim assists the attacker innocently by providing 
the information the attacker needs; whereas, identifying a phishing email or site can be 
effortless for a user who is knowledgeable about phishing attacks (Aleroud & Zhou, 2017). 
Therefore, individuals who have no social engineering knowledge end up falling victim. This 
leads to an increased success rate for phishing attacks – hence, the high number of successful 
phishing attacks reported by SABRIC. It has been a concern that, to date, only a few studies 
have been conducted to measure the vulnerability levels of users to phishing attacks (Algarni 
et al., 2014). 
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Phishing attacks are classified into several different forms. The attackers adopt the most 
appropriate technique that is suitable for a potential victim’s environment. The different forms 
of phishing attack are as follows: 
• Clone phishing 
An attacker uses this type of phishing attack by using previously distributed legitimate email 
messages (Chiew et al., 2018). The genuine email is replicated and malicious links or 
attachments are embedded into it and then it is resent (Nagarjuna & Sujatha, 2013). The email 
will appear genuine, yet it is sent from a spoofed email address (Ma, 2013). Spoofing an email 
gives the impression that it is a resend or an upgrade from the original known source. The 
malicious attachments contain spyware and screen grabbers which send the phisher information 
when the user inputs his sensitive information. Further research has discovered that email 
attachments and web browsers are the main malware vectors (Bakdash, Hutchinson, Zaroukian, 
Marusich, Thirumuruganathan, Sample, Hoffman, & Das, 2018). Therefore, users stand a high 
chance of falling victim due to the failure of identifying spoofed email addresses.  
• Spear phishing 
Another form of phishing attack is the spear phishing method. In this attack, the phisher targets 
a specific group of individuals, such as lecturers or third year students. The technique of 
targeting a specific group is to increase the success rate of the attack (Magdalin, 2015). In this 
technique, malicious emails are sent specifically to the targeted group. 
• Phone phishing 
Phone phishing is a type of phishing attack that is commonly referred to as vishing. As defined 
by Aburrous, Hossain, Dahal, and Thabtah (2010), vishing has posed a far smaller threat, 
compared to the other forms of online phishing. Similarly, vishing is further defined by Banu 
and Banu (2013) as the use of a phone to gain an individual’s sensitive information. The 
attacker makes a phone call to individuals, asking individuals for their personal information 
(Ekawade, Mule, & Patkar, 2016). The attackers use hoaxed caller ID numbers which hide their 
actual numbers. Therefore, victims fall for the phone call, believing that the call is coming from 
a trusted source.  
 
2.2.2 Identity theft  
As defined by Ziegeldorf, Morchon, and Wehrle (2014), identity theft is an attack relating an 
individual with a personal identifier, such as his first name, pseudonym, and address. Identity 
theft occurs when an attacker obtains an individual’s PII and uses it to conduct fraudulent 
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activities (Vieraitis, Copes, Powell, & Pike, 2015). These fraudulent activities are conducted 
using a false identity in order to gain the victim’s trust. Hille, Walsh, and Cleveland (2015) 
stressed how identity theft is, rapidly becoming a global concern. The rise of identity theft has 
been predominant across online transactional sites and in email messages (Kahn & Liñares-
Zegarra, 2016). In turn, this causes a major concern for e-commerce retailers and consumers 
since their PII is at risk of being stolen. This implies that online shops are at risk of losing 
purchasers, since customers are becoming hesitant in providing their PII on online sites, as well 
as conducting online transactions. Holtfreter, Reisig, Pratt, and Holtfreter (2015) identified 
that, in some instances, internet users put themselves at risk due to their risky behaviour, which 
creates entry points for attackers. Thus, when students fall victim to identity theft, it can be due 
to their online negligence or lack of identifying false identities. This is because risky online 
activities by users often lead to personal information leakage. Furthermore, Welsh (2015) 
emphasised that certain behaviour causes leakages that later cause greater problems. In 
addition, he explained that identity theft damages the victim’s name and subsequently his 
reputation becomes discredited.  
 
On a global scale, identity theft has cost organisations huge amounts of capital per year 
(Ibrahim, Ramanathan, Som, & Trevathan, 2016). The capital is either taken by hackers, or 
after the implementation of social engineering compliance training. In a study conducted by 
Song, Lew, Song, and Song (2018), it was apparent that once a social engineer has gained an 
individual’s identity, committing fraudulent activities becomes effortless. Nowadays, 
individuals conduct various online transactions across various platforms such as online banking 
or mobile applications and, therefore, the scope of identity theft has increased (Ferrell, 2017). 
To decrease the number of users who fall victim to identity theft, McGlone, Ballard, Berkelaar, 
Baryshevtsev, and Brown (2015) advised that information campaigns should be conducted. In 
their study, the campaigns conducted revealed that few consumers were aware of the online 
crime of identity theft. According to Rebovich, Allen, and Platt (2015), attention needs to be 
paid to identity theft awareness initiatives that focus on ways that individuals can protect their 
online identities. The awareness programmes do not benefit individuals only, but also 
organisations that experience financial losses due to staff negligence. It is believed that 
awareness programmes covering identity theft would improve the user’s ability to distinguish 
whether a site or email is credible. For instance, individuals would know to check the site’s 
legitimacy before providing their card details or making any form of online transaction. 
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2.2.3 Online scams 
Online scams are online acts that consist of fraudulent activities with the objective of financial 
gain. Tiwari (2018) stated that email scams are the most common form of social engineering 
attacks. This attack occurs when an attacker probes an individual via messages that are 
embedded with hyperlinks or malicious attachments. This form of attack may also include an 
alert message or a reward message that creates a sense of emergency for the individual to 
respond. The email link would seem as if it is coming from a legitimate source, yet it would be 
coming from an attacker who has recreated any reputable company’s website. Email messages 
that stipulate that other users have taken up the offer or have conducted the specific act, lure 
the victim to also comply. Similarly, if it is stipulated that the offer is available for a short time 
period, potential victims are more likely to comply with the necessary instructions in the 
malicious email (Butavicius et al., 2016).  
 
2.2.4 Social engineering compliance mechanism 
This section provides an overview explaining why individuals become victims of social 
engineering. It has been identified that trust is the core compliance mechanism that is 
compromised by social engineers in order to obtain the necessary information from individuals 
(Mann, 2017).  
• The role of trust in social engineering attacks 
Thompson (2006) specified that the common form of manipulating an individual is by gaining 
his trust. In the same vein, Granger (2003) also noted that in information security, trust and 
validity are considered to be the weakest link in any security chain. This is caused by the natural 
willingness to accept a stranger’s word which appears to be truthful; for example, a social 
engineer acting as a credible Gmail technician wanting to assist an end-user with privacy 
settings. In the message, the social engineer, impersonating the technician, would communicate 
that they require information from the end user. The user, appreciative of the assistance, 
complies willingly. As part of complying, the user gives the social engineer the necessary 
personal information that leads to a data breach. It is unfortunate that most attacks succeed due 
to the difficulty in easily identifying a non-credible source (Sattarova Feruza & Kim, 2007). 
Thus, by fostering feelings of gratitude, the social engineer takes advantage of the natural 
human tendency to trust. The response by Workman (2008) is a compliance mechanism that 
changes behaviour when a direct request is prompted, Hinson (2008). Also, as described by 
Luo, Brody, Seazzu, and Burd (2011) social engineers are compliance practitioners who lure 
 
20 
 
individuals to respond to their requests, namely, social proof, scarcity, and reciprocation. Social 
proof assists social engineers because individuals tend to adhere to the given instructions based 
on similarity and uncertainty. Scarcity encourages individuals to react to social engineers’ 
messages because they think that the prize is a valuable commodity. Reciprocation allows 
social engineers to manipulate individuals by making them feel appreciated, and the individual 
feels obliged to the social engineer and complies due to this feeling of obligation.  
 
Furthermore, Tetri and Vuorinen (2013) identified that once a social engineer gains a user’s 
trust, it becomes easy to obtain all the required information. Impersonation therefore plays a 
huge role in gaining the victim’s trust. Social engineers use impersonation to act as the victim’s 
friend, a technician requiring credentials to fix a technical error, or a person of authority (Van 
Rensburg, 2017). Thereafter, the social engineer exploits the trusting relationship. However, 
the authority technique has been found to be the least effective impersonation technique used 
to gain a user’s trust (Butavicius et al., 2016). Users are exploited due to innocently mistaking 
the credibility of a source that is unreliable, without any concrete verification (Algarni, Xu, & 
Chan, 2015). Also, they tend to use their intuition when validating a source’s reliability. If the 
user has a positive instinct about the source, they perceive no threat in responding (Rebovich 
et al., 2015). This is thought to be the reason behind attackers’ use of names or organisations 
that seem familiar, yet are bogus (Greitzer et al., 2014). In that way, victims are easily deceived 
into thinking that the source is credible. In an effort to prevent naive individuals from being 
victims to online attacks, educational awareness programmes are proposed (Derksen & 
Hilbrink, 2012). The programmes are to be guided by information security studies in relation 
to the prevalent online social engineering attacks, and are regarded as a platform to create 
awareness in individuals, with the objective of decreasing the number of successful attacks as 
individuals become more aware of the precautions that can be taken. It is also fundamental to 
understand the level of trust that causes individuals to comply so that personalised remediation 
methods can be implemented. 
 
2.3 Information security principles 
Information security entails keeping sensitive information confidential. The definition relates 
to any type of private or personal information that is considered sensitive to an individual or 
organisation (Da Silva, Da Silva, Melo, Rodrigues, Lucien, De Melo, Colares, & Garcia, 2014). 
In information security studies, privacy and data theft have been identified as the major 
concerns (Petkovic & Jonker, 2007; Vieraitis et al., 2015). This is due to the digital forms of 
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technology which make information accessible through various devices. The ability to access 
sensitive information over multiple devices makes protecting information challenging since 
attackers have various attacking options. For instance, attackers can access individuals’ 
banking details either through a mobile banking application or on the bank’s online banking 
site. This results in more vulnerabilities and information security controls that organisations 
need to put in place.  
 
It is indisputable that there is an existing connection between cybersecurity and information 
security (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). In most instances, individuals often misinterpret 
the two terms as having the same meaning. The difference is that cybersecurity is similar to an 
online battlefield, where the users have to be alert and ahead of the attacker in order not to fall 
for online attacks (Oltramari, Henshel, Cains, & Hoffman, 2015). Also, cybersecurity protects 
mainly technologies, policies, and protocols, which are formed to protect computer networks 
(Cavelty, 2014). On the other hand, information security relates to the controls that can be used 
to safeguard private information that can be found once an attacker enters the network. The 
information could be found either on online sites, or outside the internet. As long as this 
information is sensitive it requires information security to keep it safe. Moreover, information 
security entails that sensitive information is accessed only by authorised and authentic users.  
 
Nowadays, online services and social platforms, such as Instagram and Facebook, are used by 
individuals daily. The constant use of such social platforms means that there is a higher chance 
that an individual’s privacy will be violated (Wüest, 2010). This is because attackers target 
social networks, mainly to discover individuals’ online behavioural patterns (Hung, Shih, 
Shieh, Lee, & Huang, 2012). Sharma (2012) also affirmed that social networking sites are the 
main grounds for attackers stealing PII. Social networks also assist the attacker with 
information regarding the suitable time to steal a user’s information. This is because of the 
individuals’ constant exposure of their daily activities, which informs the attackers of times 
these individuals are most vulnerable. Social engineers make use of public information, such 
as regular check-ins on social networks, to discover the patterns and a suitable time to attack 
(Reyns & Henson, 2016). They also take time to build a user’s profile in order to get an in-
depth understanding of the individual, and to access sensitive information without the user 
noticing. Considering the size of the internet, attackers’ chances of accessing the individual’s 
information is increased (Panchenko, Lanze, Pennekamp, Engel, Zinnen, Henze, & Wehrle, 
2016). Thus, measures to protect individuals’ information become crucial due to the sensitivity 
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of their PII. It also appears that attackers will continue stealing individuals’ information, since 
individuals are unaware that certain behaviours on social networks create vulnerabilities which 
put them at risk. 
 
In the context of information security, online privacy of personal information becomes a 
complex issue. Privacy is described as the level of control individuals have over the disclosure 
of online personal information, as part of their PII (Alexander, 2007). Privacy consists of the 
ability to be able to socialise on social platforms anonymously, using fictitious names (Such & 
Criado, 2018). In order to combat privacy challenges, social network providers introduced 
visibility restriction options to only friends, or friends within the circle of friends (Raber, 
Kosmalla, & Krueger, 2017). The restrictions allow for PII to be confined to people inside the 
subset group (Sinha, Li, & Bauer, 2013). For instance, Facebook has restriction settings of who 
may see your profile, pictures or any other biographical information. Despite the introduction 
of privacy restrictions, young South African adults still do not know that such measures exist 
(Nyoni & Velempini, 2018). Young adults consider the process of setting the privacy settings 
manually exhausting, and complex if the structure of the settings is adjusted regularly (Watson, 
2015). As a result, users unintentionally share information, which exposes their personal 
information to a broader audience. It was also found that experienced social network users 
disclose more PII because their privacy settings are restricted to a selected audience. Further 
information security research has found that there exists a gender difference in privacy settings 
(Archer, Wood, Nosko, De Pasquale, Molema, & Christofides, 2015). Young female adults 
have demonstrated more use of privacy settings than their male counterparts. 
 
The responsibility for online privacy is highly dependent on both information technology (IT) 
and on physical security (Mann, 2017). IT security dependency relates to measures such as 
firewalls and secure passwords; whereas physical security incorporates security measures such 
as computer cable locks and manual access controls. Mann (2017) further argued that, for both 
IT and physical security, human security is considered the missing link in security control 
measures. It is perceived that information security requires an extensive approach, beyond IT 
and physical security, in order to combat online social engineering attacks (Sharma, 2012). 
This is because both technical and physical security alone cannot prevent the prevalent online 
attacks. In addition, it is fundamental to investigate the defense measures put in place for online 
attacks since social engineering techniques bypass all physical and technical security measures. 
The methods used by the attackers target the human element and humans have repeatedly been 
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the reason for the success of the attacks. Although humans implement security controls, they 
are unaware that social engineering can bypass their IT and physical controls. 
 
The rationale behind information security on online sites is adherence to the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability (CIA) triad. The CIA triad is considered an accountable environment 
that protects users’ PII. As depicted in Figure 2.2 below, an environment that is secure consists 
of the fundamental information security pillars. The CIA triad serves as a basis for the 
necessary security measure to protect information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1: CIA Triad (Mohanty, Ganguly, & Pattnaik, 2018) 
 
The key elements that govern information security are in the CIA triad, which consists of the 
following elements: 
2.3.1 Confidentiality 
Peltier (2010) defined confidentiality as the assurance that information will not be revealed to 
individuals who do not have the appropriate privileges. Generally, confidentiality is a concept 
that is regularly misunderstood for privacy and often used interchangeably (Corey, 2019). The 
underlying principal of distinguishing confidentiality and privacy is that confidentiality ensures 
that privacy of information is upheld. Confidentiality further ensures that an individual’s 
personal information is inaccessible to a third party who has no authorisation. Similarly, 
Andress (2014) defined confidentiality as a component of privacy which refers to the capability 
of protecting sensitive information. However, social engineering is considered a threat to 
confidentiality due to its ability to breach the confidentiality principle (Sattarova Feruza & 
Kim, 2007). By incorporating skilled attackers and modern social engineering techniques, 
social engineers effortlessly obtain sensitive information without authorisation. 
 
Secured Information 
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Confidentiality, as a component of information security, can be implemented at multiple levels 
of a security process (Corey, 2019). For example, a student’s password, used to log into his 
student portal, to view his marks, would be kept confidential by the student. On the other hand, 
the student’s authorised lecturer has access to the student’s marks and the student’s biographic 
information. The lecturer, being authorised, would also maintain the level of confidentiality by 
not exposing the student’s name on the results notice board. Instead, the lecturer would display 
the marks and use the student’s number, a personal identifier, to uphold the level of privacy 
through confidentiality. Yet, the level of confidentiality may be compromised by a malicious 
user who could gain unauthorised access to the school’s system. 
 
2.3.2 Integrity  
Hussein, Khalid, and Khanfar (2016) defined integrity as the practice of safeguarding 
information to restrict deletion, modification, or fabrication by unauthorised individuals. 
Integrity is essentially the assurance that any information stored will not be changed 
maliciously or destroyed unintentionally (Peltier, 2010). Upholding the integrity principle 
implies that the information stored is consistent and accurate. In the context of social 
engineering, integrity is violated when attackers infect an individual’s system with a virus 
which is usually malware (Sattarova, Feruza & Kim, 2007). Malware is often used by attackers 
to breach the integrity pillar of the CIA triad. To prevent integrity breaches, online sites use 
authorisation to determine the authenticity of the users. The authentication uses measures such 
as a combination of a user’s username and password. This has led to authorisation procedures 
becoming vital in enforcing data integrity, since social engineers are capable of using false 
identities (Whitman & Mattord, 2014). Moreover, to ensure a high level of integrity, some 
social networks ensure an end-to-end encryption. Encryption is used to ensure that the 
messages have not been intercepted by man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks (Greenberg, 2015). 
An example of a social network platform that uses end-to-end encryption is WhatsApp. The 
objective of using this practice is to eliminate intruders, such as social engineers, from gaining 
information that is sent through messages between the parties involved. 
 
2.3.3 Availability 
According to Mohanty et al. (2018), availability entails the assurance that information is 
suitable for access whenever the authorised individual requests it. Accordingly, the information 
should be accessible only to the authorised parties. Similarly, Hussein et al. (2016) stated that, 
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in their view, information has value to users when it is accessible at the desired time. Over 
time, the concept has changed, since social engineers see value in sensitive information that 
they can access. Generally, social engineers use the accessed information to achieve financial 
gains through ransomware. In recent times, individuals often use the cloud storage applications 
as a form of backup of their information. For example, Google Drive allows individuals to store 
any form of information and the individual uses precise credentials to access the information. 
In cases where social engineers hack the Google Drive storage, they would then insist that the 
user pays a certain amount, or else they would expose the information. In that way, the 
availability principle is breached by the social engineers’ ability to gain an individual’s 
information. To uphold the availability principle, online storage platforms have implemented 
authentication, which is aimed at ensuring that the individual is verified prior to obtaining any 
sensitive information. 
 
2.4 Gender 
Traditionally, as discussed by Joffe (1985), gender was classified as a socio-cultural structure, 
wherein both males and females have distinctive duties to carry out, enforced by the patriarchal 
system. In an opposing view, Tickner (1992) defined gender as the non-biological features of 
both males and females. Gender is regarded as the differences that occur in behaviour, attitude, 
and perception, between males and females. The gender difference continues to exist, and 
literature has shown that behavioural differences between genders are apparent when it comes 
to internet use (Dufour, Brunelle, Tremblay, Leclerc, Cousineau, Khazaal, Légaré, Rousseau, 
& Berbiche, 2016). During the early stages of the internet, the web was dominated by male 
users. Over the years, the rapid growth and development of the internet has led to an increase 
in the number of personal daily activities that have shifted online (Ritter, 2015). The growth of 
the internet has led to an increase in the number of female users, compared to male users (Bae 
& Lee, 2011). Furthermore, the growth of the internet has permitted both genders to use the 
online platforms for business, socialising and communication. Thus, more distinct gendered 
behavioural patterns become evident. Scott (2017) stated that online platforms have permitted 
individuals to share online information freely, such as their personal information, views and 
experiences, within their online communities. Although the internet has brought about changes 
in the ways that individuals interact, it is unfortunate that not much research has been carried 
out on gendered differences in the information security sector. Recent studies have shown that 
gender has not been a factor that has been tested in the information security discipline (Trauth, 
2013). 
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Females, as compared to their male counterparts, have little or no influence when using the 
dominant forms of communication such as Facebook and Twitter (Carli, 2001). Males are 
regarded as more influential, yet are less dominant on online platforms that have predominantly 
female users (Maceli, Baack, & Wachter, 2015). Despite males and females having different 
motives for online use, male online dominance is endorsed by statistics that reveal that males 
form the majority of the world’s population (Countrymeters, 2017). This also means that a 
higher percentage of males use the internet. Generally, a male’s identity is highly influenced 
by cultural influences and identifiers such as family, race and sexual orientation (Fang, Wen, 
George, & Prybutok, 2016). In the South African context, males come from socially structured 
environments where they are taught dominance, control and power, as preconditions to gaining 
respect (Mashiya, Kok, Luthuli, Xulu, & Mtshali, 2015). To neutralise the hierarchical gender 
differences, the South African government has established numerous policies to ensure that 
gender equality exists (Joseph, 2011). 
 
In terms of online information disclosure, such as contact numbers and addresses, studies have 
shown that such information is disclosed mainly by males (Hajli & Lin, 2014). However, 
females post the most on social platforms and are more likely to comment and like other 
individuals’ posts. In addition, females have the highest percentage of online risk and privacy 
concerns. This is due to females posting personal information, and attackers see this as an 
opportunity to use to gain trust (Hoy & Milne, 2010). The major areas of online concern 
reported by both genders are receiving an email from an unknown source, and being alerted 
that personal information is being used by a third party (Butavicius et al., 2016). Thus, 
individuals continually read unsolicited emails and register for websites that require their 
personal information. Individuals of both genders assist the attackers unknowingly, due to a 
lack of social engineering awareness. 
 
Society expects females to take on different roles to males. Females, from a young age, are 
expected to take on roles that are more nurturing, less technical, and domestic in nature; 
whereas, males are traditionally expected to take on duties and occupations that allow them to 
behave in a bold manner (Carli, 2001). It is also commonly known, and acceptable, that males 
portray more direct forms of aggression than do females. This is realised when traditional types 
of violence manifest on the internet as forms of cyber-bullying. In a study conducted by Heiman 
and Olenik-Shemesh (2015), it was noted that females had a higher rate of victimisation; 
 
27 
 
whereas social engineering and other forms of cybercrime are more commonly committed by 
males. This is because perceptions of societal masculinity are transferred onto the online 
domain. The relationship between social engineering and gender follows the nature of societal 
upbringing. As a result, societal teachings based on gender roles transfer onto the online world. 
However, there is a gap in the literature showing the gender differences that exist in online 
social engineering (Algarni et al., 2014; Slonka, 2014). 
 
The gullibility theory explains the willingness to trust someone, even without reasonable proof 
(Bullée et al., 2015). The optimistic bias theory explains that individuals believe that they have 
higher chances of positive events than negative ones. Both the above-mentioned theories imply 
that individuals believe that they are unlikely to become victims to social engineering attacks. 
Šincek (2014) in his study showed that males have the highest rating for becoming social 
engineers, whilst females have a higher chance of falling victim to social engineering attacks. 
It is thought that females fall prey the most because of their online behaviour patterns (Grabner-
Kräuter & Bitter, 2015; Hinson, 2008), which are easily obtained due to their active 
engagement with social platforms and by being active online shoppers. Therefore, female 
behaviour patterns become easily predictable for social engineers, which aids the social 
engineer in creating an entry point that would entice the targeted individual (Bae & Lee, 2011). 
In a similar study, it was evident that young female adults make no effort to familiarise 
themselves thoroughly with the internet and are therefore unfamiliar with many online 
websites. This in turn leads to carelessness in their online usage, which leads to vulnerabilities 
that work in favour of the social engineers (Fathollahi-Fard, Hajiaghaei-Keshteli, & Tavakkoli-
Moghaddam, 2018). 
 
It is therefore imperative to understand gendered online behaviour regarding online information 
security (Lewis, 2015). Gaining an understanding may assist in developing measures that 
educate both gender groups about prevalent online social engineering threats and risks. The 
different online environments, such as Twitter and gaming sites, portray distinctly different 
gender behaviour, and an understanding of these gender differences can be drawn from 
different online platforms (Helsper, 2010). Also, the difference in technology exposure that 
exists between males and females plays a vital role in online behavioural patterns. Males are 
more frequently introduced to various technological gadgets and internet usage, compared to 
females, despite the equal level of internet accessibility. Learned behaviours become the 
motive behind the difference in gender roles across the internet (Norona, Preddy, & Welsh, 
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2015). Gender is therefore socially constructed over time and leads to the identifiable 
behavioural patterns that bring about differences between male and female behaviours.  
 
2.5 Online social engineering is human-dependent 
Internet users are considered the weakest link in information security because of the amount of 
personal information they expose. The information is useful to social engineers since they 
target the weakest link in any security chain (Mann, 2017). The issue of social engineering is 
manifold, and the human element is the major factor in social engineering, due to the diverse 
techniques that social engineers presently use (Kritzinger, 2006). The common issue that 
individuals face is the lack of social engineering awareness because not much research has 
been conducted to understand the human element in social engineering attacks (Noureddine et 
al., 2015). This, in turn, leads to minimal knowledge about gender-specific ways that can help 
combat the human element in social engineering attacks. There is also no framework that 
distinctly identifies and improves social engineering challenges relating to the human 
component (Abeywardana, Pfluegel, & Tunnicliffe, 2016). Therefore, humans’ lack of 
awareness is displayed across the different attacking methods used by social engineers. Lack 
of awareness results in opening an email attachment that contains malware, without having the 
necessary knowledge to recognise the false message. Subsequently, lack of social engineering 
awareness leads to an individual becoming a social engineering victim.  
 
Humans, irrespective of gender, experience various external influences when growing up 
(Bornstein, 1991). As males and females mature, they are continuously influenced and taught 
how to socialise and behave within their societies. These variations are seen on social networks 
where each culture displays different behaviour. Freeman (2007) argued that children develop 
an understanding of their gender at a young age, further ascertaining that children act according 
to their gender, based on their upbringing. A child’s cognitive development depends on the 
parent’s elementary child-rearing principles (Ford, Massey, & Hyde, 1985). As a result, a 
child’s parental teachings reach beyond the household into all aspects of the outside world, 
such the online world. Individuals do not have the same cultural beliefs, and each generation 
of young adults experiences different cultural events. These different encounters trigger 
dissimilar behaviours and actions when faced with online social engineering attacks (Twenge, 
1997). Therefore, social engineers may choose to use various techniques to lure the target, 
based on the target’s culture (Algarni et al., 2014). 
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According to Parbanath (2011), in order for attackers to conduct a social engineering attack, 
they require the individual’s personally identifiable information. In most instances, individuals 
provide their personal information to a social engineer through being deceived. In the South 
African context, young adults have the highest percentage of internet usage, which implies that 
young adults have a higher risk of falling victim to online social engineering attacks (Lenhart, 
Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr, 2010; Hasim & Salman, 2010).  
 
2.6 Young adults  
According to  Hasim and Salman (2010), the youth are the leaders of the future and therefore 
need to master the existing and innovative technology. Nowadays, young adults are constantly 
using the internet for various forms of activities such as communication, online transactions 
and educational programmes. The use of the internet by young adult students grows continually 
as it provides different learning platforms. Furthermore, it has been noted that students are the 
societal group with the highest percentage of internet usage (Zhang et al., 2017). However, 
according to Lenhart et al. (2010), students’ online behavioural patterns are much like those of 
teenagers. 
 
A study conducted by Charles (2017) showed that online social engineering is a rising concern, 
since young adults are falling victim through being misled on the internet by social engineers. 
Further observations from the study showed that attackers tend to target a specific group of 
individuals, mainly young adult females. Social engineers target females, mainly because 
females are known to have considerably more vulnerable traits and are also careless on the 
internet. According to Tsarwe (2016), females are emotionally open on social network 
platforms and on other internet sites. Therefore, the expressed emotions become publicly 
accessible, allowing for attackers to identify the vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it has been 
reported that the impact of the internet on young adult students is more negative than positive 
(Thabethe, 2016). The negative impact is caused by malicious users, regardless of students’ 
wise use of the internet (Galloway, 2013). Previous literature has shown that young adult 
students use the internet for their personal sense of fulfilment, such as conducting online 
purchases and communicating on social networks. 
 
In South Africa, according to the Internet World Stats (IWS), 52% of the country’s population 
are internet users, as recorded in June 2016 (InternetWorldStats, 2016). In another recent 
article, it was reported that, for the first time, South Africa has reached over 20 million internet 
 
30 
 
users (TimesLive, 2017). Table 1.1, below, shows the South African internet users ranked by 
gender and age. The table shows how the young adult age group (between the ages of 18 and 
35 years) comprises the highest percentage of internet users. The table further shows how 
young female adults have a higher internet usage, compared to their male counterparts. In a 
study conducted by Perrin (2015), it was evident that females have a slightly higher internet 
usage than their male counterparts. However, in recent years, both genders have had a 
comparable rate of internet usage. Social networks are ranked as one of the highest sites for SE 
attacks (Wüest, 2010), and young adults who are responsive to the attacker’s messages, fall 
victim. This is due to the social engineer’s impersonation of a credible source whom the 
targeted potential victim knows very well, such as a friend or a relative (Algarni et al., 2014). 
 
Table 1.1: South African Internet Users (MyBroadband, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nowadays, social networking sites have become virtual communities for most young adults 
and the correlation between age, online social networks, and transactional platforms is strong 
(Perrin, 2015). It is also evident that young adults who have a form of tertiary education have 
South African internet users 
Gender Percentage 
Female 50.82% 
Male 49.18% 
Age Percentage 
Under 15 0.12% 
15 – 17 3.22% 
18 – 19 6.57% 
20 – 24 15.57% 
25 – 29 15.70% 
30 – 34 13.39% 
35 – 39 10.57% 
40 – 44 9.36% 
45 – 49 7.83% 
50 – 54 6.88% 
55 – 59 5.37% 
Over 60 5.42% 
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the most exposure to the internet. Statistics revealed that the age group that is most likely to 
use online platforms are young adults aged between 17 and 30 years. Due to the internet’s size, 
young adults’ online communication becomes risky since it is possible that they do not know 
with whom they are communicating (Charles, 2017). This is considered to be one of the reasons 
why social engineers are successful in winning young adults’ trust over the internet, as well as 
the indirect communication that does not allow the young adult to verify the validity of the 
social engineer. Therefore, it becomes difficult to identify social engineers from genuine users. 
As technology evolves, cracking or hacking into young adults’ systems is no longer the 
technique used since it is outdated and requires the social engineer to have physical access to 
the young adult’s device. The current social engineers use young adult students as an 
instrument to disclose their own personal information through manipulating and misleading 
the young adult. 
 
Increased internet usage amongst the youth raises other issues such as disclosure of confidential 
information and lack of privacy awareness (Salehi, Khalili, Hojjat, Salehi, & Danesh, 2014). 
Drawing attention to the darker side of internet usage, Vanderhoven, Schellens, Valcke, and 
Raes (2014) assert that the increasing rate of internet usage amongst students perpetuates the 
information security issues. An example given by Wallace (2014) was that of a young couple 
in Korea who was determined to raise an online virtual daughter and ended up neglecting their 
biological daughter.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the basis of social engineering and the literature review showed how 
social engineering can be associated with numerous risks for individuals. This is due to the 
nature of social engineering threats that are growing on a global scale. Irrespective of gender, 
an individual’s equal chance of being a victim puts his sensitive information at risk. Also, the 
way in which individuals, especially young adult students, have become heavily reliant on the 
internet increases the number of vulnerabilities that attackers exploit. Individuals are the 
weakest link in the information security chain, and social engineering capitalises on this 
information security gap. The current level of skills that social engineers have makes it difficult 
for both males and females to detect and defend themselves from online attacks. Therefore, 
information security in relation to social engineering needs to be encouraged, by educating 
individuals about ways in which they can protect themselves from the growing social 
engineering attacks. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review laid a foundation for understanding social engineering and how it 
breaches information security, as well as the threats that it poses to individuals. Further, the 
chapter outlined the overall importance of educating individuals about social engineering. The 
importance of awareness is motivated by the rate at which social engineering attacks are 
developing. Accordingly, the main objective is to explore the level of knowledge young adult 
students have of social engineering, and to also determine the type of social engineering attacks 
young adults encounter. Therefore, online behaviour and attitude of young adults were 
investigated. Remenyi and Money (2012) defined research methodology as the heart of any 
research since it consists of techniques that are applied to investigate the phenomenon at hand. 
Therefore, in this chapter, the researcher elaborates on the research techniques and methods 
that form a basis for this study. 
 
3.2 Research Objectives 
In Chapter 1 the research questions were outlined. The following are the research objectives 
resulting from the research questions:  
1. To determine whether there is a gender difference in the response of tertiary students 
to online social engineering; 
2. To identify students’ knowledge about online social engineering from a gender 
perspective; 
3. To determine if there is a gender difference regarding online information security 
among young adult students. 
 
3.3 Research design 
3.3.1 Research Structure 
The primary research question for this study is; “To what extent is there a gender-dependent 
response to online social engineering (OSE) attacks amongst young South African adults?” 
As stated by Kothari (2017), the research design explains what the study entails, the unit of 
analysis, the data collection method and the type of results the study seeks to achieve. This in 
turn allows the researcher to respond to the main research question. Also, to further provide an 
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analysis that meets the objectives of the study, the researcher implemented the following 
phases:  
1. Research method: qualitative research design 
2. Sampling plan 
3. Data collection 
a. Questionnaire design 
b. Distribution of questionnaire 
c. Capturing data 
4. Data analysis 
a. Data processing 
b. Analysis 
c. Interpretation 
d. Reporting 
3.3.2 Nature of the study 
Research design has several different forms, namely exploratory, explanatory or descriptive. 
Marshall and Rossman (2014) described the three type of studies: 
• Exploratory research is usually conducted when not much is known about the 
phenomenon. The researcher conducts this type of study when there is no knowledge 
available on the research problem and no related studies that indicate ways in which a 
similar phenomenon has been addressed. 
• Explanatory research is mainly used to identify any form of causal relationships between 
factors that relate to the research phenomena. This type of study is also referred to as an 
analytical study which has a structured nature.  
• Descriptive research is aimed at providing an exact reflection of the variables that are 
related to the research question. Also, this research type is more structured than the 
exploratory study.  
The nature of this study is exploratory because not much is known about the research 
phenomenon. As stated by Bhattacherjee (2012), exploratory research is most effective when 
exploring causes and outcomes. In this study, the researcher’s objective is to explore the gender 
differences in online social engineering attacks amongst young adults. Therefore, the study is 
aimed at investigating the motives that cause both genders to comply with social engineers’ 
 
34 
 
instructions; as well as the types of social engineering to which both genders are susceptible. 
Hence, an exploratory design was chosen.  
 
3.3.3 Exploratory research design 
There are four types of exploratory research design (Bhattacherjee, 2012): 
• Survey research design 
• Secondary data research design 
• Case study design 
• Interview research design 
A survey research design is used to allow a researcher to gain information from participants. 
The information that is gained usually relates to the perception, behaviour and attitude of the 
participants (Beam, 2017). Also, surveys are designed to define the frequency of occurrences 
across a population (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). Therefore, for this study, the researcher 
adopted the survey design as it was the most suitable.  
 
3.3.3.1. Data collection instruments for survey designs 
i.) Interviews: Interviews are constructed in two different ways, using structured and 
semi-structured interview techniques (Bradburn, Sudman, & Wansink, 2004). 
Structured interviews consist of the interviewer only asking a set of questions Semi-
structured interviews also consist of a set of questions. However, they allow the 
interviewer to probe the participant’s perspective to gain an in-depth understanding of 
the participant’s reasoning.  
 
ii.) Questionnaires: According to Dörnyei and Taguchi (2009), questionnaires are the 
most commonly used data collection instrument for statistical studies. Bhattacherjee 
(2012) specified that a questionnaire is a standardised research tool that was invented 
to gather responses from participants, either in a structured or unstructured manner. 
Structured questions, which are also referred to as closed-ended questions, are 
challenging to construct yet easier to analyse, with less code contradiction (Bradburn 
et al., 2004). Whereas, open-ended questions, unstructured questions, are used for 
developmental studies which explore the phenomenon in detail. Furthermore, 
unstructured questions allow participants to state their opinions, attitude and beliefs.  
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Questionnaires also come in different forms such, as interview schedules and self-administered 
documents (Dörnyei & Taguchi, 2009). Interview schedules are conducted through using fixed 
questions that are posed to a participant and the interviewer marks or records the participants’ 
responses on the answer sheet. On the other hand, self-administered questionnaires are 
manually distributed or posted to participants’ mailboxes, or via electronic mail. However, the 
disadvantage of posted questionnaires is the low response rate and participants are unable to 
be guided through the questions if they seek clarity (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). 
 
For this study, questionnaires were adopted as the data collection instrument. Manual, self-
administered, questionnaires were considered the most appropriate for this type of study, 
primarily driven by the data which was collected across different locations. The electronic 
method of distributing questionnaires was not considered, due to the disadvantage of low 
response rates. Thus, questionnaires were distributed by hand to the participants which allowed 
participants to ask if they required any clarity. 
  
3.3.4 Questionnaire design 
Kothari (2017), stressed that for a quantitative study, a questionnaire is an important part of the 
study. Therefore, it is essential that questionnaires are carefully constructed. The questionnaire 
for this study was adapted from similar studies previously conducted on online attacks. Thus, 
questions were adjusted to suit the context of this study. The structure of the questionnaire was 
designed into sections as follows: 
 
Section A: Demographic information 
This section presented questions relating to the participants’ gender, age, race, institution, and 
faculty. Gender was the main factor that would reveal the gendered differences in the analysis 
phase. 
 
Section B: Awareness  
This section consisted of questions that required the respondents to identify and match the 
question with the provided options. This was aimed at identifying the knowledge of the 
respondents about the different types of social engineering attacks. Also, the awareness section 
consisted of questions that asked respondents to match their understanding of preventative 
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measures which they considered appropriate. The aim was to understand if participants were 
aware of measures that could help secure their online information.  
 
Section C: Adequate responses 
The objective of this section was to obtain information about respondents’ conduct regarding 
online messages and attachments that they receive via email, links, online pop-ups, or from 
social network sites. Further, the section was aimed at understanding gender responses to 
messages that seem malicious; and additionally, to determine whether there are gender 
differences in responding to security alerts and emails from known sources, as compared to 
unknown sources.   
 
Section D: Attitudes  
This section was in a form of a Likert scale, questioning individuals about their security beliefs 
and concerns about online security controls and responses. 
 
Section E: Behaviour 
This section posed various questions to get information about the respondents’ online 
behaviour, with respect to passwords. The objective was to understand if respondents’ were 
careless, leading to vulnerabilities which are later exploited. The questions explored privacy 
on social sites, password sharing and the extent of personally identifiable information (PII) 
shared online. 
 
3.4 Research approaches 
Research approaches are categorised into two methods (Bhattacherjee, 2012) which are as 
follows:  
3.4.1 Qualitative 
Moore (2016) stressed that qualitative studies consist of how, what and why questions that 
require data to be collected using qualitative methods. This method of data collection consists 
of interviews or open-ended responses from a questionnaire, conducted in an interview format. 
According to Yilmaz (2013), qualitative information is collected using observation, document 
analysis, focus groups, and in-depth interviews.  
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3.4.2 Quantitative 
A quantitative study has the objective of investigating the variance between the how and why 
of the phenomenon (Kefalas, 2017). Further, quantitative studies use statistical analysis which 
provides numeric findings. The findings describe relationships between constructs found in the 
adopted theory. Moreover, quantitative studies also test the hypothesis by collecting 
quantifiable data, whereby the hypothesis states the nature of the relationship (Moore, 2016).  
 
This study adopted the quantitative research approach so that the formulated hypotheses could 
be tested accordingly. The quantitative approach was also used because it provided statistical 
results on the gender differences, based on the research phenomena. The questionnaire also 
consisted of structured questions; hence, the numeric findings were objective.  
 
3.5 Sampling 
3.5.1 Sample design  
A sampling process consists of three phases (Kothari, 2017) which are as follows: 
1. Defining the population: This is a selection of the group of individuals a researcher has 
identified to study.  
2. Sampling frame: A list of the population is provided to a researcher where the sampling 
frame can be deduced. 
3. Sample selection: A definite selection of the sample, based on the sampling technique 
adopted, is selected from the sampling frame. 
3.5.2 Sample size 
The sample size was selected, based on the table presented by Krejcie and Morgan (1970). The 
table shows that for a target population between 27000 and 30000, the sample size must be 
379. Therefore, 379 students were selected. Based on the odd number, 190 questionnaires were 
distributed to female students. The remaining 189 questionnaires were handed out to male 
students. Studies have revealed that there are more females than males in SA universities 
(Moosa, 2017). Therefore, the researcher opted to administer the extra questionnaire to a 
female student. 
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3.5.3 Sampling techniques 
According to Flick (2015), sampling methods in quantitative research can be grouped as 
follows: 
• non-random/ non-probability sampling designs and 
• random/ probability sampling designs  
In a non-probability sampling technique, some units in the sample have no chance of being 
selected (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Each unit is selected via non-random conditions. The following 
non-probability sampling techniques were identified (Creswell, 2002): 
 
i. Quota sampling 
Researchers consider this sampling technique if there is ease of access to the sample 
population (Mackey & Gass, 2015). Primarily, the sample is selected based on a location 
convenient to the researcher. Also, if the researcher comes across an individual that meets 
the criteria of being a participant, the researcher asks the individual to participate in the 
study. This type of technique is the least expensive method of selecting a sample and not 
much sampling information is needed. Information such as total number of units, location 
and sampling frame is not required. However, the disadvantage is the resulting sampling 
not being a probability of one.  
 
ii. Convenience sampling 
This sampling technique relies on the convenience of accessing the sampling population. 
The population does not share the same characteristics. Also, data collection is stopped 
when the desired number of respondents in the sample is met (Mackey & Gass, 2015). 
 
iii. Expert sampling 
In this sampling technique, participants are non-randomly selected. Participants are 
selected based on their knowledge of the research problem being studied. This approach 
has credible opinions because the sample experts are familiar with the subject matter 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012).  
In a random sampling technique, Bilau, Witt, and Lill (2018) stressed the importance of 
an equal chance of selection for each unit. This implies that the probability of selection is 
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independent and not influenced by bias preferences. The identified probability sampling 
techniques in quantitative research are as follows:  
i. Simple random sampling 
This type of technique is commonly used since it is the simplest of all the methods of 
probability sampling and is suitable for smaller populations. Simplicity is the advantage 
of this technique because the sampling frame is not subdivided, and the findings are 
generalised.  
 
ii. Stratified random sampling 
The stratified technique allows the researcher to divide the sampling frame into different 
groups (Bhattacherjee, 2012). The groups are created through categorising common 
characteristics, such as male and female.  
 
iii. Cluster sampling 
Cluster sampling is based on dividing the sampling population into groups, in instances of 
large population sizes. The groups are called clusters and can be formed based on common 
characteristics or geographic locations. The challenge with this sampling frame is 
identifying each sampling unit within the population (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
 
This study applied the probability sampling technique using the stratified sampling method. 
The subset of the target population was ranked according to gender: male and female and 150 
questionnaires were distributed to the FET college and 229 at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg (UKZN-PMB). The intention was for a 50% distribution to male students and 
the other 50% to female students. However, due to the predominance of female students in 
academic institutions, more female students were present (Moosa, 2017). Therefore, more 
female than male students completed the questionnaires.  
 
3.6 Study site 
The study site is South Africa; and within South Africa, the KwaZulu-Natal province was the 
site of the research. This study was conducted in the capital city of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg, due to the ease of data collection for the researcher. 
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3.7 Target population 
For this study, the target population consisted of young adults in South Africa. The sampling 
frame was young adult students from Pietermaritzburg. The sample was taken from 
Umgungundlovu FET College and UKZN-PMB campus. The population size is approximately 
27000 students and the target population was further divided into two groups, or subsets, 
classified according to gender.  
 
3.8 Data analysis 
Descriptive and inferential analyses are statistical methods of analysing numeric data (Neuman, 
2013). According to Bhattacherjee (2012), descriptive statistics describe the population and 
inferential statistics make a generalisation about the population. In this study, the collected data 
was interpreted into meaningful numeric variables. Thereafter, it was captured into the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for analysis. SPSS is a software package that 
allowed the data to be analysed effortlessly (Hinton, McMurray, & Brownlow, 2014). This 
study used both inferential and descriptive analyses. Descriptive analysis was used for the 
graphical interpretation to summarise the data. Inferential analysis was used to make logical 
meaning of the findings by simplifying and interpreting the data in a general manner. 
3.8.1 Reliability and validity 
In order for a study to be valid and reliable, it must implement a data collection instrument that 
will accurately measure the research questions and hypotheses (Neuman, 2013). Reliability 
consists of accuracy and consistency of the measurement tool in measuring the study’s 
phenomenon. Validity highlights the credibility of the researcher’s conclusions (Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2016). The reliability of this study was verified accordingly, using the Cronbach 
Alpha. Validity was ensured by submitting the questionnaire to the researcher’s supervisor for 
input and corrections. Thereafter, the questionnaire was sent to UKZN’s research office for 
approval.  
As identified by Sekaran and Bougie (2016), the reliability tests are as follows: 
3.8.1.1 Reliability 
Stability of measurements 
• Test-retest reliability is achieved when the same measurement is tested over time on the 
same set of respondents several months later.  
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• Parallel-form reliability is defined as using different research instruments to measure the 
same set of respondents. For instance, dividing questions in a questionnaire into two sets. 
Internal consistency of measurements 
• Inter item consistency reliability is used to test the consistency of the participants’ 
responses to all the sub-topics in a construct. Independent measurements of the same 
construct will have the same correlation. 
• Split-half reliability shows the relationship consistency between a knowledge area which 
is divided into two sets.  
A quantitative study ensures validity by considering the following (Van Rensburg, 2017) :  
3.8.1.2 Validity 
• Construct validity determines the extent to which the data collection instrument connects 
to the primary research framework. This study was influenced by the two research theories 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
• Face validity is met when the measurement tool measures what it projected to measure 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). For this study, the questions found in the questionnaire intended 
to investigate the difference in the young adults’ responses to online social engineering 
attacks. The measurement of young adults’ responses is based on gender.  
• Content validity is achieved when the research instrument adequately measures the 
research concept. The questionnaire covered a wide range of areas related to online social 
engineering. 
3.9 Theoretical frameworks 
This study implemented two frameworks. The Gender and International Security Feminist 
Theory was formulated in 1988 by Sjoberg (2009). This theory was used as the lens of the 
study, for the gender context. The second theory employed was the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(TRA) developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). The TRA theory was used as the information 
security studies theory which is within the discipline of the research paper. There are no 
theoretical frameworks in information security studies that examine the element of gender 
(Trauth, 2013). Therefore, the research had to implement the two theories to incorporate the 
gender aspect of the research project.  
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3.9.1 The Gender and International Security Feminist framework 
The Gender and International Security Feminist framework was used to understand the 
research objectives from a gendered perspective. Based on the questionnaire, this framework 
examined the participants’ responses, in relation to the TRA constructs. The two frameworks 
are used to understand the differences that exist between male and female students. Further, 
understanding the responses of both genders helps in determining the gender that falls victim 
the most due to their lack of knowledge or careless online behaviour. Further, understanding 
the gendered differences regarding social engineering will assist in developing awareness 
programmes that can be tailored to each gender group. Therefore, awareness programmes will 
be personalized, based on the findings of this research. 
3.9.2 Theory of Reasoned Action 
The TRA theory, which is an information studies theory, explains how individuals behave, 
based on their acquired knowledge of information security. The relationship of the framework’s 
constructs in relation to the research questions were as follows: 
 
Attitude 
Individuals’ attitudes to security practices are based on their learned behaviour or social 
engineering knowledge (Cooke et al., 2016). For instance, if an individual ensures that their 
privacy settings are restricted to their circle of friends, it implies that they do not want unknown 
individuals to know about their life. Such an attitude leads to them excluding certain individuals 
or even not accepting their friend invitations. In this study, this construct was used to 
understand the young adults’ attitude to the importance of online security, and to discover if 
both male and female students have concerns about online security. It is believed that their 
online attitude or concerns would influence their online behaviour.  
 
Subjective norm 
Normative beliefs are external factors that influence an individual to behave in a certain manner 
(Cooke et al., 2016). For this study, the subjective norm was used to pose behavioural questions 
based on different situations. In the questionnaire, young adult students were asked whether 
they would give their details to an unknown person. Also, in another question they were asked 
if they would give out their personal details to an unknown person in order to win a prize. This 
was to determine whether external factors, such as winning a prize, influences students’ 
behaviour.  
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Behavioural intention  
Behavioural intention is an individual’s instinctive behaviour while performing an action 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Certain questions were aligned with this construct, when asking 
both male and female students whether they would act in a certain manner, based on their 
instincts. For example, there were questions that asked if an individual would share their 
credentials with a close friend. Therefore, if certain individuals instinctively believe that there 
is no harm in doing so, they would share information such as their passwords and usernames. 
This means that they innocently expose their information to possible attackers.  
 
Behaviour 
Behaviour is considered to be the final stage of an individual’s behavioural decision-making 
process (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). In this study, this construct was aligned by asking questions 
that sought to understand both male and female students’ online behaviour. Individuals were 
asked whether they revealed their true identities on their online social network profiles. They 
were also asked how often they changed their security settings and whether they checked in on 
social network sites. The objective was to understand the way they conducted themselves on 
online and on social platforms.  
 
3.10 Ethical considerations 
 Beauchamp and Childress (2001) identified four important ethical philosophies that need to 
be considered in a research project:  
1. Autonomy: Participants have the right to participate in a study without intimidation. The 
participants also have a right to be informed what the study is about. To ensure autonomy, 
this study implemented the following steps: 
• Participants were asked of their willingness to participate in the study. 
• Willing participants were taken through an explanation of the research and further 
questions from the participants were addressed. 
• To have full assurance of the participants’ consent, the study was explained to the 
interested participants and they were asked if they were still interested in taking part 
in the study. Reassured participants were given a questionnaire that included a 
consent form which they were required to sign. Their signatures implied that they 
were agreeing to participate. Furthermore, their signatures would be affirmation that 
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they had full understanding and were willing to contribute to the research. Unwilling 
individuals were given the freedom to not participate in the study. 
• To satisfy further ethical considerations, the researcher obtained signed gatekeeper 
letters from the institutions where the data was collected.  
2. Non-maleficence: Mechanisms to prevent participants from psychological or physical 
harm were put in place. This study achieved non-maleficence by an ethical clearance 
application that was submitted to the university’s ethical clearance committee. The 
application addressed maleficence issues. 
3. Beneficence: Both the participants and society benefit from the research. One of the 
research objectives of this study is to provide platforms for awareness programmes, based 
on the findings of the research. By conducting awareness programmes, participants and 
society will have more knowledge of social engineering and will be more cautious in their 
online conduct. Participants will have less chance of being victims.  
4. Justice: This refers to fairness in the way that all participants are treated. In this study, all 
participants were treated equality. No special incentives were given to specific individuals.  
 
3.11 Summary of Chapter 3 
The chapter highlighted the following key research areas: 
1. The nature of this research was exploratory. The survey research design technique was 
adopted, and questionnaires were used as the data collection instrument. The questionnaires 
were self-administered. 
2. The questionnaires were evaluated for validity and amended prior to their administration. 
3. The sample population consisted of young adult students from Pietermaritzburg 
institutions, the UKZN and Umgungundlovu FET. The sample size was determined by the 
Krejcie and Morgan (1970) table.  
4. Gatekeeper letters were obtained from UKZN and Umgungundlovu FET. 
5. Collected data was coded and then captured into SPSS for analysis. 
6. The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters presented the approaches that were used in conducting this study. This 
chapter presents the findings obtained from the student respondents. It additionally analyses 
the responses in relation to the research questions. As discussed in Chapter Three, this study’s 
objective is to identify the gendered responses to online social engineering (OSE) among young 
adult students. Identifying the difference in responses of males and females leads to 
understanding the gender that is more susceptible to falling victim to online social engineering 
attacks, this can assist in personalising awareness programmes according to gender. This 
chapter presents the results obtained from the respondents. Further interpretations of the results 
are presented in Chapter Five.  
 
4.2 Response rate 
In this study, 379 questionnaires were distributed to the sample population on site. Both UKZN 
and Umgungundlovu FET College are based in Pietermaritzburg (Appendix C). The sample 
population was in conformity with the Krejcie and Morgan (1970) table. Of the total 
questionnaires, 229 were distributed at UKZN and 150 questionnaires at Umgungundlovu FET 
College. Umgungundlovu FET College had a smaller number of students enrolled for the NC4, 
which is equivalent to a tertiary qualification. A total of 361 valid questionnaires were returned, 
yielding a 95% acceptable response rate.  
 
4.3 Consistency and reliability 
To determine the internal consistency of the responses provided by the students, a Cronbach 
alpha reliability test was conducted. This test was conducted to determine whether the study 
generated comparable results for the tested questions, provided the research was to be 
conducted with a larger sample. The Cronbach alpha coefficient ranges from 0 to 1. Heale and 
Twycross (2015) stated that the closer the Cronbach alpha value is to 1, the higher the reliability 
of the responses. The items in the research instrument used for this study were assessed using 
the reliability test in the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The Cronbach alpha 
tested the 83 questionnaire items including the demographic variables of the respondents. The 
test results for all the items gave a Cronbach alpha value of 0.720, as presented in Table 4.1 
(Appendix D).  
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Table 4. 1: Reliability test results 
 
 
 
4.4 Normality test 
The Kolmogorov Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests were used to determine the data 
characteristics. Norman (2010) noted that if the data is normally distributed, parametric tests 
such as t-tests and ANOVA are suitable. Therefore, data sets that do not follow a normal 
distribution employ non-parametric tests such as the Chi-square test and Mann-Whitney U test 
(McCrum-Gardner, 2008). The normality test hypotheses used are as follows: 
 
H0: The variables tested are normally distributed 
H1: The variable tested are not normally distributed 
 
The normality of a data set is determined by producing a significance value greater than 0.05 
for both the Kolmogorov Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests. The significance value obtained 
for this study was less than 0.05 (see Appendix E). Therefore, the results reject the null 
hypothesis (H0) for all the variables. Thus, non-parametric tests are applicable to test the 
variables of this study. Hence, the Chi-square test was employed on the variables of this study 
to determine the significance of the results obtained.  
 
4.5 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics were generated, based on the data code entered in SPSS. Detailed 
descriptive statistics for each of the items in the research instrument are presented in Appendix 
F. The respondents’ demographic information for this study is as follows: 
 
4.5.1 Gender 
Gender responses for the study’s population size had an outcome of 44.6% males and 55.4% 
female students (See Fig 4.2). These findings correlate with a study conducted by Cloete 
(2014), where it was evident that tertiary institutions have a higher number of female students.  
Cronbach's Alpha No. of Items
.720 83
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Fig. 4. 1: Gender representation of respondents 
 
4.5.2 Respondents’ ages 
The respondents’ ages, as in Fig 4.2, show that out of the 361 students that participated in this 
study, 46.0% were between the ages of 21 and 23; with 27.7% between the age of 18 and 20; 
17.5% were aged 24 to 26; and 8.9% were 27 years and older. This resonates with a study 
conducted by Cloete (2014) which found that most students enrolled in universities are between 
the ages of 20 and 24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. 2: Age range of respondents 
 
4.5.3 Respondents’ racial classification  
The targeted population of this study was young adult South African students based 
Pietermaritzburg, in the KwaZulu-Natal province. KwaZulu-Natal is dominated by the African 
population, followed by the Indian ethnic group (Naidoo, 2011). South Africa has a 
predominance of four ethnic groups, namely African, Indian, Coloured and White. The ethnic 
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groups of the respondents of this study consisted of 73.4% African; 21.1% belonged to the 
Indian ethnic group; 1.9% were of Coloured ethnicity; 3.3% of the White ethnic group; and 
0.3% of the respondents did not wish to disclose their ethnicity (Fig 4.3).  
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. 3: Ethnicity of the respondents 
 
4.5.4 Tertiary institution of respondents 
This study was carried out in two Pietermaritzburg tertiary institutions: UKZN and 
Umgungundlovu FET College, where 361 students were the respondents in this study. Of the 
valid questionnaires from both institutions, 74.2% were UKZN students and 25.8% were 
Umgungundlovu FET College students. (See Fig 4.4.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. 4: Respondents’ respective institutions 
 
4.5.5 Faculty 
The study consisted of student respondents from varying disciplines. As seen in Fig 4.5, the 
results show that 39.3% were students from the Law and Management faculty; 26% from Social 
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Sciences; 25.5% from Science and Technology; 7.5% from Art and Drama; and 1.7% 
respondents were from Health Sciences. All of the above-mentioned faculties are found at 
UKZN, while Umgungundlovu FET students were from the Management and Science and 
Technology faculties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. 5: Faculty grouping of respondents 
 
4.5.6 Awareness 
To determine the awareness level of the respondents about online attacks, the respondents were 
required to categorise examples of online attacks with a given definition of the attack. If the 
respondents did not know the answer, there was an option for them to mark that they do not 
know.  
 
The findings of this study for the phishing example showed that 30.5% categorised the example 
as an email spam; 20.2% of the respondents did not know the answer; 19.9% classified the 
given example as a phishing attack; 17.5% categorised the example as cyber-crime; 8.9% 
indicated that the example is identity theft and 3.0% noted the example as malware (A in Fig 
4.6).  
 
In the identity theft example for which the respondents had to select an answer, findings that 
revealed that 62.3% of students correctly identified it as identity theft (B in Fig 4.6). However, 
15.8% classified it as cyber-crime; 14.7% of the respondents did not know the answer; 3.3% 
classifying it as a phishing attack; 2.8% categorised it as an email spam; leaving 1.1% 
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perceiving it to be malware. As presented in Fig 4.6 (C), the majority of the respondents 
(59.8%) identified the third example as cyber-crime, which was accurate. A further 17.7% of 
the students did not know the answer, with 8.3% considering malware as the answer. Also, 
6.9% of the respondents indicated that the correct answer was identity theft and only 2.8% 
considered the example as a form of an email spam.  
 
Another example provided was that of an email spam. The results showed that 37.7% of the 
respondents accurately identified the example as an email spam. However, 18% of the 
respondents did not know what form of attack the example was. Also, the smallest percentage 
(1.4%) of students thought it was an example of identity theft (D in Fig 4.6). The last example 
provided was a malware example. The findings show that the majority of respondents (42.4%) 
were able to correctly identify the example as malware. However, this was followed by 23.8% 
of students who did not know what type of attack it was. The lowest percentage (1.7%) of 
students categorised the example as identity theft (E in Fig 4.6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
Fig. 4.6: Respondents’ online attack awareness 
 
52 
 
4.6 Constructs used in this study  
To address the framework used in this study, the respondents were asked questions that were 
aligned with the research constructs, namely attitude, subjective norm, behavioural intention 
and behaviour. The questions ranged from ordinal to nominal scaling. The responses obtained 
from the student respondents are as follows: 
 
4.6.1 Attitude  
To test attitude, a Likert scale of ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’, was used to rank the 
respondents’ attitudes to, and perception of, the importance of online security (Refer to 
Appendix C and G.). Most respondents (83.4%) perceived online security as important, while 
0.60% strongly disagreed that online security is important. The respondents were further asked 
whether they considered online security to be outside a user’s control, and 36% of the students 
gave a neutral response, neither agreeing nor disagreeing. This response was followed by 
20.2% of students that disagreed. The smallest percentage was 9.1%, who strongly disagreed 
that online security is outside the user’s control. Regarding the students’ concern about online 
security, 36.8% of students showed that they are strongly concerned about online security, 
while 10.2% strongly disagreed that online security is of concern to them. To understand the 
students’ attitudes to information security, 64.5% of students were willing to be taught about 
information security, whereas 2.8% strongly disagreed that it was necessary.  
 
4.6.2 Subjective norm  
The responses given by students showed that 61.8% considered no threat when responding to 
an email from a known source (i.e. a friend or lecturer). Meanwhile, the remaining 38.2% had 
an opposing opinion. The findings also revealed that 83.9% of students have accepted a friend 
request on social media from someone they do not know, while 89.2% of students would 
respond to a social media request from someone they think they know. In another subjective 
norm question, it was evident that 49.9% of the respondents would not share their social 
network password with somebody close to them. However, 31% of the respondents indicated 
that they would share their password, provided they are convinced by the requester’s response. 
A further 10% indicated that they would give somebody close their password and 9.1% also 
indicated that they would give the password by typing it in.  
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4.6.3 Behavioural intention 
Young adult students were asked the same question, under different facilitating conditions, 
about an ordinary telephone call as compared to a telephone call where they stood a chance of 
winning something. Without verifying the caller, the students’ responses to someone that they 
know showed that 93% of the students would provide their personally identifiable information 
(PII) over the telephone, knowing that they stand a chance to win something. Whereas, if there 
was nothing to be won, 90% of the students would provide their PII in a telephone call. Also, 
the findings showed that 91% of young adult students would send their PII to someone close, 
without verifying the sender, if they stood a chance to win something. If there was nothing to 
be won, 81% of students would send their PII without verifying the sender.  
 
4.6.4 Behaviour  
As shown in Appendix G, this construct was used to identify the young adults’ online 
information security behaviour. The students’ responses revealed that the majority of young 
adults (73.1%) use their actual names on social networks. The findings also showed that 58.2% 
of the students never change their social network passwords. To further understand the 
students’ behaviour, they were asked if they have responded to an email message, link, online 
pop-up or social media message that they suspect was an attempt to get their personal details. 
Of the students, 33.8% have responded to a social media message; 21.6% have responded to 
an email message; 13.9% have responded to a link; and 11.6% have responded to an online 
pop-up. Also, the responses showed that only 21.1% of students attend to security alerts and 
5% of the students do not know how to attend to such alerts. 
 
4.7 Cross-tabulations 
Cross-tabulations were used to identify existing gendered relationships between variables in 
this study. They were used to determine the gender relationships existing between the study 
variables and both males and females. According to Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner, and Barrett 
(2004), a cross-tabulation is a frequency distribution that further investigates the different 
variables. This study also employed the Chi-square test which was conducted to determine the 
significance of the relationships between variables. A Chi-square test generates a ‘p’ value that 
indicates whether the variable relationship is valid or not. A p value greater than 0.05 indicates 
that there is no relationship between the tested variables. Alternatively, if the p value is less 
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than 0.05 it is an indication that there exists a significant relationship between the tested 
variables. 
 
 4.7.1 Cross-tabulation between gender and phishing attack awareness 
The cross-tabulation conducted between gender and phishing attack shows that 42 males 
(26.1%) identified the example to be a phishing attack and 30 females (15%) considered the 
example as a phishing attack example. The total number of both females and males that 
correctly identified the example was 19.9% (Table 4.2). However, 23.5% of females did not 
know the response and 16.1% of male respondents indicated that they do not know. The other 
respondents incorrectly identified the example provided: 33.5% of males and 28% of females 
identified the example as email spam. The majority of students (30.5%) identified the example 
as email spam rather than a phishing attack.  
 
Table 4. 2: Cross-tabulation between gender and phishing attack awareness 
 
 
The Chi-square test conducted for this cross-tabulation resulted in a ‘p’ value of 0.028. This 
signifies that there is a significant relationship between gender and phishing attack awareness. 
Males are more likely to be aware of phishing attacks than their female counterparts (Appendix 
G). 
 
 4.7.2 Cross-tabulation between gender and identity theft awareness 
The gender responses for identifying identity theft example showed that 67% of males and 
58.5% of females were able to correctly classify the example, leaving 62.3% of the overall 361 
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students able to identify the type of attack as identity theft (Table 4.3). A larger percentage 
(19%) of females did not know the attack type and 9.3% of males indicated that they did not 
know the correct answer, so 14.7% of the students did not know what type of attack the example 
was. However, 15.8% of the students (17.4% of males and 14.5% of females) identified the 
example as cyber-crime. The smallest number of students, consisting of 1.2% of males and 1% 
of females, thought the example was a malware attack. 
Table 4. 3: Cross-tabulation between gender and identity theft awareness 
 
 
The asymptotic significance of the above-mentioned correlation gave a ‘p’ value of 0.147. This 
indicates that there is no existing relationship between the two variables, gender and identity 
theft awareness. This implies that, irrespective of gender, students are familiar with what 
identity theft is.  
 
 4.7.3 Cross-tabulation between gender and cyber-crime awareness 
The two variables, gender and cyber-crime were tested. The results, in Table 4.4 below, showed 
that more male students (68.3%) are aware of what cyber-crime is, compared to their female 
(53%) counterparts. Also, more female students (21.5%) indicated that they do not know what 
the provided example was. A smaller percentage of males (13%) also indicated that they did 
not know what type of attack the example was. However, it can be concluded that more males 
than females were aware of how cyber-crime manifests. Only a few of the students (4.5% of 
female and 0.60% of male students) mistook the example as email spam.  
 
Cyber-
crime
Phishing 
attack Malware
Email 
spam
Identity 
theft
I do not 
know
Count 28 5 2 3 108 15 161
% within 
Gender
17.4% 3.1% 1.2% 1.9% 67.1% 9.3% 100.0%
Count 29 7 2 7 117 38 200
% within 
Gender
14.5% 3.5% 1.0% 3.5% 58.5% 19.0% 100.0%
Count 57 12 4 10 225 53 361
% within 
Gender
15.8% 3.3% 1.1% 2.8% 62.3% 14.7% 100.0%
Total
The deliberate use of someone else's name, usually as a 
method to gain a financial advantage or obtain credit and 
other benefits in the person's name and perhaps to the other 
persons disadvantage or loss
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 4: Cross-tabulation between gender and cyber-crime awareness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Chi-square test applied to these two variables indicated that there is an existing relationship 
between gender and cyber-crime knowledge. The Chi-square test produced a ‘p’ value of 0.026. 
This relationship implies that male students are more aware of the cyber-crime. 
 
 4.7.4 Cross-tabulation between gender and email spam awareness 
The cross-tabulation showed that more male students (42.9%) were able to correctly recognise 
the type of attack illustrated by the example. The findings showed that fewer male students 
(14.3%) did not identify the email spam example. On the other hand, fewer female students 
(33.5%) were able to associate the given example with the right attack type. More female (21%) 
than male students did not know what the correct response was. In total, 18% of the students, 
irrespective of gender, were unable to identify the example. It can be seen in Table 4.5, below, 
that the second largest percentage (21.6%) of students confused an email spam with a phishing 
attack.  
 
The p value for the two tested variables was 0.199 for the Chi-square test. This implies that no 
significant relationship exists between gender and email spam awareness. Therefore, it can be 
deduced that both genders have the same knowledge of email spam (see Appendix G).  
 
 
 
Cyber-
crime
Phishing 
attack Malware
Email 
spam
Identity 
theft
I do not 
know
Count 110 7 11 1 11 21 161
% within 
Gender
68.3% 4.3% 6.8% .6% 6.8% 13.0% 100.0%
Count 106 9 19 9 14 43 200
% within 
Gender
53.0% 4.5% 9.5% 4.5% 7.0% 21.5% 100.0%
Count 216 16 30 10 25 64 361
% within 
Gender
59.8% 4.4% 8.3% 2.8% 6.9% 17.7% 100.0%
Total
The below points are all examples of...? -Hacking into computer 
systems -Introducing viruses to vulnerable networks -Identity 
theft -Credit card theft
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 5: Cross-tabulation between gender and email spam awareness 
 
 4.7.5 Cross-tabulation between gender and malware awareness 
As portrayed in Table 4.6, gender was cross-tabulated against malware. The findings of the 
cross-tabulation revealed that most male students (60.9%) were able to accurately associate the 
example with the form of attack. A low percentage (13%) of the male students indicated that 
they do not know the response, whereas most female students (32.5%) indicated that they did 
not know what form of attack the example was. The results showed that only 27.5% of female 
students responded with the accurate category. The lowest percentage (1.7%) of students 
specified that the example was identity theft. This percentage comprised of 2% female students 
and 1.2% of male students.  
Table 4.6: Cross-tabulation between gender and malware awareness 
Cyber-
crime
Phishing 
attack Malware
Email 
spam
Identity 
theft
I do not 
know
Count 6 37 24 69 2 23 161
% within 
Gender
3.7% 23.0% 14.9% 42.9% 1.2% 14.3% 100.0%
Count 16 41 31 67 3 42 200
% within 
Gender
8.0% 20.5% 15.5% 33.5% 1.5% 21.0% 100.0%
Count 22 78 55 136 5 65 361
% within 
Gender
6.1% 21.6% 15.2% 37.7% 1.4% 18.0% 100.0%
Total
A type of unwanted electronic messages. The messages may 
also contain disguised links that appear to be for familiar 
websites but in fact lead to phishing web sites or sites that are 
hosting malware
Total
Gender Male
Female
Cyber-
crime
Phishing 
attack Malware
Email 
spam
Identity 
theft
I do not 
know
Count 20 13 98 7 2 21 161
% within 
Gender
12.4% 8.1% 60.9% 4.3% 1.2% 13.0% 100.0%
Count 38 20 55 18 4 65 200
% within 
Gender
19.0% 10.0% 27.5% 9.0% 2.0% 32.5% 100.0%
Count 58 33 153 25 6 86 361
% within 
Gender
16.1% 9.1% 42.4% 6.9% 1.7% 23.8% 100.0%
Total
Any piece of software that was written with the intention of 
doing harm to information, devices or to people
Total
Gender Male
Female
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The Chi-square test (p=0.00) highlighted an existing relationship between malware awareness 
and gender. The relationship implies that male students are more likely to identify a malware 
attack as they are knowledgeable about how a malware attacks manifest.  
 
 4.7.6 Cross-tabulation between gender and receiving and responding to an email message 
This cross-tabulation was conducted to identify the number of students who have received 
email messages in a form of social engineering, and to identify which gender responds the 
most. The results showed that a higher percentage of male students (82%) have received emails 
that they believed were malicious in nature. Female students who had received similar email 
messages constituted 67.5%. Table 4.8 shows that, in as much as 74% (Table 4.7) of students 
received social engineering email messages, 78.4% of students did not respond. However, both 
male students (21.7%) and female students (25.2%) had similar response rates. As shown in 
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8, below, there was a higher percentage of students that have received 
malicious emails and most students, irrespective of gender, did not respond.  
 
The Chi-square test conducted revealed an existing relationship between receiving a malicious 
email message and gender. Hence, the Chi-square test produced a ‘p’ value of 0.002. This 
implies that male students have higher chances of receiving social engineering attacks via 
emails. Further, the Chi-square test conducted between gender and responding to an email 
message that seems suspicious produced p>0.05, which showed that there is no existing 
relationship between responding to a malicious email message and gender (see Appendix G). 
The findings indicate that both female and male students are non-responsive towards emails 
that seem suspicious. This behaviour is believed to be due to the students’ knowledge of 
phishing attacks.  
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Table 4. 7: Cross-tabulation between gender and receiving an email message 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 8: Cross-tabulation between gender and responding to an email message 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
4.7.7 Cross-tabulation between gender and receiving and responding to an online link 
The results for this cross-tabulation showed that more male students (73.3%) suspected that 
they had received online links that they considered were attempts to obtain their personal 
details. On the other hand, 60.5% of female students also suspected that they had received such 
online links. As shown in Table 4.10, both genders had higher percentages (86.1%) of non-
responsiveness to the suspicious online links; although, 15.5% of male students and 12.5% of 
female students responded to the links they received. More male students received and 
responded to the online links (Table 4.9 and Table 4.10).  
 
The Chi-square test (Appendix G) conducted on gender and receiving suspicious online links 
yielded a p value of 0.011 which indicates an existing relationship. This indicates that male 
students are more likely to receive malicious links. However, the Chi-square test (p=0.408) 
Yes No
Count 132 29 161
% within 
Gender
82.0% 18.0% 100.0%
Count 135 65 200
% within 
Gender
67.5% 32.5% 100.0%
Count 267 94 361
% within 
Gender
74.0% 26.0% 100.0%
Male
Female
Total
Have you ever received an 
email message that you 
suspect was an attempt to 
get your personal details
Total
Gender
Yes No
Count 35 126 161
% within 
Gender
21.7% 78.3% 100.0%
Count 43 157 200
% within 
Gender
21.5% 78.5% 100.0%
Count 78 283 361
% within 
Gender
21.6% 78.4% 100.0%
Total
Have you ever responded to 
an email message that you 
suspect was an attempt to 
get your personal details
Total
Gender Male
Female
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between gender and responding to online links indicated that no relationship existed. This 
implies that both male and female students’ response rates are similar. There are no distinct 
differences towards responding to online links that are suspicious in nature. 
 
Table 4. 9: Cross-tabulation between gender and receiving an online link 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 10: Cross-tabulation between gender and responding to an online link 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.7.8 Cross-tabulation between gender and receiving and responding to an online pop-
up message 
Gender was cross-tabulated against two variables, receiving and responding, in the behaviour 
construct. The cross-tabulations obtained between gender and receiving an online pop-up 
showed that males are perceived to receive more pop-up messages that were an attempt to 
Yes No
Count 25 136 161
% within 
Gender
15.5% 84.5% 100.0%
Count 25 175 200
% within 
Gender
12.5% 87.5% 100.0%
Count 50 311 361
% within 
Gender
13.9% 86.1% 100.0%
Male
Female
Total
Have you ever 
responded to a link that 
you suspect was an 
attempt to get your 
personal details
Total
Gender
Yes No
Count 118 43 161
% within 
Gender
73.3% 26.7% 100.0%
Count 121 79 200
% within 
Gender
60.5% 39.5% 100.0%
Count 239 122 361
% within 
Gender
66.2% 33.8% 100.0%
Have you ever received a 
link that you suspect was 
an attempt to get your 
personal details
Total
Gender Male
Female
Total
 
61 
 
obtain their PI information. As shown in Table 4.11, 77.6% male students and 52.5% female 
students are convinced they have received questionable online pop-up messages. The response 
variable showed that most students (92.5% of females and 83.2% of males) did not respond to 
the online pop-ups (Table 4.12). However, some students (16.8% of males and 7.5% of 
females) did respond, irrespective of the online pop-up message being an attempt at obtaining 
their personal details, or not.  
 
A Chi-square test result for gender and receiving suspicious online pop-up messages showed 
that there is a significant relationship, p<0.05 (Appendix G). This implies that receiving 
malicious pop-up messages is most common amongst male students. Further, the p value 
between gender and responding to pop-up messages produced a value of p<0.05. This value 
indicates that male students have higher chances of falling victim to online pop-up social 
engineering attempts since they are the most responsive gender.  
 
Table 4. 11: Cross-tabulation between gender and receiving an online pop-up message 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 12: Cross-tabulation between gender and responding to an online pop-up message 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes No
Count 27 134 161
% within 
Gender
16.8% 83.2% 100.0%
Count 15 185 200
% within 
Gender
7.5% 92.5% 100.0%
Count 42 319 361
% within 
Gender
11.6% 88.4% 100.0%
Male
Female
Total
Have you ever responded 
to an online pop-up that 
you suspect was an 
attempt to get your 
personal details
Total
Gender
Yes No
Count 125 36 161
% within 
Gender
77.6% 22.4% 100.0%
Count 105 95 200
% within 
Gender
52.5% 47.5% 100.0%
Count 230 131 361
% within 
Gender
63.7% 36.3% 100.0%
Have you ever received an 
online pop-up that you 
suspect was an attempt to 
get your personal details
Total
Gender Male
Female
Total
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 4.7.9 Cross-tabulation between gender and receiving and responding to a social media 
message 
Table 4.13 below presents the cross-tabulation between gender and receiving a social 
engineering social media message. The table presents findings that show a relatively high 
percentages of students that claim to have received deceptive messages on social networks. 
Female students (78.5%) receive more social engineering messages than male students 
(70.8%). The overall percentage of students that receive deceptive social media messages was 
75.1%, as seen in Table 4.13. To test the percentage of gender responses, a cross-tabulation 
between the response rate and gender was conducted. This showed that female students 
(41.5%) respond the most to social media messages that have malicious intentions. The 
percentage of male students that have responded to such messages was 24.2%. Furthermore, 
the results of both genders showed that 75.8% of male students and 58.5% of female students 
have not responded to the messages; while an overall 33.8% (Table 4.14) of the students 
respond to the messages. 
A p value of 0.93 was produced by the Chi-square test for gender and receiving social media 
messages that were perceived to be malicious (Appendix G). This implies that malicious social 
media messages received are non-gender-dependent. Also, the Chi-square test for gender and 
responsiveness to the suspicious social media messages yielded a value p=0.001. As seen in 
Appendix G, the value confirms that the response rate is gender-dependent. This implies that 
female students are more than likely to fall victim to social engineering attempts which are 
conducted over social networks. 
 
Table 4. 13: Cross-tabulation between gender and receiving a social media message 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes No
Count 114 47 161
% within 
Gender
70.8% 29.2% 100.0%
Count 157 43 200
% within 
Gender
78.5% 21.5% 100.0%
Count 271 90 361
% within 
Gender
75.1% 24.9% 100.0%
Have you ever received a 
social media message 
that you suspect was an 
attempt to get your 
personal details
Total
Gender Male
Female
Total
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Table 4. 14: Cross-tabulation between gender and responding to a social media message 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.7.10 Cross-tabulation between gender and online security perceptions 
Students’ responses to the importance of online security showed that the majority of students 
(86.3% of males and 81% of females) considered online security important. However, there 
were a few female students (1.0%) who considered online security unimportant by indicating 
on the ‘strongly disagree’ option. It is important to note that the students had an option of 
‘disagree’, but none of the students took this option (Table 4.15). The Chi-square test conducted 
for this question revealed that the attitude to security importance has a significant relationship 
with gender. This was concluded by the significant value p=0.022 (see Appendix G) from the 
Chi-square analysis, and supported by the cross-tabulation results, which implies that males 
are the gender that perceive online security to be important. Also, a cross-tabulation conducted 
between gender and the perceived necessity for online security showed that 71.5% of students, 
consisting of 74.5% male and 69% female student, do consider online security necessary (Table 
4.16). The significance value produced indicated that there is no relationship between gender 
and perceived necessity for online security. This suggests that both male and female students 
find online security necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes No
Count 39 122 161
% within 
Gender
24.2% 75.8% 100.0%
Count 83 117 200
% within 
Gender
41.5% 58.5% 100.0%
Count 122 239 361
% within 
Gender
33.8% 66.2% 100.0%
Have you ever responded to 
a social media message 
that you suspect was an 
attempt to get your personal 
details
Total
Gender Male
Female
Total
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Table 4. 15: Cross-tabulation between gender and online security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 16: Cross-tabulation between gender and necessity for online security 
 
The majority of the student respondents (35.7%) were neutral as to whether online security is 
outside the user’s control (Table 4.17). Male students had a stronger sense of agreement 
(‘strongly agree’ = 12.4% and ‘agree’ = 23%) and disagreement (‘strongly disagree’ = 6.2% 
and ‘disagree’ = 24.8%) whether online security is outside a user’s control, while 37.5% of 
female students were more neutral in their responses. The Chi-square test conducted to assess 
the relationship between gender and whether online security is outside the user’s control 
resulted in a significant value (0.034, as shown in Appendix G). The p value suggests that male 
students are more aware of the users’ control in online security.  
 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Count 0 4 18 139 161
% within 
Gender
0.0% 2.5% 11.2% 86.3% 100.0%
Count 2 0 36 162 200
% within 
Gender
1.0% 0.0% 18.0% 81.0% 100.0%
Count 2 4 54 301 361
% within 
Gender
.6% 1.1% 15.0% 83.4% 100.0%
Total
Online security is important
Total
Gender Male
Female
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Count 1 2 3 35 120 161
% within 
Gender
.6% 1.2% 1.9% 21.7% 74.5% 100.0%
Count 1 1 8 52 138 200
% within 
Gender
.5% .5% 4.0% 26.0% 69.0% 100.0%
Count 2 3 11 87 258 361
% within 
Gender
.6% .8% 3.0% 24.1% 71.5% 100.0%
Total
Online security is necessary
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 17: Cross-tabulation between gender and user control of online security 
 
A further cross-tabulation was conducted between gender and online security. The results of 
the respondents concerning online security were tabulated in Table 4.18, below. The table 
shows that female students are more concerned about online security than males. Based on the 
findings, 37.5% and 30.5% of female students noted that they strongly disagree and disagree, 
respectively, with the question posed. The majority of male students also indicated that they 
have a concern about online security (‘strongly disagree’ = 35.4% and ‘disagree’ = 29.2%). 
The Chi-square test produced a value greater than 0.05. The results show that there is no 
relationship between gender and online security concerns. This implies that both female and 
male students have similar concerns about online security.  
 
Table 4. 18: Cross-tabulation between gender and online security concern 
 
The cross-tabulation conducted between gender and responding to a sender, provided the 
source is unknown or the source is a friend, showed that most students are concerned (Table 
4.19 and Table 4.20). As shown in Table 4.19, 53.2% of students (54% of males and 52.5% of 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Count 1 2 3 35 120 161
% within 
Gender
.6% 1.2% 1.9% 21.7% 74.5% 100.0%
Count 1 1 8 52 138 200
% within 
Gender
.5% .5% 4.0% 26.0% 69.0% 100.0%
Count 2 3 11 87 258 361
% within 
Gender
.6% .8% 3.0% 24.1% 71.5% 100.0%
Total
Online security is necessary
Total
Gender Male
Female
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree
Stronlgy 
Agree
Count 57 47 25 15 17 161
% within 
Gender
35.4% 29.2% 15.5% 9.3% 10.6% 100.0%
Count 75 61 21 21 22 200
% within 
Gender
37.5% 30.5% 10.5% 10.5% 11.0% 100.0%
Count 132 108 46 36 39 361
% within 
Gender
36.6% 29.9% 12.7% 10.0% 10.8% 100.0%
Total
I am not concerned about online security
Total
Gender Male
Female
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females) are very (‘strongly’) concerned and 24.1% of students (23.6% of males and 24.5% of 
females) are somewhat concerned when responding to an unknown source. Further findings, 
in Table 4.20, showed that 14.4% (18% of males and 11.5% of females) of students are very 
concerned and 24.4% of students are somewhat concerned (26.7% of males and 22.5% of 
females) about online security when responding to a friend. However, the results show that 
there is less concern about online security when the both genders are responding to a friend. 
Both Chi-square tests conducted against gender and security concerns when responding to a 
friend and to an unknown source yielded non-significant relationships (Appendix G). This 
suggests that being concerned about online security when responding to a known or unknown 
individual has no relationship with the gender variable. So students have online security 
concerns, irrespective of their gender. 
 
Table 4. 19: Cross-tabulation between gender and online security concern when responding 
to an unknown source 
 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Count 13 5 18 38 87 161
% within 
Gender
8.1% 3.1% 11.2% 23.6% 54.0% 100.0%
Count 17 13 16 49 105 200
% within 
Gender
8.5% 6.5% 8.0% 24.5% 52.5% 100.0%
Count 30 18 34 87 192 361
% within 
Gender
8.3% 5.0% 9.4% 24.1% 53.2% 100.0%
Total
I am concerned about online security when responding to 
an unknown source
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 20: Cross-tabulation between gender and online security concern when responding 
to a friend 
 
 
 4.7.11 Cross-tabulation between gender and information security-related principles 
To understand the effect of gender on attitudes to information security, various cross-
tabulations were conducted. In a cross-tabulation to identify the gender differences in attitudes 
to online privacy, the majority of the students (55.3% of males and 49.5% of females) 
considered protection of their information to be the reason why online privacy exits. However, 
a few students (7% of females and 5% of males) stated that they did not know the reason behind 
online privacy on social networks. A similar response was given by both genders (29.2% of 
males and 28% of females) who considered online privacy important as a mechanism to prevent 
identity theft (Table 4.21). A further 15.5% of females and 10.6% of males believed that online 
privacy on social networks is for hiding their images and contact information from unknown 
sources. The Chi-square p value produced was 0.414, which indicated a non-significant 
relationship (Appendix G). Therefore, understanding the importance of online privacy is not 
gender-dependent. Both male and female students have similar perceptions about the reasons 
behind the importance of online privacy. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Count 27 25 37 43 29 161
% within 
Gender
16.8% 15.5% 23.0% 26.7% 18.0% 100.0%
Count 45 44 43 45 23 200
% within 
Gender
22.5% 22.0% 21.5% 22.5% 11.5% 100.0%
Count 72 69 80 88 52 361
% within 
Gender
19.9% 19.1% 22.2% 24.4% 14.4% 100.0%
Total
I am not concerned about online security when 
responding to a friend
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 21: Cross-tabulation between gender and perceptions of the importance of online 
privacy  
 
To ascertain whether gender influenced opinions regarding safeguarding of online information, 
a cross-tabulation tab was conducted between gender and the actions they believed could help 
secure their information on online sites. Appendix G shows that 66.5% of male, and 61.5% of 
female, students considered installing an antivirus as a measure to help secure their online 
information. However, the second highest percentage of students (23% of males and 21% of 
females) indicated that they did not know which of the presented options would help them in 
protecting their online information. Also, as seen in Appendix G, more female students (14.5%) 
than male students (6.2%) specified that not changing their password is a technique that can 
help in safeguarding their online information. To determine any existing relationships, the Chi-
square test was conducted. The results of the test showed that there is no existing relationship 
between gender and approaches to safeguarding information on social media, since the p value 
from the Chi-square test had a value of 0.085. Therefore, male and female students have similar 
opinions about the correct and incorrect methods of safeguarding their information. 
 
A further information security-related cross-tabulation was conducted between gender and the 
students’ opinions of the least suitable ways of securing a password. A similar percentage of 
both males (62.1%) and females (62%) said they understand that writing down a password was 
not a good way to secure a password (Appendix G), while 19.9% of males and 15.5% of 
females noted that memorising a password is not a secure way to secure that password. A 
further 13% of female and 11.8% of male students also indicated that it is not safe practice to 
write down a password and leave it in a secured place with no title, or information of what the 
Prevention of 
Identity Theft
Protection of 
my Information
Hiding my Image 
and contact info 
from unknowns
I dont 
know
Count 47 89 17 8 161
% within 
Gender
29.2% 55.3% 10.6% 5.0% 100.0%
Count 56 99 31 14 200
% within 
Gender
28.0% 49.5% 15.5% 7.0% 100.0%
Count 103 188 48 22 361
% within 
Gender
28.5% 52.1% 13.3% 6.1% 100.0%
Total
Which of the options presented do you believe represents the 
most important reason behind online privacy on social networks
Total
Gender Male
Female
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password is for. However, 9.5% of female and 6.2% of male students indicated that they do 
not know which practice is not appropriate for securing their passwords. The Chi-square test 
showed that there is no relationship between gender and unsuitable ways of securing 
passwords.  
 
A cross-tabulation was conducted between gender and behaviour when someone close requests 
a social network password (see Appendix G). It was evident that 54% of male students and 
46.5% of female students would not give their partner any of their social media passwords. 
However, 33.5% of female and 28% of male students would give their passwords to their 
partners after asking questions and receiving convincing responses. Also, 10.6% of male and 
8% of female students would provide their passwords by typing them in; whereas 12% of 
females and 7.5% of males would give their partners their social network passwords. The p 
value produced was 0.222, which means that there is no relationship between gender and 
sharing a social network password with someone close.  
 
Table 4.22, below, shows the cross-tabulation between gender and the students’ concern for 
their information being accessed by third parties without their knowledge. Most students 
indicated that they were very concerned about their information being accessed by third parties. 
The majority of the students who were very concerned consisted of 48% of female and 47.8% 
of male students. These results were followed by 28.6% of male and 26% of female students, 
who indicated that they were, to a certain degree, concerned about their information being 
accessed by a third party. Nevertheless, 20.2% of the respondents (20.5% of males and 20% of 
females) were not too concerned; and 4.7% of the students (6% of females and 3.1% of males) 
were not at all concerned. The Chi-square results showed that there was no relationship (p = 
0.612) (Appendix G) between gender and concern for information being accessible to third 
parties without one’s knowledge. 
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Table 4. 22: Cross-tabulation between gender and online security concern 
 
Gender was cross-tabulated against when students last changed their privacy settings on social 
networks (Table 4.23). The results indicated that 37% of females and 26.7% of males changed 
their privacy settings after having a profile for a while. A further 30.4% of male, and 22.5% of 
female, students indicated that they changed their privacy settings after they had worked out 
how to change them; whereas 5.3% of students (7% of females and 3.1% of males) indicated 
that they did not know how to change their privacy settings on social networks. Also, 18.5% 
of female and 16.1% of male students indicted that they had never changed their privacy 
settings on social network sites; while 18.8% (23.6% of males and 15% of females) specified 
that they changed their social network privacy settings right at the beginning of their profile 
creation. The two variables, gender and changing of privacy setting on social networks, resulted 
in a significant p value of 0.022. The relationship is interpreted to mean that male students have 
a better understanding of the importance of changing their privacy settings on social networks.  
 
Not at all 
concerned
Not too 
concerned
Somewhat 
concerned
Very 
concerned
Count 5 33 46 77 161
% within 
Gender
3.1% 20.5% 28.6% 47.8% 100.0%
Count 12 40 52 96 200
% within 
Gender
6.0% 20.0% 26.0% 48.0% 100.0%
Count 17 73 98 173 361
% within 
Gender
4.7% 20.2% 27.1% 47.9% 100.0%
Female
Total
How concerned are you, that some of the information you 
share on social networking sites might be accessed by 
third parties, (i.e.: advertisers) without your knowledge
Total
Gender Male
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Table 4. 23: Cross-tabulation between gender and change of privacy settings on social 
network sites 
 
A cross-tabulation was conducted between gender and the last time that students changed their 
privacy settings on their email accounts. This showed that most students (27.7%; 31% of 
females and 23.6% of males) had changed their email settings after having the email account 
for some time. A further 23.8% of students (26.1% of males and 22% of females) changed their 
settings after they had worked out how to; and 23.5% of the students (25% of females and 
21.7% of males) had never changed their privacy settings. Moreover, 23% of male and 13.5% 
of female students changed their email privacy settings right at the beginning, after opening an 
email account. Additionally, 8.5% of female and 5.6% of male students indicated that they did 
not know how to change their privacy settings on their email accounts. The Chi-square results 
showed that there was no relationship between gender and changing of privacy settings on 
email accounts. The p value produced was 0.079.  
 
A cross-tabulation between gender and whether students would like to be taught about 
information security was conducted. The responses given by students are displayed in Table 
4.24. The table shows that both male and female students are willing to be taught about 
information security. The percentage of female students (66.5% = ‘strongly agree’ and 22.5% 
= ‘agree’) willing to be taught about information security was slightly higher than for the male 
students (62.1% = ‘strongly agree’ and 21.7% = ‘agree’). Only a few students across both 
genders denied having an interest in being taught about information security: 2.8% = ‘strongly 
disagree’ and 2.2% = ‘disagree. Furthermore, 11.2% of males and 6% of females gave neutral 
responses.  
I do not know 
how to
I have never 
changed the 
settings
After having 
a profile for 
a while
After I 
figured out 
how to
Right at 
the 
beginning
Count 5 26 43 49 38 161
% within 
Gender
3.1% 16.1% 26.7% 30.4% 23.6% 100.0%
Count 14 37 74 45 30 200
% within 
Gender
7.0% 18.5% 37.0% 22.5% 15.0% 100.0%
Count 19 63 117 94 68 361
% within 
Gender
5.3% 17.5% 32.4% 26.0% 18.8% 100.0%
Total
When did you change your privacy settings on social networks 
since creating your profile
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 24: Cross-tabulation between gender and online security learning 
 
The cross-tabulation produced a p value of 0.485, which indicates that no relationship between 
gender and the willingness to learn about information security exists. Thus, it can be inferred 
that male and female students are both interested in learning about information security.  
 
 4.7.12 Cross-tabulations between gender and responding to a random email message 
A cross-tabulation was conducted between gender and responses to a random email message 
in a given circumstance. The cross-tabulation showed that 49.7% of male students and 37.5% 
of female students would verify the sender before providing their PII in a random email 
message. The majority of the female students (62.5%) and 50.3% of male students would not 
verify the sender before providing their PII (Table 4.25). The Chi-square test produced a p 
value of 0.02, which implies a relationship between gender and verifying the sender before 
responding, namely, that verifying the sender before responding is less likely to occur amongst 
female students. On the other hand, a cross-tabulation of the same concept was conducted to 
determine the gender response rate, provided they are going to win something (Appendix G). 
The cross-tabulation showed that 54% of female and 52.8% of male students would not verify 
the sender; whereas, 47.2% of male and 46% of female students would verify the sender before 
responding. The Chi-square test produced a value of p=0.820, which indicated that there is no 
relationship between gender and verifying the sender if students are to win something (see 
Appendix G). This is interpreted to mean that both female and male students respond in a 
similar manner if they are going to win something.  
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Count 5 3 18 35 100 161
% within 
Gender
3.1% 1.9% 11.2% 21.7% 62.1% 100.0%
Count 5 5 12 45 133 200
% within 
Gender
2.5% 2.5% 6.0% 22.5% 66.5% 100.0%
Count 10 8 30 80 233 361
% within 
Gender
2.8% 2.2% 8.3% 22.2% 64.5% 100.0%
Total
I would like to be taught about information security
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 25: Cross-tabulation between gender and verifying the sender of a random email 
message 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.26 shows the results from a cross-tabulation to determine the gender response of both 
female and male students to whether they would respond without verifying the sender. The 
cross-tabulation results showed that the majority of the students (95% of females and 93.2% of 
males) would not respond without verifying the sender. The remaining students (6.8% of males 
and 5% of females) indicated that they would respond with their PII without verifying the 
sender. The Chi-square test (p=0.46) found no relationship between gender and responding 
without verifying (refer to Appendix G). However, when a similar cross-tabulation was 
conducted between gender and the response rate if the students were to win something, the 
likelihood of responding without verifying the sender increased. Appendix G shows that 12.5% 
of female and 11.8% of male students would respond to the email message without verifying 
the sender. However, the majority of both male (88.2%) and female (87.5%) students would 
not respond without verifying the sender. The Chi-square test conducted between gender and 
responding without verifying the sender, if students were going to win something, showed no 
relationship (p=0.840) between the two variables. This implies similar behaviour from males 
and females, regarding not verifying the sender, if the students were going to win something. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes No
Count 80 81 161
% within 
Gender
49.7% 50.3% 100.0%
Count 75 125 200
% within 
Gender
37.5% 62.5% 100.0%
Count 155 206 361
% within 
Gender
42.9% 57.1% 100.0%
Total
Under what circumstance would you 
provide personally identifiable information 
(e.g.: identity number) over a random email 
message, would you verify the sender
Total
Gender Male
Female
 
74 
 
Table 4. 26: Cross-tabulation between gender and responding without verifying the sender of 
a random email message 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender was further cross-tabulated against responding after verifying the email sender. The 
cross-tabulation showed that most students (81% of females and 63.4% of males) would not 
respond to the email, even after verifying the sender, while 36.6% of male and 19% of female 
students would respond to the email with their PII after verifying the sender (Table 4.27, 
Appendix G). The Chi-square test generated a p value of 0.000, which implies that there is a 
relationship between gender and responding to an email after verifying the sender. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that female students are less responsive after verifying the 
sender, whereas, male students are more responsive after verifying the sender. This implies that 
male students have a higher likelihood of falling victim through email messages if the social 
engineers use impersonation. Another cross-tabulation was conducted between gender and 
response rates after verifying the sender, if students knew they stood a chance to win 
something. As seen in Table 4.28, more female students (77%) would not respond with their 
PII, compared to male students (65.2%). The findings showed that 34.8% of male, and 23% of 
female, students would respond with their information after verifying the sender of the email. 
A Chi-square test was conducted between gender and the response rates of students to a random 
email message if they were to win something. A significance value of 0.013 for p was produced, 
which implies a relationship between the two variables. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
male students’ higher response rates make them more vulnerable to social engineers. This 
implies that male students have a higher chance of falling victim to social engineering attempts 
in email messages, if something were to be won.  
Yes No
Count 11 150 161
% within 
Gender
6.8% 93.2% 100.0%
Count 10 190 200
% within 
Gender
5.0% 95.0% 100.0%
Count 21 340 361
% within 
Gender
5.8% 94.2% 100.0%
Total
Under what circumstance would you 
provide personally identifiable 
information (e.g.: identity number) over a 
random email message, would you 
respond without verifying the sender
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 27: Cross-tabulation between gender and responding after verifying the sender of a 
random email message 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 28: Cross-tabulation between gender and responding after verifying the sender of a 
random email message when something will be won 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.7.13 Cross-tabulations between gender and responding to an email from someone close 
Table 4.29 presents the results of a cross-tabulation conducted between gender and whether 
female and male students would or would not verify the sender. The cross-tabulation results 
showed that the majority of the students (57.8% of male and 53% of female students) would 
not verify the sender. Whereas, the rest of the students, 47% of female and 42.2% of male 
students would verify the sender. The Chi-square test produced a significant value of p=0.366, 
which means that there is no relationship between the two variables. This implies that students, 
males and females, behave in a similar manner when verifying, or not verifying, someone close 
who is emailing them. On the other hand, a cross-tabulation was conducted to determine the 
Yes No
Count 59 102 161
% within 
Gender
36.6% 63.4% 100.0%
Count 38 162 200
% within 
Gender
19.0% 81.0% 100.0%
Count 97 264 361
% within 
Gender
26.9% 73.1% 100.0%
Total
Under what circumstance would you provide 
personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) over a random email message, after 
verifying the sender would you respond
Total
Gender Male
Female
Yes No
Count 56 105 161
% within 
Gender
34.8% 65.2% 100.0%
Count 46 154 200
% within 
Gender
23.0% 77.0% 100.0%
Count 102 259 361
% within 
Gender
28.3% 71.7% 100.0%
Total
Under what circumstance would you provide 
personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity 
number) over a random email message, after 
verifying the sender would you respond
Total
Gender Male
Female
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effect of gender when verifying an email sender, supposedly from someone close, provided the 
student stood a chance to win something. The results showed an increasing number of female 
students (55.5%) who would not verify the sender; whereas, more male respondents would 
verify the sender (49.7%). The Chi-square test showed that there was no relationship (p=0.326) 
between gender and verifying, or not verifying, the sender if there was something to be won. 
This suggests that male and female students react in a similar manner to email messages that 
come from someone close, when they stand a chance of winning something. 
 
Table 4. 29: Cross-tabulation between gender and verifying if it is someone close 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A cross-tabulation was conducted to determine whether gender influenced behaviour when 
responding, without verifying, to an email from someone close. Table 4.30 shows that 30.4% 
of male, and 16% of female, students would not verify the sender before responding. 
Furthermore, the cross-tabulation showed that more females (84%) than their male (69.6%) 
counterparts would not respond without verifying the sender. The Chi-square test conducted 
for gender and whether the students would respond without verifying the sender resulted in a 
p value of 0.001. This implies that there is a relationship between gender and responding 
without verifying the sender. It can be concluded that male students are more likely to fall 
victim if social engineers use identity theft to email them. This further means that female 
students are less likely to respond with their PII as they understand the value of their personal 
information. However, if there is something to be won, female students (26.5%) would respond 
more, without verifying the sender; while more male students (76.4%) would verify the sender. 
The Chi-square test produced a p=0.529, indicating no relationship between gender and 
responding to someone close, if there is something to be won. This suggests that the behaviour 
Yes No
Count 68 93 161
% within 
Gender
42.2% 57.8% 100.0%
Count 94 106 200
% within 
Gender
47.0% 53.0% 100.0%
Count 162 199 361
% within 
Gender
44.9% 55.1% 100.0%
Total
Under what circumstance would you 
provide personally identifiable information 
(e.g.: identity number) to someone close 
emailing, would you verify the sender
Total
Gender Male
Female
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of male and female students is similar when responding to someone close, despite standing a 
chance to win something. 
 
Table 4. 30: Cross-tabulation between gender and response without verifying that it is 
someone close 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A cross-tabulation was conducted to determine the percentage of students that would only 
respond after verifying the email sender (Table 4.31). The cross-tabulation conducted between 
gender and whether students would respond after verifying showed that most students would 
not respond; and 69% of female and 68.9% of male students would not respond with their PII, 
even after verifying the sender. However, a similar percentage of both genders (31.1% male 
and 31% female) would respond with their information after verifying the sender. The p value 
produced by the Chi-square test was p=0.991 (see Appendix G), which indicates no relationship 
between gender and response after verifying the sender. Nevertheless, when students stand a 
chance to win something the response behaviour changes. In a cross-tabulation between gender 
and whether students would respond if they stood a chance to win something, it was evident 
that 69.5% of female and 61.5% of male students would not respond to the sender, even after 
verifying the email sender. However, there was an increase in the percentage of male students 
(38.5%) that would respond after verifying the sender, as compared to female students (30.5%). 
According to the Chi-square test, p=0.110 for the two variables. This indicates that there is no 
apparent relationship between gender and response after verifying the sender.  
 
 
Yes No
Count 49 112 161
% within 
Gender
30.4% 69.6% 100.0%
Count 32 168 200
% within 
Gender
16.0% 84.0% 100.0%
Count 81 280 361
% within 
Gender
22.4% 77.6% 100.0%
Total
Under what circumstance would you 
provide personally identifiable 
information (e.g.: identity number) to 
someone close emailing, would you 
respond without verifying the sender
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 31: Cross-tabulation between gender and response after verifying if it is someone 
close 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.7.14 Cross-tabulation between gender and responding to a direct message on social 
media  
A cross-tabulation conducted between gender and whether students verify a sender on social 
media showed that most students do not verify a sender of a direct message on social media. 
Table 4.31 shows that 60.2% of male, and 56.5% of female, students would not verify the 
sender. Whereas, 43.5% of female, and 39.8% of male, students would verify the sender. A 
Chi-square test was also conducted for the two variables, and it resulted in a p value of 0.473 
(Appendix G). This means that there is no relationship between gender and verifying a sender 
of a direct message on social media. The results also indicate that there is no distinct difference 
in behaviour for male and female students, for the tested variables. To identify if there is a 
difference in behaviour if students stood a chance to win something, a further cross-tabulation 
was constructed. The two variables tested were gender and whether students would verify the 
sender of a direct social media message, provided they stood a chance to win something. As 
shown in Table 4.32, the gender behaviour is similar. However, the percentage of males who 
would not verify significantly decreases to 55.3%. On the other hand, 44.7% of male, and 44% 
of female, students would verify the sender of the online message. The Chi-square test 
conducted generated a significance value of 0.891, indicating no relationship between gender 
and verifying the sender of a message on social media.  
 
 
Yes No
Count 50 111 161
% within 
Gender
31.1% 68.9% 100.0%
Count 62 138 200
% within 
Gender
31.0% 69.0% 100.0%
Count 112 249 361
% within 
Gender
31.0% 69.0% 100.0%
Total
Under what circumstance would you 
provide personally identifiable 
information (e.g.: identity number) to 
someone close emailing, after verifying 
the sender would you respond
Total
Gender Male
Female
 
79 
 
Table 4. 32: Cross-tabulation between gender and verifying the social media message sender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To test whether students do respond to social media direct messages without verifying the 
sender, gender was cross-tabulated against whether students would respond without verifying 
the sender. The results showed that the majority of students would not respond with their PII 
without verifying the sender. As shown in Table 4.33, 92.5% of female, and 78.3% of male, 
students would not respond with their PII without verifying the sender. Yet, 21.7% of male, 
and 7.5% of female, students would send their information without verifying the sender. A Chi-
square test was conducted and produced an asymptotic value of p=0.000. This signifies a 
relationship between gender and response rate without verifying the sender. The relationship 
suggests that females are less likely to send their PII, compared to male students. Therefore, 
male students have higher chances of falling victim on social networks since they do not verify 
the sender prior to sending their PII. Moreover, to identify any gender-dependent differences 
in behaviour if students stood a chance to win something, a cross-tabulation was conducted. 
The tested variables were gender and whether students would respond without verifying, if 
they had a possibility of winning something. As shown in Appendix G, most students (88% of 
females and 86.3% of males) would not respond without verifying the sender, even though they 
stood a chance of winning something. The value of p produced by the Chi-square test was 
0.637, which implies no relationship between gender and responding without verifying the 
social media sender (Appendix G). Therefore, response behaviours to social media messages 
when something is to be won, are not gender-dependent.  
 
 
 
Yes No
Count 64 97 161
% within 
Gender
39.8% 60.2% 100.0%
Count 87 113 200
% within 
Gender
43.5% 56.5% 100.0%
Count 151 210 361
% within 
Gender
41.8% 58.2% 100.0%
Total
Under what circumstance would you 
provide personally identifiable information 
(e.g.: identity number) over a social network 
direct message, would you verify the sender
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 33: Cross-tabulation between gender and responding without verifying the social 
network sender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender was further cross-tabulated against whether students would send their information after 
verifying the sender (see Appendix G). The cross-tabulation showed that more female students 
(78.5%), than male students (72.7%), would not respond with their PII to a direct social media 
message; while 27.3% of male, and 21.5% of female, students would respond to a social media 
message with their information. The variables – gender and whether students would respond 
with their PII – were further tested using a Chi-square test. The test showed that there is no 
relationship between the two variables, since p=0.198. To further identify a gender difference 
in response if students knew they stood a chance of winning something, a cross-tabulation 
between the two variables was completed. Table 4.34 presents the results that show that 77.5% 
of female, and 66.5% of male, students would not respond to the social media message after 
verifying the sender. However, other students (33.5% of males and 22.5% of females) would 
respond with their PII after verifying the social media sender. As seen in Appendix G, a Chi-
square test produced a significance value of p=0.019 for gender and responding after verifying 
the sender when there is something to be won. The results suggest that a relationship exists. In 
this instance, the relationship implies that male students respond more after verifying the 
sender, if they stand a chance of winning; whereas, female students are not responsive to social 
media messages, regardless of verifying the sender. Therefore, male students are more 
susceptible to falling victim on social networks if there is something to be won since they 
willingly provide their PII.  
 
Yes No
Count 35 126 161
% within 
Gender
21.7% 78.3% 100.0%
Count 15 185 200
% within 
Gender
7.5% 92.5% 100.0%
Count 50 311 361
% within 
Gender
13.9% 86.1% 100.0%
Total
Under what circumstance would you 
provide personally identifiable information 
(e.g.: identity number) over a social 
network direct message, would you 
respond without verifying the sender
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 34: Cross-tabulation between gender and response after verifying the social network 
message sender when something will be won 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.7.15 Cross-tabulation between faculty and phishing awareness 
To gain an understanding of the level of awareness, based on each faculty, a cross-tabulation 
was carried out between the two variables. Table 4.35 shows the phishing example that was 
posed to the respondents. The findings showed that 29.3% of students from Science and 
Technology were able to correctly identify the example. Also, 19.7% of students from Law and 
Management Studies, 14.9% of students from Social Sciences and 11.1% of students from Art 
and Drama accurately classified the given example. However, no student from Health Sciences 
was able to accurately identify the provided example. Furthermore, the Health Sciences 
students, consisting of 50% of both male and female students, indicated that they do not know 
the attack type. Also, 26.6% of students from Social Sciences, 25.9% of students from Art and 
Drama and 17.6% of students from Law and Management indicated that they did not know the 
answer to the given example. Science and Technology students had the second lowest 
percentage (14.1%) of students who said that they did not know the answer. A Chi-square test, 
giving a significance value p=0.162, showed that there was no relationship between faculty and 
phishing awareness. This shows that, regardless of the faculty, students lack awareness about 
the different types of online attacks. Therefore, awareness campaigns need to be driven across 
all faculties as there are students in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics 
(STEM) who do not know about social engineering attacks. 
 
Yes No
Count 54 107 161
% within 
Gender
33.5% 66.5% 100.0%
Count 45 155 200
% within 
Gender
22.5% 77.5% 100.0%
Count 99 262 361
% within 
Gender
27.4% 72.6% 100.0%
Total
Under what circumstance would you provide 
personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity 
number) over a social network direct message, 
after verifying the sender would you respond
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Table 4. 35: Cross-tabulation between faculty and phishing awareness 
 
 
4.7.16 Cross-tabulation between gender, ethnicity and online security concern 
A cross-tabulation was carried out between three variables, namely gender, ethnicity and online 
security concern (refer to Appendix G). The objective of the cross-tabulation was to identify 
gender differences in attitudes to online security, based on race. The findings showed that the 
most concerned students were White female students (77.8%), followed by White male 
students (66.7%), who were equally as concerned as Indian female students (66.7%). Also, 
African male student (56%) were strongly concerned, as well as 50% of Indian male students 
and 49.4% of female African students. A male respondent, who did not wish to specify his 
race, noted that he was very concerned (100%) about online security. However, it is important 
to note that Coloured male students (0%) showed no concern about online security when 
responding to an unknown source; whereas Coloured female students (20%) showed a greater 
concern. Furthermore, the results showed that Coloured students (50% of males and 20% of 
females) are the least concerned of the ethnic groups. Also, small percentages of African 
students (9% females and 7.3% males), Indian students (8.7% males and 3.3% females) and 
White students (11.1% females) indicated that they are not concerned about online security 
when responding. A Chi-square test was conducted for the variables and all the test results 
Cyber-
crime
Phishing 
attack Malware
Email 
spam
Identity 
theft
I do not 
know
Count 5 3 0 10 2 7 27
% within 
Faculty
18.5% 11.1% 0.0% 37.0% 7.4% 25.9% 100.0%
Count 0 0 0 3 0 3 6
% within 
Faculty
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Count 25 28 8 45 11 25 142
% within 
Faculty
17.6% 19.7% 5.6% 31.7% 7.7% 17.6% 100.0%
Count 16 14 0 29 10 25 94
% within 
Faculty
17.0% 14.9% 0.0% 30.9% 10.6% 26.6% 100.0%
Count 17 27 3 23 9 13 92
% within 
Faculty
18.5% 29.3% 3.3% 25.0% 9.8% 14.1% 100.0%
Count 63 72 11 110 32 73 361
% within 
Faculty
17.5% 19.9% 3.0% 30.5% 8.9% 20.2% 100.0%
Health 
Sciences
Law/Mana
gment
Social 
Sciences
Science/T
echnology
Total
Emails that usually appear to come from a well-known organization 
and ask for your personal information - such as credit card number, 
account number or password
Total
Faculty Art/Drama
 
83 
 
produced p>0.05, which signified no relationships between the tested variables. The results 
suggest that online security concern exists across all genders and races. 
 
4.8 Summary of gender-dependent results 
Below is a high-level overview of the gender differences identified in this study. These 
relationships of the existing correlations are supported by Chi-square tests that provided a p 
value less than 0.05. 
 4.8.1 Awareness:  
• Phishing knowledge 
• Cybercrime knowledge 
• Malware knowledge 
 4.8.2 Receiving and responding to random SE messages 
• Receiving social engineering attempts over online links 
• Receiving social engineering attempts over online pop-up messages 
• Responding to social engineering attempts over online popup messages 
• Responding to social engineering attempts over social media messages 
 4.8.3 Online security perceptions 
• Online security is important 
• Online security is outside the user’s control 
 4.8.4 Information security-related principles 
• Changing of privacy settings on social networks  
 4.8.5 Responding to random email messages 
• Verifying the email sender  
• Responding after verifying the email sender 
• Responding after verifying the email sender when there is something to be won 
 4.8.6 Responding to random email messages from someone close 
• Responding without verifying the email sender 
 4.8.7 Responding to a social media direct message 
• Responding without verifying the message sender 
• Responding after verifying the email sender when there is something to be won 
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4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the participants’ responses. The total response rate was 95% and the 
majority of the respondents were female students. The data for this study did not follow a 
normal distribution; therefore, non-parametric tests were conducted. Cross-tabulations were 
used to identify relationships between the constructs. The following chapter (Chapter 5) 
discusses these results in more detail and in relation to the research objectives outlined in 
Chapter 1.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a detailed analysis of the responses, including descriptive statistics 
generated from the data, were presented. This chapter presents a detailed discussion of the 
findings in relation to the research objectives of this study. In addition, the chapter discusses 
how the study’s research objectives were achieved through the analysed data.  
 
5.2 Alignment of the findings with the research objectives 
As noted in Chapter 1, the research objectives of this study are as follows:  
1. To determine whether there is a gender difference in the response of tertiary students 
to online social engineering; 
2. To identify students’ knowledge, from a gender perspective, about online social 
engineering;  
3. To determine if there is a gender difference in attitudes to online information security 
among young adult students. 
5.3 Answering research objectives 
5.3.1 Research Objective 1: 
Determine whether there is a gender difference in the response of tertiary students to 
online social engineering 
To achieve the gender dependence objective, young adult students were asked to complete 
questionnaires that consisted of situational-based questions. The questions had different 
scenarios that tested whether the student would respond. Based on the gender construct, the 
analysed responses showed the following: 
• male dominance in receiving social engineering messages  
The findings indicated that more male students acknowledged receiving email messages that 
were suspicious in nature. Generally, both male and female students use the internet extensively 
for their learning assessments and for communication purposes with the university. Male 
students are often considered to be technology enthusiasts, using technology for numerous 
purposes; and have more email addresses, mainly for online gaming purposes (Noguti, Singh, 
& Waller, 2019). Hence, a higher percentage of male students claimed to have received random 
email messages. The findings further indicated that both female and male students have similar 
response rates. However, male students have a higher response rate to random email messages. 
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Similar findings were also discovered in a study conducted by Tewari (2015). It was discovered 
that email messages are commonly used to initiate different types of phishing attempts. 
Furthermore, it can be implied that male students stand a higher risk of falling victim to social 
engineering attacks, since they have more email accounts which lead to more phishing attack 
attempts. In addition, the influence of gender was verified by the Chi-square test, which showed 
a relationship between gender and receiving a random email message. 
 
Furthermore, based on the findings, more male students indicated that they had received online 
links that are possible social engineering attempts. The findings showed that more male 
students respond to the random online links, compared to female students. These findings can 
be interpreted to mean that female students are aware that random online links are malicious. 
Therefore, they more often refrain from responding to the link attempts, compared to male 
students. In a similar study conducted by Al Hasib (2009), it was noted that students tend to 
avoid clicking on online links because they have identified them as scams. These findings 
further support the studies of Cai, Fan, and Du (2017), which found that male students tend to 
have confidence when performing online activities; whereas female students demonstrated 
computer anxiety when conducting online tasks. Therefore, the higher percentage of male 
students responding to random online links can be associated with their online confidence over 
the internet. Additionally, the Chi-square tests showed that a relationship exists between gender 
and receiving a random online link. This implies that male students are more likely to fall 
victims to social engineering online link attempts, since they receive and respond more to 
online link messages. However, there is no gender-dependent relationship with responding to 
random online links, as both genders showed similar response behaviour. 
 
The results obtained for online pop-up messages showed that male students reported having 
received more messages that appeared to be malicious in nature. This is not unexpected, as 
males have been reported to spend more time online (Noguti et al., 2019). Diffley, Kearns, 
Bennett, and Kawalek (2011) noted in their study that male student respondents specified that 
they are not bothered by online pop-up messages. Evidently, based on this research study’s 
findings, the percentage of male students who have responded to pop-up messages is more than 
double that of their female counterparts. This is due to males being more curious (Malandrino 
et al., 2013) which suggests that they are likely to respond to the online pop-up messages that 
appear, whilst they are browsing the internet. Furthermore, significant relationships were found 
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between gender and receiving and responding to online pop-up messages that seemed to be SE 
attacks, confirming that male students are more susceptible to online pop-up messages.  
 
• female dominance in receiving direct social media messages 
In this study, a higher percentage of female students indicated that they have received direct 
social media messages. These messages appeared to be an attempt at obtaining their personal 
information. Despite the messages being suspicious in nature, more female students admitted 
that they have responded to similar messages in the past. These findings correspond to a study 
conducted by Perrin (2015), in which females indicated that they were active participants on 
social media sites. This behaviour works in favour of social engineers since they target users 
continually on social networking sites, due to the significant amount of ‘available’ personally 
identifiable information (PII). Similarly, in a study conducted by Joiner, Cuprinskaite, 
Dapkeviciute, Johnson, Gavin, and Brosnan (2016), females and males demonstrated 
differences in their responses to social media. In most instances, females demonstrated more 
sympathy in their responses, compared to males. In another study conducted by Herring and 
Kapidzic (2015), females were more likely to use social networks for communication. This 
implies that females are more likely to respond, based on their emotional supportive nature. 
Furthermore, it means that female students stand a higher chance of falling victim in instances 
where social engineers convey a sense of urgency, since females would feel the urge to assist. 
A study conducted by Veltri, Krasnova, Baumann, and Kalayamthanam (2014) showed that 
online gender patterns exist and are motivated by societal roles of both male and females. 
 
In addition to the cross-tabulations of receiving, and responding to, social media messages, 
Chi-square tests were conducted. The results showed that there is no relationship between 
gender and receiving a suspicious social media message. This can be because both genders 
engage actively on social media sites (Perrin, 2015). However, there exists a relationship 
between gender and responding to suspicious direct social media messages, showing that 
females on social media are more likely to fall victim. If social engineers use the trust 
mechanism to communicate with females, female students would engage with the sender and 
comply with the given instructions.  
 
5.3.2 Research Objective 2: 
Identify students’ knowledge about online social engineering from a gender perspective 
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In this study, students were required to match the appropriate attack type with the given 
example. Cross-tabulations were conducted to identify the difference in social engineering 
knowledge between male and female students. The cross-tabulation findings were as follows: 
 
• gender-based awareness and knowledge of attacks related to social engineering 
A phishing attack example was provided, and the respondents were asked to identify it. More 
male students than females were able to identify it accurately as a phishing attack. Equally 
importantly, more female students acknowledged that they did not know the answer. The Chi-
square test showed a relationship between gender and phishing attack awareness. These 
findings suggest that female students require more social engineering education relating to 
phishing attacks. In support of the findings, it was also found, in the study conducted by Diaz, 
Sherman, and Joshi (2020), that females are less knowledgeable about phishing attacks. 
However, despite male students being more knowledgeable about phishing attacks, there is a 
risk of them falling victim to phishing attacks. This is due to careless online behavioural 
patterns. This is supported by a study conducted by Munien (2010) that studied users’ 
awareness levels and the probability of falling victim to phishing attempts. The study found 
that individuals, irrespective of their knowledge of phishing, fall victim to phishing attacks. 
The susceptibility of individuals falling victim was due to inadequate online security behaviour.  
 
Techopedia (2014) noted that identity theft victims experience severe consequences, such as 
damaged credit scores and reputations. Students were given a description of an identity theft 
that they had to identify. Most of the students were able to accurately classify the example as 
identity theft. However, the findings indicated that more male students provided accurate 
responses, compared to female students. These findings can be aligned with the studies of Luo 
et al. (2011) and Hassan (2019), which reported that young adult students are aware of identity 
theft and the repercussions. However, more female students indicated that they did not know 
the answer. This echoes the study conducted by Harrell and Langton (2015) which indicated 
that young adult students fall victim to identify theft, although they were not familiar with the 
appropriate term for the attack. Therefore, this implies the possibility that female students who 
indicated that they ‘do not know’ had previously had identity theft encounters, without 
knowing that it was a form of identity theft. However, due to the lack of knowledge and 
information about security, they did not identify the encounter as identity theft. Also, females’ 
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trusting nature makes them unaware that they are victims of social engineering. No relationship 
between gender and identify theft awareness was uncovered by the Chi-square test.  
 
To determine whether students are familiar with cybercrime, they were provided with a 
question which was specific to cybercrime identification. According to the findings, more male 
students correctly categorised the given example, suggesting that more male students are aware 
of what cybercrime is and how it operates. These findings correlate with the research conducted 
by Yu (2014), which concluded that males are aware, and less fearful of, cyberbullying. In 
support of those findings, Erdur-Baker (2010) also showed how males are more likely to be the 
perpetrators of cybercrime, compared to their female counterparts. Back, Soor, and LaPrade 
(2018) conducted a study which affirmed that males, in numerous countries, have a close 
association with computer hacking. Similarly, Walker, Sockman, and Koehn (2011), in their 
study, found that there is a positive correlation between physical crime and cybercrime. 
Furthermore, a higher percentage of female students admitted that they did not know the 
response. This implies that more attention should be focused on female students as they are 
more likely to fall victim to cybercrime. Moreover, female students need to be educated about 
security measures that can be applied to adequately protect themselves in cybercrime situations, 
similar to the physical campaigns that females stage in South Africa (Gouws, 2018). The 
awareness programmes should also include how to timeously discover that they have fallen 
victim to any form of cyberattack. The Chi-square test showed that cybercrime awareness is 
gender-dependent. This means that male students are less likely to fall victim to cybercrime 
since they will easily identify that they are being attacked. Also, in most cybercrime offenses, 
males are the perpetrators.  
 
Further findings from this study showed that more male students were able to accurately 
identify the email spam example. In support of the findings, Alazab and Broadhurst (2016) 
revealed how the rapid growth of social networks has contributed to the volumes of spam. 
Tewari (2015) identified that, nowadays, spam emails are embedded with phishing links, 
causing differentiation difficulties. This is due to the similarities between email spam and 
phishing emails, such as language and links embedded in the emails. The Chi-square test 
conducted indicated that there is no relationship between gender and email spam awareness.  
 
Male students demonstrated a greater awareness of malware. These findings suggest that 
female students are at risk of downloading content that contains malware since they are not as 
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knowledgeable about malware. Furthermore, in this research, more female students indicated 
that they could not identify the malware example presented. A Chi-square test was conducted 
and showed a relationship between gender and malware knowledge. Therefore, it can be 
deduced that male students’ exposure to technology makes them familiar with malicious 
software, such as malware. It also implies that male students would be able to identify if their 
computer is affected with malware and know the necessary measures to be taken. Chandarman 
and Van Niekerk (2017) stressed that malware campaigns should be conducted to emphasise 
the importance of regular updates of personal computers. It is believed that campaigns would 
assist in decreasing the number of successful malware attacks. However, more focus should be 
given to female students since they are underrepresented in academic streams that provide 
exposure to both technology hardware and software knowledge. 
 
5.3.3 Research Objective 3: 
Determine if there is a gender difference in attitudes to online information security among 
young adult students 
• gender-based interest in online security 
This research found that male students have more interest in online security. These findings 
correlate with those of Bada, Sasse, and Nurse (2019). Their study revealed that male students 
are more adventurous in technology domains. Therefore, the constant usage of the internet, 
apparent in male students, leads to a better understanding of the relevance of online security. 
This also suggests the possibility that male students have previously encountered various forms 
of social engineering attacks which have made them realise the need for online security. This 
is reflected further in the research findings, where more male students considered online 
security important. Gender and the perception of whether online security is necessary were 
tested to determine if there is a relationship. Although more male students indicated that online 
security is necessary, there was no relationship. The Chi-square tests indicated that, in as much 
as male students perceived that online security is necessary, there was no major difference in 
perception.  
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• gender-based knowledge about online security  
Most male students disagreed that online security was outside the user’s control. A study 
conducted by Herring and Kapidzic (2015) corresponds to these research findings. In their 
study, it was evident that male students are aware that assigning security measures lies within 
the users’ control. The study implied that male students are more experimental and practical in 
computer-related matters, which leads to familiarity with computer security. For instance, male 
students are more aware that installing an antivirus is the users’ responsibility. These findings 
are supported by the findings of Lund (2018). His study showed that male students are 
knowledgeable about how to safeguard their workstations and how to modify their online 
security settings. Also, this study’s results showed a higher percentage of female students who 
provided neutral responses as to whether online security is outside the user’s control. These 
results are supported by a study which showed that when students do not know the adequate 
answer to a question, they provide neutral responses (Saltzman & Price, 2017). This is also 
believed to be due to the lower representation of female students in the Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) fields (Liu & Murphy, 2016). The Chi-square test 
results indicated that there is a relationship between gender and an understanding of whether 
online security is outside the user’s control. The Chi-square test results affirm that male 
students are more likely to have adequate security controls and security knowledge since they 
understand that security measures are their responsibility as users.  
 
• gender-based perceptions of information security 
Further findings about information security perceptions showed that most male respondents 
considered online privacy as a mechanism to protect their information. Similar findings were 
presented in the study by Hunter and Taylor (2019), where male students indicated that social 
networks use online privacy settings to protect their information from hackers. The findings of 
this research further showed that more male students considered online privacy a means to 
prevent identity theft. The findings of this study correlate with the findings of a study conducted 
by Hayat, Lesser, and Samuel-Azran (2017), who presented findings that revealed that fewer 
female students used privacy settings.   
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• the differences in gender behaviour on online social platforms 
A higher percentage of female students indicated that hiding their image and contact 
information is the important reason behind online privacy. This is supported by Mazman and 
Usluel (2011), whose findings in their study showed that more female students, as compared 
to males, hide their PII on social networks. The findings also relate to the study conducted by 
Markman (2012), which indicated that females hiding their personal information is associated 
with traditional societal roles that women uphold. This is in relation to the social pressure that 
defines how females should conduct themselves. The findings also showed that many female 
students do not know the reason behind the importance of online privacy. This implies the 
possibility that female students will expose their PII information on social networks as they do 
not know the relevance of online privacy, indicating that a higher number of female students 
are vulnerable to social engineering attempts. The conducted Chi-square test showed that 
privacy perception is not gender-dependent. This is interpreted to mean that no gender is more 
knowledgeable than the other in terms of online privacy importance on social networks. Also, 
both genders hold similar views about online privacy. 
 
• Gender beliefs towards safeguarding their online information 
To further understand gender-dependent attitudes of students to mechanisms that can help 
safeguard their information, a cross tabulation was conducted. The results showed similar 
results for both male and female students. More male students considered installing an antivirus 
as a means of safeguarding their information. Similarly, a study conducted by Malandrino et 
al. (2013) revealed that male students had false perceptions about protecting their PII. Their 
findings also showed that some students knew the right tools required to protect their 
information; yet they lacked the skill, and had negative attitudes, to implementing the tool. 
Therefore, despite male students claiming to take adequate measures to protect their 
information, it does not guarantee that they are safe from SE attacks. Male students may not 
have the necessary skill to install the antivirus. Accordingly, Shen, Yang, and Zhou (2015), 
highlighted the common mistake that individuals make, by perceiving that installing an 
antivirus is an adequate measure to safeguard their information. Therefore, more accurate 
responses are due to the male students’ familiarity with technology. In support of these 
findings, Rathore, Sharma, Loia, Jeong, and Park (2017) noted male students’ familiarity with 
computers. 
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On the other hand, more female students considered not changing their password as the best 
solution. These findings indicate that more females than males lack information security 
knowledge about password security. The cause may be influenced by the lack of females’ 
exposure to computers and other technologies. Similarly, this is presented in the study by 
Singh, Chandwani, Singh, and Kumar (2019) where female respondents displayed anxiety 
when using computers. Also, a relatively high percentage of both male and female students 
indicated that they do not know the best suitable solution for protecting their online 
information. This implies that both genders have similar challenges with the knowledge that 
can help safeguard their information. The results relate to a study conducted by Chandarman 
and Van Niekerk (2017) which showed that students have the misperception that social 
engineers see no value in their PII. Students are vulnerable due to their lack of information 
security knowledge, which may help safeguard and prevent them from falling victim to social 
engineering attacks. The Chi-square test conducted showed no relationship between gender and 
the perception of protecting online information. Therefore, both genders have similar attitudes 
to adequate and non-adequate measures of protecting their information. 
 
• gendered concerns about online security 
Further results obtained showed that most male students are very concerned about online 
security. The concern arises when students respond to an unknown source. Students were asked 
to indicate their level of online security concern when responding to a friend. Male students 
showed more concern than females. However, more male students were less concerned when 
responding to a friend than an unknown source. Findings about perception, regarding concern, 
showed that male students are the more concerned gender. Yet, when responding to a known 
source, the concern is reduced. It can be deduced that male students’ higher level of concern 
for online security arises from their greater internet usage. In a study conducted by Bashir et 
al. (2016), it was noted that males spend most of their time online. Also, in another study 
conducted by Siomos, Dafouli, Braimiotis, Mouzas, and Angelopoulos (2008), male students 
had the most internet addition disorder and were at risk from internet usage. The findings 
further indicated that, when students are familiar with an individual, they are less concerned. 
This is believed to work in favour of social engineers who use identity theft on individuals 
through messages and emails. The results indicate that both genders would fall victim to social 
engineering when social engineers present themselves as friends. Grabner-Kräuter and Bitter 
(2015), in their study, found that both genders fall victim due to the trust mechanism used by 
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social engineers. The Chi-square test results for both – responding to a friend and to an 
unknown source – showed no gender influence. These results imply that both female and male 
students have similar risks of falling victim to the attacker’s deception that leads the students 
into thinking that they are responding to someone known to them.  
 
• gendered attitudes about information security 
The overall findings regarding students’ attitudes to being taught about information security 
were positive. Both female and male students noted that they would definitely like to be taught 
about information security; and female students showed a higher interest in being taught about 
information security. Only a few students were disinterested in learning about information 
security. The findings of Heartfield and Loukas (2015) highlighted the approaches to 
educational activities that raise SE awareness levels. Their approach entailed a multilayered 
technique in terms of incorporating the human and technical aspects of social engineering. The 
findings of this study correspond, since most students showed interest in being taught about 
information security. Also, as shown in the studies of Glanz, Rimer, and Viswanath (2008); 
Luo et al. (2011); Williams, Beardmore, and Joinson (2017), increasing young adults’ 
awareness levels leads to a change in behaviour, which supports information security practices. 
In their study, they also found that educational awareness programmes are more meaningful 
when they consist of explaining the dangers of social engineering. The Chi-square test which 
was conducted showed that there is no relationship between gender and students’ attitudes. 
This further implies that students share the same eagerness for knowledge about acquiring 
information security.  
 
A study by Potgieter (2019) stated that students are regarded as the population which is most 
vulnerable to cybersecurity attacks since they spend most of their time on the internet. The 
study further found that, in most cases, students are often irresponsible when using the internet, 
and they their personal information on online sites. Behaviour was cross-tabulated against 
gender in order to identify gender-dependent behaviours. Students were asked to indicate their 
behaviour regarding changing their social network passwords. The findings showed that more 
male students changed their privacy settings, after creating their social network passwords. The 
findings further showed that other male participants changed their privacy settings after they 
had worked out how to do the security changes. These findings can be associated with the 
internet knowledge that male students have. It is evident that male students are more 
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knowledgeable about the technical details of the internet, and other platforms on the internet. 
Similarly, in a study conducted by Nami and Vaezi (2018), it was apparent that male students 
understood the technical details of computer hardware and software. This study shows that 
male students’ computer knowledge transfers into the online world and assists them in 
protecting their information. The Chi-square test signified a positive relationship between 
gender and privacy settings on social networks. The relationship implies that male students’ 
information is not as exposed, compared to that of female students. This further implies that 
female students on social networks are more exposed, compared to male students.  
 
• gendered response rates to messages associated with social engineering  
The research findings revealed that male students were more likely to verify a random email 
message sender. A higher percentage of female students indicated that they would not verify 
the sender, even though the email message would be random. Similarly, in a study conducted 
by Heartfield and Loukas (2015), it was evident that young adults, despite their awareness of 
the risks involved, continue to reveal their information online. The behaviour was noted in 
instances where young adults download or watch videos from untrusted sites. The Chi-square 
test conducted found a significant relationship between gender and verifying an email sender 
of a random message. These findings imply that female students are the more susceptible 
gender since they indicated no intention of verifying an email sender. The findings further 
revealed that, if there is something to be won, more female students would again not verify the 
sender. These findings are supported by a study conducted by Beneito-Montagut (2017) which 
noted how females are easily influenced by emotional and social associations to products. Also, 
in support of the findings, a study conducted by Malandrino et al. (2013) showed that 
individuals fill in their personal information on the sites in order to stand a chance of winning 
a gift. Furthermore, a study conducted by Liu and Murphy (2016) indicated that females have 
a higher susceptibility to products advertised online products than do men. Therefore, in the 
context of this research’s findings, it can be concluded that female students are more likely to 
reveal their information, provided there is something to be won. This also means that female 
students can be lured, due to their trust in the advertised product. As shown in the research 
results, female students habitually do not verify the message sender if there is something to be 
won. Verifying a random email message was tested against gender. However, the Chi-square 
test to analyse verifying an email message when there is something to be won showed no gender 
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dependence. This implies that both males and females can be lured by social engineers in 
random email messages, provided there is something to be won. 
 
The findings for random email messages further showed that gender-dependent relationships 
exist in responding to the email sender after verifying the sender. The relationships were for 
both responding after verifying the sender when there is nothing to be won, and for when there 
is something to be won. In both instances, more male students noted that they would respond 
to the message by providing their PII after they had verified the sender. The findings relate to 
a study by Chaudhry et al. (2016) which showed that more male students are risk-takers, 
compared to their female counterparts. These findings imply that male students are more likely 
to responding to random email messages. Even though they respond after verifying, it does not 
provide any assurance that the sender is a legitimate source. Therefore, male students are more 
likely to fall for phishing attempts, based on their behaviour in responding to the random email 
messages. 
 
Students were further asked to indicate whether they would respond to a direct social media 
message without verifying the sender. The findings showed that most female students would 
not respond to a direct social network message without verifying the message sender. Also, 
even after verifying the sender, only a few of the female respondents indicated that they would 
provide their PII. These findings were confirmed by the relationships uncovered by the Chi-
square test for both situations. Similar findings are found in the study by Cai et al. (2017), in 
which female students responded to social network messages from individuals in their circle 
of friends. This shows that female students are more cautious about their PII, compared to male 
students. This also emerged in this research, as a gender-dependent relationship. Furthermore, 
the findings imply that male students willingly provide their personal information to 
individuals with whom they are not familiar, over social platforms. There is also the possibility 
that male students verify the sender; yet it can be a fictitious sender, or a profile created by the 
attackers to lure the individual. Therefore, male students are more vulnerable on social network 
sites since they are the more responsive gender. 
 
The students’ responses indicated that male students have received the most random email 
messages, online links, and online pop-up messages that seemed to be attempts at social 
engineering. Thus, the findings show that male students are the more-targeted gender. Also, 
phishing messages are the most common social engineering attempts. In support of these 
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research findings, a study conducted by Falk (2016) showed that students use emails daily. 
Therefore, this research’s findings can be related to the constant use of email messaging used 
by universities and students as a communication platform. It can therefore be deduced that 
students’ constant use of emails exposes them to more phishing attacks; and male students 
received the most social engineering attempts, which indicates that male students are more 
vulnerable. Also, the Chi-square tests for receiving a phishing, online link and online pop-up 
social engineering attempt revealed gender-dependent relationships. The Chi-square results 
show that social engineers are more likely to attack male students through phishing, online 
links, and online pop-ups. 
 
On the other hand, female students received the most social engineering attempts on social 
media. These finding correlate with the study of Al-Jabri et al. (2015), where it was evident 
that female students are the more active on social networks. However, the Chi-square test 
conducted on gender and social engineering on social media showed that no relationship exists. 
This implies that there is no gender-dependent relationship with attempts at social engineering 
on social media. Furthermore, these findings suggest that both male and female students have 
the same risk of falling victim to social engineering across all social networks. 
 
5.4 Adaptation of the Gender and International Security, Feminist Theory to the study 
The study adopted the feminist theory, since gender concepts are not covered by existing 
information security theories. The adopted theory focused on interpreting the study’s findings 
from a gendered perspective. This research shows that there are prevalent gender differences 
in online social engineering (OSE). The findings further showed that subjective norms and 
attitudes do have an impact on the behavioural intentions of both genders. This is believed to 
be the influence of learned gendered societal roles which play a part in the way that both male 
and female students respond to online attacks. For instance, this study shows how the 
traditional norm for females is to portray characteristics of nurturing. This in turn leads to the 
vulnerability of female students on the online platform when social engineers use the trust 
mechanism. This study also found that female students are easily influenced by social 
associations due to their emotional nature. On the other hand, male students showed a more 
dominant online presence, linked to their traditional masculinity teachings. Also, the greater 
exposure of males to technology allows them to be more knowledgeable about social 
engineering. This is because society regards technology as a male domain; hence the lack of 
females in the Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics streams. This study found 
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that male students have more knowledge about social engineering and of ways that can help 
safeguard their information. However, the findings showed that male students are more 
responsive to most online social engineering attempts. These findings affirm the masculinity 
teachings of males having to portray bravery as they are considered the leaders of their families. 
This in turn reveals that gendered societal norms do transfer into the online world.  
 
To determine a gendered attitude towards information security, the feminist theory was further 
applied. This study found that both male and female students have a positive attitude to being 
educated about information security. The findings also showed that male students place more 
importance on online security. More male students understand the importance of online 
security, and that it is in the user’s control, due to their knowledge of the prevalent online social 
engineering attacks which were addressed earlier in this chapter. Also, the early exposure of 
males to technical fields leads them to understand that users control the online safety of their 
information. It is believed that such differences in attitudes and behaviour are habits, resulting 
from early childhood teaching that shapes the behaviour of both genders.  
 
5.5 Adaptation of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) to the study 
This study further tested constructs from the TRA theory that are believed to influence 
behaviour.  
 
Attitude: The feminist theory guided this construct and it produced results which indicated 
that both male and female students approve of information security. 
 
Subjective Norm: This study found that external factors, such as feminism and masculinity, 
impact on behavioural intentions. The feminist theory applied looked at this construct in more 
depth. 
  
Behavioural Intention: The study was aimed at discovering whether female and male 
students’ behavioural intentions are influenced by attitude and subjective norms. Based on the 
findings, the motivations for behaviour are influenced by normative beliefs and attitudes. The 
findings showed that female students act out of femininity teachings. This was shown by 
females indicating that they would comply with messages if they stood a chance to win 
something. This suggests a vulnerability in female students, due to their social associations to 
products. It is also believed that female students’ lack of technology exposure influences their 
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behaviour, as it is traditionally believed that technology is a male domain. The research further 
found that male students’ behavioural intentions are influenced by patriarchal teachings. Male 
students exhibited boldness in most of the social engineering attacks. Also, male students were 
more capable in terms of understanding social engineering and adequate controls to protect 
their online information. This further confirms that social norm impacts behaviour based on 
masculinity. However, both male and female students’ attitudes are similar in nature. This was 
indicated by the respondents showing similar online security concerns and a positive attitude 
to learning about information security. This implies that the attitude construct is not gender-
dependent, compared to social norms. The only commonality of attitude exists regarding online 
security training.  
 
Behaviour: Based on the previously defined constructs, it can be inferred that behaviour is 
driven by external constructs. Although higher percentages of male students respond more to 
the different categories of social engineering attempts, they are also more knowledgeable about 
measures that can help safeguard their information; whereas female students are more reluctant 
on online platforms, as they are less knowledgeable. However, female students act when they 
have an emotional connection to messages offering rewards. The findings highlight the possible 
vulnerabilities make both female and male students more susceptible on the internet.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explained the results obtained, relative to the research objectives. The chapter also 
outlined the research objectives and how they have been achieved. The primary research 
objective of this study was to explore the gender dependence of OSE responses among young 
adult students. Based on this objective, it was evident that both female and male students have 
different response behaviours. The research findings further showed that male students have 
received and responded more to social engineering attempts. The responses were to social 
engineering attempts in random email messages and random online links. The chapter also 
presented the gender differences in knowledge about social engineering knowledge. It was 
concluded that male students have better social engineering awareness than females. In most 
instances, female students indicated that they did not know the ‘suitable’ answer. However, 
both genders indicated a strong willingness to being taught about information security. This 
demonstrates a positive attitude to information security awareness programmes. Furthermore, 
the findings highlight areas where students need to be educated about social engineering and 
ways of protecting themselves. In addition, the chapter provided a summary of how the two 
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frameworks correlate with the research findings. Both the frameworks show that behaviour is 
mostly influenced by subjective norms. It is believed that social engineering campaigns can 
change the mindset of students and lead to similar behavioural patterns and social engineering 
knowledge in both male and female students.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the research findings in relation to the study’s research 
objectives. It further presented how the research objectives were achieved through data 
analysis. The current study was rooted in its objectives, presented in Chapter 1. The aim of the 
study was to explore, explain and examine, according to gender, online social engineering 
attacks on young adult students. The quantitative research approach taken was to better 
understand, quantify and provide explanations of attacks on students. This chapter provides the 
conclusion, and thereafter summarises the major findings based on the study’s results. 
Furthermore, this chapter presents recommendations for social engineering (SE) awareness 
initiatives. In addition, it provides suggestions for future research.  
 
6.2 Summary of the study 
Chapter 1 provided an outline of the study. It introduced the concept of online social 
engineering (OSE) and the existing attacks on various online channels. It also explained why 
young adult students are the most vulnerable to social engineering attacks. It further provided 
an overview of the problem statement and the research questions and objectives. In addition, 
the chapter explained in detail the two adopted research frameworks used in this study. 
Furthermore, the chapter provided the limitations of the study and an overview of the 
subsequent chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 presented previous literature on social engineering. It also explained the common 
attack types of social engineering. Furthermore, it reviewed social engineering in relation to 
information security, gender and young adult students. The chapter also provided an overview 
of social engineers use of compliance mechanisms to lure young adult students into falling 
victim. Additionally, it explained the concept of online social engineering and how it is human-
related.  
 
Chapter 3 presented an in-depth description of the research methodology and techniques used 
in this study. It also described the methods by which data was collected and analysed. Data was 
collected through questionnaires from students at two academic institutions in 
Pietermaritzburg. It discussed the Krejcie and Morgan table, used to select the sample size 
(379), and the probability sampling method used. Furthermore, the chapter provided a 
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description data analysis which was conducted using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS).  
 
Chapter 4 presented the analysed findings from the collected data. The chapter presented the 
reliability test and normality test results as the introduction, prior to the detailed description of 
the analysed data. The normality test results indicated that this study’s collected data was not 
normally distributed. Hence, the study employed non-parametric tests on the data. In addition, 
this chapter presented the results of cross-tabulations and chi-square tests. The results were 
used to distinguish existing relationships between tested variables.  
 
Chapter 5 discussed the findings in detail, in relation to the research objectives of this study. 
The results presented were aligned to the research objectives.  
 
6.3 Conclusion of the study 
The primary objective of this study was to discover whether there is a gender difference in 
responses to online social engineering attempts, and to provide awareness programmes based 
on the findings of the research. Two frameworks were adopted in order to conduct the study 
through a gendered lens. A feminist theory, in conjunction with the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(TRA), was used to guide the study. The two theoretical frameworks guided the study in terms 
of gender and IT. The constructs of the TRA theory guided the formulation of the study’s 
research questions and objectives. The first research question focused on identifying the 
students’ gender differences in online social engineering attempts. The research question 
centered around identifying the gender differences in online social engineering attempts. It also 
tested the different recognition levels of both female and male students. The second research 
question investigated the young adults’ attitudes. It was aimed at identifying the extent to which 
there is a gender difference in social engineering attitudes. The third question focused on 
identifying the gender differences in responses to online social engineering. It was aimed at 
discovering whether the social engineering responses are adequate to protect both males and 
females.  
 
The study employed a quantitative research approach, which used 379 questionnaires that were 
distributed to students at UKZN, Pietermaritzburg campus, and Umgungundlovu FET college. 
The collected data was further analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
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(SPSS). Based on the research findings, it was found that there is a gender difference in 
responses to online social engineering attacks. These gender differences were influenced by 
external factors, found in the TRA theory, which contribute to behavioural intentions that 
impact the overall behaviour of both female and male students. Thus, the variables in the TRA 
theory are considered valid, based on the data analysis of this study.  
 
The study revealed that gender plays a significant role in behavioural intentions, which are 
built upon normative beliefs. These beliefs, in turn, shape the differences in behaviour of 
female and male students. Due to gendered normative beliefs, such as the traditional societal 
roles of males and females, male students showed more online presence and familiarity with 
the online domain. This is due to a males’ prior exposure to technology as technology is 
considered a male domain. This exposure contributes to the male students’ knowledge about 
social engineering attacks and information security-related principles. This was revealed in the 
positive correlations that were found between gender and SE awareness. The findings showed 
that male students have better recognition levels and understanding of attacks. Also, traditional 
male upbringing nurtures bravery in male students, which influences their behaviour. In this 
study, such teachings were found to influence the way in which male students respond boldly 
to random online messages without knowing or verifying the message sender. On the other 
hand, it was found that female students showed inadequate social engineering awareness and 
more reserved behaviour in responding to online messages. It was also evident that, due to the 
female students’ underrepresentation in technology fields, female students lacked awareness 
and knowledge of SE attacks and adequate measures to protect their information on online 
social networks. 
 
Findings also revealed that behaviour regarding SE attacks is influenced by the differences in 
the gendered attitudes. Prior exposure to technology and the dominant online presence of male 
students led to their understanding the importance of online security. Also, male students 
showed more understanding of user controls and privacy settings to safeguard their online 
information. Prior exposure to technology also influenced the behavioural intentions of male 
students. It was found that male students’ knowledge of technology, and their online attitude, 
led to the bold behaviour noted by the male students. Male students consider themselves ‘tech 
savvy’, which allows them to be more curious and behave in a manner that makes them more 
vulnerable to online attackers. Female students’ lack of understanding of information security 
led to them perceiving online security as unimportant. Therefore, the female students’, ‘I do 
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not know’ attitude, influenced their behaviour, and they were more reluctant to respond to 
random messages. However, both genders showed positive attitudes to being taught about 
online security. This is believed to shape both males’ and females’ behaviour regarding online 
information security. 
 
6.4 Recommendations 
Email and intranet notifications 
Academic institutions can provide awareness notifications via the intranet and by using the 
students’ emails. The notifications can be sent out in bulk, educating students about social 
engineering. This approach will reach every student on the university’s emailing system, as per 
the school’s standard notification system. However, the limitation is the low number of students 
who would take their time to thoroughly read the email.  
 
Information security module 
Universities can introduce an information security module, focusing on social engineering. The 
module can consist of theoretical and practical ways of identifying online social engineering 
attacks. The practical aspect of the module can include interactive real-life social engineering 
simulations. The shortcoming of this approach may be that students do not register for the 
module as they may be disinterested. This limitation can be addressed by making the module 
compulsory for students, across all the faculties. The module can be an introductory module to 
information security as per the research findings, Chapter 5. It was noted that the majority of 
the students agreed to being educated about information security. 
 
Computer screensavers 
In the university’s local area networks (LAN), the computers utilised by students may have 
screen messages. The messages can be updated, based on the current and predominant types of 
social engineering attacks. However, there is no guarantee that students will read the 
screensavers. In order to ensure that students have read the screensaver message, the message 
can be interactive and made compulsory. In order to log onto a computer, the students would 
be required to identify the suspicious example, such as a phishing email, online pop-up or social 
media message. This awareness method can assist with data collection to identify other social 
engineering topics that need attention.  
 
 
105 
 
Online security and privacy posters 
The university can post awareness posters that show students how to safeguard their 
information on the internet. The posters can contain steps on how to change security settings 
across the different social networks, in order for students to better secure their online 
information. Also, the posters can inform students about the potential dangers to their personal 
information, as well as why it is necessary to constantly change passwords across online 
channels such as Gmail and Facebook. In highlighting the ‘why’, students would understand 
the relevance of complying with the tips provided on the posters. The limitation is that there is 
no assurance that students will read the posters. Thus, it is believed that this approach will 
provide a subconscious awareness, based on the continuous security messages carried out on 
the posters.  
 
Information security centre 
The university can provide an information security centre that focuses on conducting 
workshops and provides support for students who wish to gain more information security 
knowledge. Also, students will be shown what social engineering attacks look like, as well how 
to avoid falling victim. The centre could also assist those students who experience a digital 
divide gap. Therefore, students will be given direct assistance, such as modifying their online 
security settings and installing antiviruses to enforce online privacy. The shortfall of this 
technique is that students may not approach the centre for advice. Therefore, to ensure that 
students are capitalising on the information security center, the centre can be situated next to 
the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) help desk to create awareness 
whenever students come in for their student account assistance.  
 
University policy 
Universities can implement a password policy that regulates email accounts. The policy can 
consist of password expiry and non-recycling of passwords. The policy will mean students are 
unable to use the same password repeatedly after its expiry date. 
 
6.5 Suggestions for future research 
The study has confirmed the need for further scientific social engineering research. Thus, based 
on this research, the areas that are suggested for future research are as follows: 
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• A qualitative in-depth investigation of the victimisation impact that female and male 
students face due to social engineering. The study should particularly focus on 
investigating the impact of identity theft.  
• A further quantitative study conducted across students from various provinces in South 
Africa. This study will provide broader findings which can be generalised. 
• A quantitative study that will test awareness through simulation exercises at the 
beginning of the year; thereafter, heighten social engineering awareness and then retest. 
This study will provide statistics based on the impact that awareness has on female and 
male student behaviour.  
•  A qualitative study that looks deeper into the gender dimensions by incorporating 
additional gender-based theories, such as the Hofstede’s Masculinity versus Femininity 
dimension, into technology.  
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Questionnaire 
Gender Responses Towards Online Social Engineering Attacks amongst Young Adult Students in South 
Africa, Pietermaritzburg 
 
Researcher: Happyness Ngwane 
Supervisor: Professor Manoj Maharaj 
 
Discipline of Information Systems & Technology 
College of Law and Management Studies 
University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Pietermaritzburg campus 
 
• Please note that there are no correct/incorrect answer. 
• Please note that participation in the study is voluntary. 
• Please sign the letter of informed consent, giving me permission to use your responses for this 
research project. 
• Please kindly take note of the “general instruction” while filling this questionnaire. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTION: In all the sections, kindly provide your response by making a tick (√) in the 
appropriate box and fill in the gaps in the case of open-ended questions. 
 
SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
1. Your gender:           Male            Female    
2. Your age:           18 - 20           21 – 23           24 - 26           27 or older            
3. Your race:          African           Coloured          Indian           White 
          Do not wish to  
          Answer 
4. Institution:           UKZN           UMgungundlovu FET   
5. Faculty: 
          Art/  
          Drama 
          Health 
          Sciences 
          Law /     
         Management 
 
          Social 
          Sciences 
          Science/ Technology 
 
SECTION B: AWARENESS  
- Please categorise the following examples  
- Please note that there is only one category per example 
EXAMPLES 
Cyber
-crime 
Phishing 
attack 
Malware 
Email 
spam 
Identity 
theft 
I do not 
know 
1. 
Emails that usually appear to come from a well-known 
organization and ask for your personal information — such as 
credit card number, social security number, account number or 
password 
    
 
 
2. 
The deliberate use of someone else's name, usually as a method 
to gain a financial advantage or obtain credit and other benefits 
in the person's name, and perhaps to the other person's 
disadvantage or loss 
    
 
 
3. 
The below points are all examples of…? 
- Hacking into computer systems 
- Introducing viruses to vulnerable networks 
- Identity theft  
- Credit card theft 
    
 
 
4. 
A type of unwanted electronic messages. The messages may 
also contain disguised links that appear to be for familiar 
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websites but in fact lead to phishing web sites or sites that are 
hosting malware 
5. 
Any piece of software that was written with the intention of 
doing harm to information, devices or to people 
    
 
 
   
6. QUESTION OPTIONS  
6.1 
Which of the options presented do you believe represents 
the most important reason behind online privacy on 
social networks 
          Prevention of identity theft 
6.2           Protection of my information 
6.3 
          Hiding my images and contact information from  
          Unknowns 
6.4           I do not know 
7. QUESTION OPTIONS  
7.1 
Which of these actions do you believe can help to 
safeguard your information on social network sites 
          Install an antivirus software 
7.2 
          Leave my social network logon active even when 
          I am not at the computer 
7.3           Not changing my password  
7.4           I do not know 
 
SECTION C: USER’S RESPONSES 
1. I am cautious when opening email attachments           Yes           No 
2. 
There is no threat in responding to emails which come 
from a known source (e.g.: friend or lecturer) 
          Yes           No 
 
 
Always 
(100% of 
the time) 
Often 
(75% of 
the time) 
Sometimes 
(50% of the 
time) 
Rarely 
(25%o
f the 
time) 
Never 
(0% of 
the 
time) 
I do not 
know 
how to 
3. 
I attend to security alerts that come up at login on social 
media sites 
   
  
 
4. 
I check my privacy controls and settings on my social 
media sites 
   
  
 
5. 
I check for viruses when I download a file from my 
emails 
   
  
 
6. I check for viruses when I open an email attachment       
 
7. QUESTION Category Question Received Responded 
7.1 
Have you ever received a  
Email message  
 
that you suspect 
was an attempt to 
get your personal 
details? 
          Yes           No           Yes           No 
7.2 
Link 
          Yes           No           Yes           No 
7.3 
Online pop-up 
          Yes           No           Yes           No 
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7.4 
Social media 
message 
 
          Yes           No           Yes           No 
 
SECTION D: ATTITUDES 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree 
1. Online security is important      
2. Online security is necessary 
     
3. Online security is outside the user’s control 
     
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree 
4. I am not concerned about online security 
     
5. 
I am not concerned about online security when responding to 
a friend  
     
6. 
I am concerned about online security when responding to an 
unknown source 
     
7. I would like to be taught about information security 
     
 
SECTION F: BEHAVIOUR 
1. I reveal my real name on social networks 
          
Yes 
          No 
2. I reveal my email address on social networks 
          
Yes 
          No 
 
3. QUESTION Category Accepted 
3.1 
Have you ever accepted a 
friend request on social media 
from 
Someone you do not know           Yes           No 
3.2 
A friend of a friend           Yes           No 
3.3 
Someone you have mutual 
friends with 
          Yes           No 
3.4 
Someone you think you know 
          Yes           No 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
4. Using privacy settings is time consuming 
     
5. Privacy settings are complicated 
     
6. I consider my information safe on social networks 
     
7. 
Using privacy settings on social networks would require a 
considerable amount of effort 
     
8. 
There is too much work associated with trying to increase my 
information protection through the use of privacy settings 
     
 
 
 Daily Weekly Monthly Yearly Never 
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9. 
How often do you change your social network passwords 
across your social networks 
     
10. How often do you check in on social networks 
      
  
 
Very 
concerned 
Somewhat 
concerned 
Not too 
concerned 
Not at all 
concerned 
11. 
How concerned are you, that some of the information you share on 
social networking sites might be accessed by third parties, (i.e.: 
advertisers) without your knowledge 
    
 
 
QUESTION 15 TO 18: 
- Please select the most appropriate option 
- Please choose one option per question 
14. QUESTION OPTIONS 
14.1 
Which of these do you believe is NOT a good way to 
secure your password 
          To memorise it 
14.2           To write it down (e.g.: paper, notebook) 
14.3 
To write it down but only in a secured place      
   and with no title information (e.g.: sticky note) 
14.4           I do not know 
15. QUESTION OPTIONS 
15.1 
What will you do when somebody close to you (such as 
your partner) requests your social network’s password 
(e.g.: Facebook password) 
          Give it to him/her the password 
15.2           Give it to him/her by typing it in 
15.3 
          Ask questions and give him/her if you are  
          Convinced 
15.4           Say no 
16. QUESTION OPTIONS 
16.1 
Which of these is in line with your belief about privacy 
on social network 
          It is necessary and important 
16.2 
          It should be optional depending on what you  
          have to protect 
16.3           It is totally outside my control 
16.4           I am not concerned about privacy  
17. QUESTION OPTIONS 
 
Right at 
the 
beginning 
After I 
figured out 
how to 
After 
having a 
profile for a 
while 
I have never 
changed the 
settings 
I do not 
know how 
to  
12. 
When did you change your privacy settings on social 
networks since creating your profile 
     
13. 
When did you change your privacy settings on your 
email (i.e. Gmail) since creating your profile 
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17.1 
Which of these describe reasons behind hiding your 
profile information (e.g.: hometown, cell phone 
number) 
           My information might be stolen 
17.2           I don’t feel secured on social networks generally 
17.3 
          I just choose not to put original personal   
          information on my profile 
17.4           I do not hide any personal information  
 
 
18. QUESTION Category 
Would you verify 
the caller/ sender 
 Would you respond 
without verifying the 
caller/ sender 
After verifying the 
caller/ sender would 
you respond 
18.1 
Under what circumstance would 
you provide personally 
identifiable information 
(e.g.: identity number) 
Random 
telephone call 
          
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No 
18.2 
Random email 
message 
          
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No 
18.3 
Someone close 
calling (friend) 
          
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No 
18.4 
Someone close 
emailing (friend) 
          
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No 
18.5 
Social network 
direct message 
          
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No 
 
 
19. QUESTION Category 
Would you verify 
the caller/ sender 
 Would you respond 
without verifying the 
caller/ sender 
After verifying the 
caller/ sender would 
you respond 
19.1 
Under what circumstance would 
you provide personally 
identifiable information knowing 
you stand a chance to win 
something 
(e.g.: identity number) 
Random 
telephone 
          
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No 
19.2 
Random email 
message 
          
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No 
19.3 
Someone close 
calling (friend) 
          
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No 
19.4 
Someone close 
emailing (friend) 
          
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No 
19.5 
Social network 
direct message 
          
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No           
Yes 
          No 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME!!!  
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APPENDIX D: RELIABILITY TEST 
 
 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Gender 248.11 131.633 .093 
Age 247.58 131.932 .010 
Race 248.11 135.063 -.137 
Institution 248.40 129.619 .314 
Faculty 246.06 133.319 -.063 
Emails that usually appear to come from a well-known organization and ask for your personal 
information - such as credit card number, account number or password 
246.12 124.155 .145 
The deliberate use of someone else's name, usually as a method to gain a financial advantage 
or obtain credit and other benefits in the person's name and perhaps to the other persons 
disadvantage or loss 
245.29 125.091 .143 
The below points are all examples of...? -Hacking into computer systems -Introducing viruses 
to vulnerable networks -Identity theft -Credit card theft 
247.20 116.467 .286 
A type of unwanted electronic messages. The messages may also contain disguised links that 
appear to be for familiar websites but in fact lead to phishing web sites or sites that are hosting 
malware 
246.05 125.211 .170 
Any piece of software that was written with the intention of doing harm to information, devices 
or to people 
246.25 123.974 .162 
Which of the options presented do you believe represents the most important reason behind 
online privacy on social networks 
247.69 128.976 .179 
Which of these actions do you believe can help to safeguard your information on social network 
sites 
247.75 127.377 .138 
I am cautious when opening email attachments 248.97 132.880 -.014 
There is no threat in responding to emails which come from a known source (e.g.: friend or 
lecturer) 
249.04 133.040 -.030 
I attend to security alerts that come up at login on social media sites 245.61 129.816 .031 
I check my privacy controls and settings on my social media sites 245.50 126.706 .138 
I check for viruses when I download a file from my emails 246.03 125.333 .153 
I check for viruses when I open an email attachment 246.24 123.499 .213 
Have you ever received an email message that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal 
details 
248.40 132.257 .049 
Have you ever responded to an email message that you suspect was an attempt to get your 
personal details 
245.88 131.709 .112 
Have you ever received a link that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal details 248.32 130.746 .182 
Have you ever responded to a link that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal details 245.80 131.478 .169 
Have you ever received an online pop-up that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal 
details 
248.30 130.237 .225 
Have you ever responded to an online pop-up that you suspect was an attempt to get your 
personal details 
245.78 131.936 .122 
Item-Total Statistics 
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Have you ever received an social media message that you suspect was an attempt to get your 
personal details 
248.41 131.854 .091 
Have you ever responded to an social media message that you suspect was an attempt to get 
your personal details 
245.99 132.872 -.014 
Online security is important 244.85 133.600 -.079 
Online security is necessary 245.01 134.153 -.110 
Online security is outside the user's control 246.54 129.071 .094 
I am not concerned about online security 247.40 129.947 .042 
I am not concerned about online security when responding to a friend 246.75 132.152 -.033 
I am concerned about online security when responding to an unknown source 245.56 132.941 -.054 
I would like to be taught about information security 245.22 133.875 -.083 
I reveal my real name on social networks 248.93 132.989 -.024 
I reveal my email address on social networks 249.15 132.731 -.003 
Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from someone you do not know 248.82 132.942 -.016 
Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from a friend of a friend 248.76 133.093 -.035 
Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from someone you have mutual friends 
with 
248.73 133.077 -.034 
Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from someone you think you know 248.77 133.279 -.060 
Using privacy settings is time consuming 246.55 125.387 .224 
Privacy settings are complicated 246.60 126.935 .181 
I consider my information safe on social networks 246.80 127.870 .123 
Using privacy settings on social networks would require a considerable amount of effort 246.56 126.903 .184 
There is too much work associated with trying to increase my information protection through 
the use of privacy settings 
246.42 126.817 .191 
How often do you change your social network passwords across your social networks 248.08 130.111 .115 
How often do you check in on social networks 245.26 131.976 -.003 
How concerned are you, that some of the information you share on social networking sites 
might be accessed by third parties, (i.e.: advertisers) without your knowledge 
246.48 132.839 -.035 
When did you change your privacy settings on social networks since creating your profile 246.30 128.917 .107 
When did you change your privacy settings on your email (i.e. Gmail) since creating your 
profile 
246.45 130.259 .046 
Which of these do you believe is NOT a good way to secure your password 247.55 130.848 .083 
What would you do when somebody close to you (such as your partner) requests your social 
network’s password (e.g.: Facebook password) 
246.45 131.704 .013 
Which of these is in line with your belief about privacy on social network 248.12 130.498 .090 
Which of these describe reasons behind hiding your profile information (e.g.: hometown, cell 
phone number) 
247.72 132.370 -.016 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) over a random telephone call, would you verify the caller 
248.20 129.741 .260 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) over a random telephone call, would you respond without verifying the caller 
245.72 133.120 -.043 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) over a random telephone call, after verifying the caller would you respond 
244.05 130.161 .228 
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Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) over a random email message, would you verify the sender 
248.09 129.656 .270 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) over a random email message, would you respond without verifying the sender 
245.72 133.231 -.064 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) over a random email message, after verifying the sender would you respond 
243.93 130.645 .207 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) to someone close calling, would you verify the caller 
248.20 131.430 .110 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) to someone close calling, would you respond without verifying the caller 
245.91 132.772 -.002 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) to someone close calling, after verifying the caller would you respond 
244.07 130.517 .194 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) to someone close emailing, would you verify the sender 
248.11 130.713 .174 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) to someone close emailing, would you respond without verifying the sender 
245.88 131.809 .100 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) to someone close emailing, after verifying the sender would you respond 
243.97 130.310 .229 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) over a social network direct message, would you verify the sender 
248.07 129.631 .273 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) over a social network direct message, would you respond without verifying the sender 
245.80 133.323 -.063 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity 
number) over a social network direct message, after verifying the sender would you respond 
243.90 130.212 .261 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random telephone call, would 
you verify the caller 
248.17 129.876 .247 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random telephone call, would 
you respond without verifying the caller 
245.79 133.248 -.054 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random telephone call, after 
verifying the caller would you respond 
243.98 130.500 .209 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random email message, would 
you verify the sender 
248.12 128.791 .344 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random email message, would 
you respond without verifying the sender 
245.78 133.684 -.111 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random email message, after 
verifying the sender would you respond 
243.94 129.872 .279 
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Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close calling, would you 
verify the caller 
248.14 131.313 .120 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close calling, would you 
respond without verifying the caller 
245.92 132.799 -.005 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close calling, after 
verifying the caller would you respond 
244.03 130.843 .168 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close emailing, would you 
verify the sender 
248.13 130.584 .185 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close emailing, would you 
respond without verifying the sender 
245.91 133.175 -.042 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close emailing, after 
verifying the sender would you respond 
244.00 130.278 .225 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a social network direct message, 
would you verify the sender 
248.10 129.346 .296 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a social network direct message, 
would you respond without verifying the sender 
245.79 133.607 -.101 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you 
stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a social network direct message, 
after verifying the sender would you respond 
243.93 129.840 .285 
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APPENDIX E: NORMALITY TESTS 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Gender .369 361 .000 .632 361 .000 
Age .270 361 .000 .843 361 .000 
Race .453 361 .000 .593 361 .000 
Institution .464 361 .000 .545 361 .000 
Faculty .202 361 .000 .854 361 .000 
Emails that usually appear to come from a well-known organization and ask 
for your personal information - such as credit card number, account number 
or password 
.199 361 .000 .880 361 .000 
The deliberate use of someone else's name, usually as a method to gain a 
financial advantage or obtain credit and other benefits in the person's name 
and perhaps to the other persons disadvantage or loss 
.422 361 .000 .668 361 .000 
The below points are all examples of...? -Hacking into computer systems -
Introducing viruses to vulnerable networks -Identity theft -Credit card theft 
.364 361 .000 .688 361 .000 
A type of unwanted electronic messages. The messages may also contain 
disguised links that appear to be for familiar websites but in fact lead to 
phishing web sites or sites that are hosting malware 
.200 361 .000 .895 361 .000 
Any piece of software that was written with the intention of doing harm to 
information, devices or to people 
.270 361 .000 .846 361 .000 
Which of the options presented do you believe represents the most 
important reason behind online privacy on social networks 
.291 361 .000 .817 361 .000 
Which of these actions do you believe can help to safeguard your 
information on social network sites 
.400 361 .000 .659 361 .000 
I am cautious when opening email attachments .438 361 .000 .582 361 .000 
There is no threat in responding to emails which come from a known source 
(e.g.: friend or lecturer) 
.402 361 .000 .616 361 .000 
I attend to security alerts that come up at login on social media sites .157 361 .000 .917 361 .000 
I check my privacy controls and settings on my social media sites .177 361 .000 .913 361 .000 
I check for viruses when I download a file from my emails .153 361 .000 .914 361 .000 
I check for viruses when I open an email attachment .189 361 .000 .907 361 .000 
Have you ever received an email message that you suspect was an attempt 
to get your personal details 
.463 361 .000 .547 361 .000 
Have you ever responded to an email message that you suspect was an 
attempt to get your personal details 
.484 361 .000 .507 361 .000 
Have you ever received a link that you suspect was an attempt to get your 
personal details 
.424 361 .000 .597 361 .000 
Have you ever responded to a link that you suspect was an attempt to get 
your personal details 
.517 361 .000 .409 361 .000 
Have you ever received an online pop-up that you suspect was an attempt 
to get your personal details 
.412 361 .000 .609 361 .000 
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Have you ever responded to an online pop-up that you suspect was an attempt to get 
your personal details 
.525 361 .000 .372 361 .000 
Have you ever received an social media message that you suspect was an attempt to 
get your personal details 
.468 361 .000 .538 361 .000 
Have you ever responded to an social media message that you suspect was an attempt 
to get your personal details 
.420 361 .000 .613 361 .000 
Online security is important .486 361 .000 .423 361 .000 
Online security is necessary .423 361 .000 .581 361 .000 
Online security is outside the user's control .193 361 .000 .911 361 .000 
I am not concerned about online security .253 361 .000 .822 361 .000 
I am not concerned about online security when responding to a friend .170 361 .000 .898 361 .000 
I am concerned about online security when responding to an unknown source 
.298 361 .000 .727 361 .000 
I would like to be taught about information security .372 361 .000 .647 361 .000 
I reveal my real name on social networks .459 361 .000 .554 361 .000 
I reveal my email address on social networks .347 361 .000 .636 361 .000 
Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from someone you do not 
know 
.508 361 .000 .441 361 .000 
Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from a friend of a friend 
.530 361 .000 .347 361 .000 
Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from someone you have 
mutual friends with 
.539 361 .000 .268 361 .000 
Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from someone you think you 
know 
.528 361 .000 .357 361 .000 
Using privacy settings is time consuming .179 361 .000 .913 361 .000 
Privacy settings are complicated .204 361 .000 .906 361 .000 
I consider my information safe on social networks .181 361 .000 .908 361 .000 
Using privacy settings on social networks would require a considerable amount of 
effort 
.189 361 .000 .913 361 .000 
There is too much work associated with trying to increase my information protection 
through the use of privacy settings 
.189 361 .000 .912 361 .000 
How often do you change your social network passwords across your social networks 
.343 361 .000 .708 361 .000 
How often do you check in on social networks .384 361 .000 .642 361 .000 
How concerned are you, that some of the information you share on social networking 
sites might be accessed by third parties, (i.e.: advertisers) without your knowledge .290 361 .000 .804 361 .000 
When did you change your privacy settings on social networks since creating your 
profile 
.175 361 .000 .908 361 .000 
When did you change your privacy settings on your email (i.e. Gmail) since creating 
your profile 
.160 361 .000 .909 361 .000 
Which of these do you believe is NOT a good way to secure your password .351 361 .000 .784 361 .000 
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What would you do when somebody close to you (such as your partner) requests your 
social network’s password (e.g.: Facebook password) 
.289 361 .000 .759 361 .000 
Which of these is in line with your belief about privacy on social network .380 361 .000 .673 361 .000 
Which of these describe reasons behind hiding your profile information (e.g.: 
hometown, cell phone number) 
.242 361 .000 .818 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) over a random telephone call, would you verify the caller .365 361 .000 .633 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) over a random telephone call, would you respond without verifying 
the caller 
.540 361 .000 .247 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) over a random telephone call, after verifying the caller would you 
respond 
.396 361 .000 .620 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) over a random email message, would you verify the sender .379 361 .000 .629 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) over a random email message, would you respond without verifying 
the sender 
.540 361 .000 .247 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) over a random email message, after verifying the sender would you 
respond 
.459 361 .000 .554 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) to someone close calling, would you verify the caller .365 361 .000 .633 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) to someone close calling, would you respond without verifying the 
caller 
.468 361 .000 .538 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) to someone close calling, after verifying the caller would you respond .386 361 .000 .625 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) to someone close emailing, would you verify the sender .367 361 .000 .633 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) to someone close emailing, would you respond without verifying the 
sender 
.480 361 .000 .515 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) to someone close emailing, after verifying the sender would you 
respond 
.440 361 .000 .580 361 .000 
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Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) over a social network direct message, would you verify the sender .385 361 .000 .626 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) over a social network direct message, would you respond without 
verifying the sender 
.517 361 .000 .409 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: 
identity number) over a social network direct message, after verifying the sender would 
you respond 
.472 361 .000 .531 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random 
telephone call, would you verify the caller 
.347 361 .000 .636 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random 
telephone call, would you respond without verifying the caller .519 361 .000 .400 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random 
telephone call, after verifying the caller would you respond 
.434 361 .000 .587 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random 
email message, would you verify the sender 
.360 361 .000 .634 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random 
email message, would you respond without verifying the sender 
.518 361 .000 .403 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a random 
email message, after verifying the sender would you respond 
.452 361 .000 .564 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close 
calling, would you verify the caller 
.349 361 .000 .636 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close 
calling, would you respond without verifying the caller 
.464 361 .000 .545 361 .000 
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Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close 
calling, after verifying the caller would you respond .406 361 .000 .613 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close 
emailing, would you verify the sender 
.357 361 .000 .635 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close 
emailing, would you respond without verifying the sender 
.467 361 .000 .540 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close 
emailing, after verifying the sender would you respond 
.423 361 .000 .599 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a social 
network direct message, would you verify the sender 
.372 361 .000 .631 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a social 
network direct message, would you respond without verifying the sender 
.521 361 .000 .391 361 .000 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information 
knowing you stand a chance to win something (e.g.: identity number) over a social 
network direct message, after verifying the sender would you respond 
.456 361 .000 .558 361 .000 
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APPENDIX F: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Gender 1.55 .498 361 
Age 2.07 .896 361 
Race 1.55 .951 361 
Institution 1.26 .438 361 
Faculty 3.60 1.111 361 
Emails that usually appear to come from a well-known organization and ask for your personal information - such as 
credit card number, account number or password 
3.54 1.759 361 
The deliberate use of someone else's name, usually as a method to gain a financial advantage or obtain credit and 
other benefits in the person's name and perhaps to the other persons disadvantage or loss 
4.37 1.628 361 
The below points are all examples of...? -Hacking into computer systems -Introducing viruses to vulnerable networks 
-Identity theft -Credit card theft 
2.46 2.014 361 
A type of unwanted electronic messages. The messages may also contain disguised links that appear to be for familiar 
websites but in fact lead to phishing web sites or sites that are hosting malware 
3.61 1.466 361 
Any piece of software that was written with the intention of doing harm to information, devices or to people 3.40 1.691 361 
Which of the options presented do you believe represents the most important reason behind online privacy on social 
networks 
1.97 .814 361 
Which of these actions do you believe can help to safeguard your information on social network sites 1.91 1.271 361 
I am cautious when opening email attachments .69 .463 361 
There is no threat in responding to emails which come from a known source (e.g.: friend or lecturer) .62 .487 361 
I attend to security alerts that come up at login on social media sites 4.05 1.448 361 
I check my privacy controls and settings on my social media sites 4.16 1.386 361 
I check for viruses when I download a file from my emails 3.63 1.533 361 
I check for viruses when I open an email attachment 3.42 1.513 361 
Have you ever received an email message that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal details 1.26 .439 361 
Have you ever responded to an email message that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal details 3.78 .412 361 
Have you ever received a link that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal details 1.34 .474 361 
Have you ever responded to a link that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal details 3.86 .346 361 
Have you ever received an online pop-up that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal details 1.36 .481 361 
Have you ever responded to an online pop-up that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal details 3.88 .321 361 
Have you ever received an social media message that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal details 1.25 .433 361 
Have you ever responded to an social media message that you suspect was an attempt to get your personal details 3.66 .479 361 
Online security is important 4.81 .488 361 
Online security is necessary 4.65 .637 361 
Online security is outside the user's control 3.12 1.170 361 
I am not concerned about online security 2.25 1.317 361 
I am not concerned about online security when responding to a friend 2.91 1.342 361 
I am concerned about online security when responding to an unknown source 4.10 1.242 361 
I would like to be taught about information security 4.43 .938 361 
I reveal my real name on social networks .73 .444 361 
I reveal my email address on social networks .51 .501 361 
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Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from someone you do not know .84 .368 361 
Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from a friend of a friend .90 .304 361 
Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from someone you have mutual friends with .93 .249 361 
Have you ever accepted a friend request on social media from someone you think you know .89 .311 361 
Using privacy settings is time consuming 3.11 1.212 361 
Privacy settings are complicated 3.06 1.147 361 
I consider my information safe on social networks 2.86 1.257 361 
Using privacy settings on social networks would require a considerable amount of effort 3.10 1.143 361 
There is too much work associated with trying to increase my information protection through the use of privacy 
settings 
3.24 1.127 361 
How often do you change your social network passwords across your social networks 1.58 .820 361 
How often do you check in on social networks 4.40 1.020 361 
How concerned are you, that some of the information you share on social networking sites might be accessed by third 
parties, (i.e.: advertisers) without your knowledge 
3.18 .919 361 
When did you change your privacy settings on social networks since creating your profile 3.36 1.129 361 
When did you change your privacy settings on your email (i.e. Gmail) since creating your profile 3.21 1.196 361 
Which of these do you believe is NOT a good way to secure your password 2.11 .781 361 
What would you do when somebody close to you (such as your partner) requests your social network’s password 
(e.g.: Facebook password) 
3.20 .973 361 
Which of these is in line with your belief about privacy on social network 1.54 .843 361 
Which of these describe reasons behind hiding your profile information (e.g.: hometown, cell phone number) 1.94 .969 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) over a 
random telephone call, would you verify the caller 
1.45 .499 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) over a 
random telephone call, would you respond without verifying the caller 
3.94 .234 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) over a 
random telephone call, after verifying the caller would you respond 
5.61 .489 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) over a 
random email message, would you verify the sender 
1.57 .495 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) over a 
random email message, would you respond without verifying the sender 
3.94 .234 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) over a 
random email message, after verifying the sender would you respond 
5.73 .444 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) to someone 
close calling, would you verify the caller 
1.45 .499 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) to someone 
close calling, would you respond without verifying the caller 
3.75 .433 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) to someone 
close calling, after verifying the caller would you respond 
5.59 .493 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) to someone 
close emailing, would you verify the sender 
1.55 .498 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) to someone 
close emailing, would you respond without verifying the sender 
3.78 .418 361 
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Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) to someone 
close emailing, after verifying the sender would you respond 
5.69 .462 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) over a social 
network direct message, would you verify the sender 
1.58 .493 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) over a social 
network direct message, would you respond without verifying the sender 
3.86 .346 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information (e.g.: identity number) over a social 
network direct message, after verifying the sender would you respond 
5.76 .428 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) over a random telephone call, would you verify the caller 
1.49 .501 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) over a random telephone call, would you respond without verifying the caller 
3.87 .340 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) over a random telephone call, after verifying the caller would you respond 
5.68 .467 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) over a random email message, would you verify the sender 
1.54 .499 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) over a random email message, would you respond without verifying the sender 
3.88 .333 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) over a random email message, after verifying the sender would you respond 
5.72 .451 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close calling, would you verify the caller 
1.52 .500 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close calling, would you respond without verifying the caller 
3.74 .438 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close calling, after verifying the caller would you respond 
5.63 .485 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close emailing, would you verify the sender 
1.53 .500 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close emailing, would you respond without verifying the sender 
3.75 .435 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) to someone close emailing, after verifying the sender would you respond 
5.66 .475 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) over a social network direct message, would you verify the sender 
1.56 .497 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) over a social network direct message, would you respond without verifying the 
sender 
3.87 .334 361 
Under what circumstance would you provide personally identifiable information knowing you stand a chance to win 
something (e.g.: identity number) over a social network direct message, after verifying the sender would you respond 
5.73 .447 361 
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APPENDIX G: CROSS TABULATIONS AND CHI-SQUARE TESTS 
 
Cross tabulation between gender and phishing attack awareness 
  
Emails that usually appear to come from a well-known organization and 
ask for your personal information - such as credit card number, account 
number or password 
Total 
Cyber-
crime 
Phishing 
attack Malware 
Email 
spam 
Identity 
theft 
I do not 
know 
Gender Male Count 22 42 3 54 14 26 161 
% 
within 
Gender 
13.7% 26.1% 1.9% 33.5% 8.7% 16.1% 100.0% 
Female Count 41 30 8 56 18 47 200 
% 
within 
Gender 
20.5% 15.0% 4.0% 28.0% 9.0% 23.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 63 72 11 110 32 73 361 
% 
within 
Gender 
17.5% 19.9% 3.0% 30.5% 8.9% 20.2% 100.0% 
 
Chi-square tests 
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.513a 5 .028 
Likelihood Ratio 12.631 5 .027 
Linear-by-Linear Association .609 1 .435 
N of Valid Cases 361     
 
Cross tabulation between gender and identity theft awareness 
  
The deliberate use of someone else's name, usually as a method to 
gain a financial advantage or obtain credit and other benefits in the 
person's name and perhaps to the other persons disadvantage or loss 
Total 
Cyber-
crime 
Phishing 
attack Malware 
Email 
spam 
Identity 
theft 
I do not 
know 
Gender Male Count 28 5 2 3 108 15 161 
% 
within 
Gender 
17.4% 3.1% 1.2% 1.9% 67.1% 9.3% 100.0% 
Female Count 29 7 2 7 117 38 200 
% 
within 
Gender 
14.5% 3.5% 1.0% 3.5% 58.5% 19.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 57 12 4 10 225 53 361 
% 
within 
Gender 
15.8% 3.3% 1.1% 2.8% 62.3% 14.7% 100.0% 
 
  
The deliberate use of someone else's name, usually as a method to 
gain a financial advantage or obtain credit and other benefits in the 
person's name and perhaps to the other persons disadvantage or loss Total 
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Cyber-
crime 
Phishing 
attack Malware 
Email 
spam 
Identity 
theft 
I do not 
know 
Gender Male Count 28 5 2 3 108 15 161 
% 
within 
Gender 
17.4% 3.1% 1.2% 1.9% 67.1% 9.3% 100.0% 
Female Count 29 7 2 7 117 38 200 
% 
within 
Gender 
14.5% 3.5% 1.0% 3.5% 58.5% 19.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 57 12 4 10 225 53 361 
% 
within 
Gender 
15.8% 3.3% 1.1% 2.8% 62.3% 14.7% 100.0% 
 
Chi-square tests 
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.174a 5 .147 
Likelihood Ratio 8.457 5 .133 
Linear-by-Linear Association 
1.204 1 .272 
N of Valid Cases 361     
 
Cross tabulation between gender and cyber-crime awareness 
  
The below points are all examples of...? -Hacking into computer 
systems -Introducing viruses to vulnerable networks -Identity theft -
Credit card theft 
Total 
Cyber-
crime 
Phishing 
attack Malware 
Email 
spam 
Identity 
theft 
I do not 
know 
Gender Male Count 110 7 11 1 11 21 161 
% 
within 
Gender 
68.3% 4.3% 6.8% .6% 6.8% 13.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 106 9 19 9 14 43 200 
% 
within 
Gender 
53.0% 4.5% 9.5% 4.5% 7.0% 21.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 216 16 30 10 25 64 361 
% 
within 
Gender 
59.8% 4.4% 8.3% 2.8% 6.9% 17.7% 100.0% 
 
Chi-square tests 
  Value df 
Asymptotic Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.715a 5 .026 
Likelihood Ratio 13.704 5 .018 
Linear-by-Linear Association 
7.940 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 361     
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Cross tabulation between gender and email spam awareness 
  
A type of unwanted electronic messages. The messages may also 
contain disguised links that appear to be for familiar websites but in 
fact lead to phishing web sites or sites that are hosting malware 
Total 
Cyber-
crime 
Phishing 
attack Malware 
Email 
spam 
Identity 
theft 
I do not 
know 
Gender Male Count 6 37 24 69 2 23 161 
% 
within 
Gender 
3.7% 23.0% 14.9% 42.9% 1.2% 14.3% 100.0% 
Female Count 16 41 31 67 3 42 200 
% 
within 
Gender 
8.0% 20.5% 15.5% 33.5% 1.5% 21.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 22 78 55 136 5 65 361 
% 
within 
Gender 
6.1% 21.6% 15.2% 37.7% 1.4% 18.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi-square tests 
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.297a 5 .199 
Likelihood Ratio 7.460 5 .189 
Linear-by-Linear Association 
.114 1 .736 
N of Valid Cases 361     
 
 
Cross tabulation between gender and malware awareness 
  
Any piece of software that was written with the intention of doing 
harm to information, devices or to people 
Total 
Cyber-
crime 
Phishing 
attack Malware 
Email 
spam 
Identity 
theft 
I do not 
know 
Gender Male Count 20 13 98 7 2 21 161 
% 
within 
Gender 
12.4% 8.1% 60.9% 4.3% 1.2% 13.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 38 20 55 18 4 65 200 
% 
within 
Gender 
19.0% 10.0% 27.5% 9.0% 2.0% 32.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 58 33 153 25 6 86 361 
% 
within 
Gender 
16.1% 9.1% 42.4% 6.9% 1.7% 23.8% 100.0% 
 
Chi-square tests 
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 43.468a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 44.507 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.633 1 .006 
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N of Valid Cases 361     
 
 
  
Cross-tabulationulation between Gender and most important reason behind online privacy on 
social networks 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymptotic Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.858a 3 .414 
Likelihood Ratio 2.899 3 .408 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.399 1 .237 
N of Valid Cases 361     
 
Cross-tabulation between Gender and the actions believed can help safeguard information on 
social network sites 
  
Which of these actions do you believe can help to safeguard 
your information on social network sites 
Total 
Install an 
antivirus 
Leave my social 
network logon 
active even when I 
am not at the 
computer 
Not 
changing 
my 
password 
I do not 
know 
Gender Male Count 107 7 10 37 161 
% within 
Gender 66.5% 4.3% 6.2% 23.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 123 6 29 42 200 
% within 
Gender 61.5% 3.0% 14.5% 21.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 230 13 39 79 361 
  
Which of the options presented do you believe represents the most 
important reason behind online privacy on social networks 
Total 
Prevention of 
Identity Theft 
Protection of 
my Information 
Hiding my Image 
and contact info 
from unknowns 
I dont 
know 
Gender Male Count 47 89 17 8 161 
% within 
Gender 29.2% 55.3% 10.6% 5.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 56 99 31 14 200 
% within 
Gender 28.0% 49.5% 15.5% 7.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 103 188 48 22 361 
% within 
Gender 28.5% 52.1% 13.3% 6.1% 100.0% 
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% within 
Gender 63.7% 3.6% 10.8% 21.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymptotic Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 
6.627a 3 .085 
Likelihood Ratio 6.949 3 .074 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .476 1 .490 
N of Valid Cases 361     
 
Cross-tabulationulation between Gender and what is believed as not a good way to secure 
passwords 
  
Which of these do you believe is NOT a good way to secure your 
password 
Total 
To memorise 
it 
To write it 
down (e.g.: 
paper, 
notebook) 
To write it 
down but only 
in a secured 
place and with 
no title 
information 
(e.g.: sticky 
note) 
I do not 
know 
Gender Male Count 32 100 19 10 161 
% within 
Gender 
19.9% 62.1% 11.8% 6.2% 100.0% 
Female Count 31 124 26 19 200 
% within 
Gender 
15.5% 62.0% 13.0% 9.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 63 224 45 29 361 
% within 
Gender 
17.5% 62.0% 12.5% 8.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymptotic Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 
2.283a 3 .516 
Likelihood Ratio 2.304 3 .512 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 2.160 1 .142 
N of Valid Cases 361     
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Cross-tabulationulation between Gender and response when somebody close requests for your 
social network password 
  
What would you do when somebody close to you 
(such as your partner) requests your social 
network’s password (e.g.: Facebook password) 
Total 
Give it to 
him/her 
the 
password 
Give it to 
him/her 
by typing 
it in 
Ask 
questions 
and give 
him/her if 
you are 
convinced Say no 
Gender Male Count 12 17 45 87 161 
% within 
Gender 7.5% 10.6% 28.0% 54.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 24 16 67 93 200 
% within 
Gender 12.0% 8.0% 33.5% 46.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 36 33 112 180 361 
% within 
Gender 10.0% 9.1% 31.0% 49.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.390a 3 .222 
Likelihood Ratio 4.436 3 .218 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.862 1 .172 
N of Valid Cases 361     
 
Cross-tabulationulation between Gender and How often do you check in on 
social networks 
  
How often do you check in on social networks 
Total Never Yearly Monthly Weekly Daily 
Gender Male Count 3 3 10 30 115 161 
% 
within 
Gender 
1.9% 1.9% 6.2% 18.6% 71.4% 100.0% 
Female Count 10 7 26 33 124 200 
% 
within 
Gender 
5.0% 3.5% 13.0% 16.5% 62.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 13 10 36 63 239 361 
% 
within 
Gender 
3.6% 2.8% 10.0% 17.5% 66.2% 100.0% 
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Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson 
Chi-Square 8.852
a 4 .065 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
9.249 4 .055 
Linear-by-
Linear 
Association 
7.161 1 .007 
N of Valid 
Cases 
361     
 
 
Cross-tabulationulation between Gender and How concerned are you, that some of the 
information you share on social networking sites might be accessed by third parties, (i.e.: 
advertisers) without your knowledge 
  
How concerned are you, that some of the information you share 
on social networking sites might be accessed by third parties, 
(i.e.: advertisers) without your knowledge 
Total 
Not at all 
concerned 
Not too 
concerned 
Somewhat 
concerned 
Very 
concerned 
Gender Male Count 5 33 46 77 161 
% within 
Gender 3.1% 20.5% 28.6% 47.8% 100.0% 
Female Count 12 40 52 96 200 
% within 
Gender 6.0% 20.0% 26.0% 48.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 17 73 98 173 361 
% within 
Gender 4.7% 20.2% 27.1% 47.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymptotic Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.816a 3 .612 
Likelihood Ratio 1.879 3 .598 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .279 1 .598 
N of Valid Cases 361     
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Cross-tabulationulations between Gender and receiving/responding to an online pop-up message 
 
Yes No Yes No
Count 125 36 161 Count 27 134 161
% within 
Gender
77.6% 22.4% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
16.8% 83.2% 100.0%
Count 105 95 200 Count 15 185 200
% within 
Gender
52.5% 47.5% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
7.5% 92.5% 100.0%
Count 230 131 361 Count 42 319 361
% within 
Gender
63.7% 36.3% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
11.6% 88.4% 100.0%
Value df
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) Value df
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided)
Pearson 
Chi-
Square
24.383
a 1 .000
Pearson 
Chi-
Square
7.456
a 1 .006
Continuity 
Correction
b
23.308 1 .000
Continuity 
Correction
b
6.581 1 .010
Likelihood 
Ratio
25.073 1 .000
Likelihood 
Ratio
7.444 1 .006
Fisher's 
Exact Test
.000 .000
Fisher's 
Exact Test
.008 .005
Linear-by-
Linear 
Associatio
n
24.315 1 .000
Linear-by-
Linear 
Associatio
n
7.435 1 .006
N of Valid 
Cases
361
N of Valid 
Cases
361
Male
Female
Total
Chi-Square Tests
Total
Chi-Square Tests
Have you ever responded 
to an online pop-up that 
you suspect was an 
attempt to get your 
personal details
Total
Gender
Have you ever received an 
online pop-up that you 
suspect was an attempt to 
get your personal details
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Cross-tabulationulations between Gender and receiving/responding to an email message  
 
 
 
Yes No Yes No
Count 132 29 161 Count 35 126 161
% within 
Gender
82.0% 18.0% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
21.7% 78.3% 100.0%
Count 135 65 200 Count 43 157 200
% within 
Gender
67.5% 32.5% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
21.5% 78.5% 100.0%
Count 267 94 361 Count 78 283 361
% within 
Gender
74.0% 26.0% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
21.6% 78.4% 100.0%
Value df
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided)
Exact Sig. (2-
sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) Value df
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided)
Exact Sig. (2-
sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided)
Pearson 
Chi-
Square
9.721
a 1 .002
Pearson 
Chi-
Square
.003
a 1 .956
Continuity 
Correction
b
8.983 1 .003
Continuity 
Correction
b
0.000 1 1.000
Likelihood 
Ratio
9.958 1 .002
Likelihood 
Ratio
.003 1 .956
Fisher's 
Exact Test
.002 .001
Fisher's 
Exact Test
1.000 .528
Linear-by-
Linear 
Associatio
n
9.694 1 .002
Linear-by-
Linear 
Associatio
n
.003 1 .956
N of Valid 
Cases
361
N of Valid 
Cases
361
Have you ever responded to 
an email message that you 
suspect was an attempt to 
get your personal details
Total
Gender Male
Female
Have you ever received an 
email message that you 
suspect was an attempt to 
get your personal details
Total
Gender Male
Total
Chi-Square Tests
Female
Total
Chi-Square Tests
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Cross-tabulationulations between Gender and receiving/responding to an online link 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes No Yes No
Count 118 43 161 Count 25 136 161
% within 
Gender
73.3% 26.7% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
15.5% 84.5% 100.0%
Count 121 79 200 Count 25 175 200
% within 
Gender
60.5% 39.5% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
12.5% 87.5% 100.0%
Count 239 122 361 Count 50 311 361
% within 
Gender
66.2% 33.8% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
13.9% 86.1% 100.0%
Value df
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) Value df
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided)
Pearson 
Chi-
Square
6.523
a 1 .011
Pearson 
Chi-
Square
.685
a 1 .408
Continuity 
Correction
b
5.964 1 .015
Continuity 
Correction
b
.455 1 .500
Likelihood 
Ratio
6.599 1 .010
Likelihood 
Ratio
.682 1 .409
Fisher's 
Exact Test
.014 .007
Fisher's 
Exact Test
.445 .249
Linear-by-
Linear 
Associatio
n
6.505 1 .011
Linear-by-
Linear 
Associatio
n
.683 1 .408
N of Valid 
Cases
361
N of Valid 
Cases
361
Male
Female
Total
Chi-Square Tests
Total
Chi-Square Tests
Have you ever 
responded to a link that 
you suspect was an 
attempt to get your 
personal details
Total
Gender
Have you ever received a 
link that you suspect was 
an attempt to get your 
personal details
Total
Gender Male
Female
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Cross-tabulationulations between Gender and receiving/responding to a social media message 
 
 
 
Cross tabulation between gender, ethnicity and information security concern 
Race 
I am concerned about online security when responding to an 
unknown source 
Total 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
African Gender Male Count 8 4 12 24 61 109 
% within 
Gender 7.3% 3.7% 11.0% 22.0% 56.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 14 12 13 40 77 156 
% within 
Gender 9.0% 7.7% 8.3% 25.6% 49.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 22 16 25 64 138 265 
% within 
Gender 8.3% 6.0% 9.4% 24.2% 52.1% 100.0% 
Coloured Gender Male Count 1   0 1 0 2 
% within 
Gender 50.0%   0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 1   1 2 1 5 
Yes No Yes No
Count 114 47 161 Count 39 122 161
% within 
Gender
70.8% 29.2% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
24.2% 75.8% 100.0%
Count 157 43 200 Count 83 117 200
% within 
Gender
78.5% 21.5% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
41.5% 58.5% 100.0%
Count 271 90 361 Count 122 239 361
% within 
Gender
75.1% 24.9% 100.0%
% within 
Gender
33.8% 66.2% 100.0%
Value df
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. (2-
sided)
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) Value df
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. (2-
sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided)
Pearson 
Chi-
Square
2.820
a 1 .093
Pearson 
Chi-
Square
11.899
a 1 .001
Continuity 
Correction
b
2.424 1 .119
Continuity 
Correction
b
11.139 1 .001
Likelihood 
Ratio
2.808 1 .094
Likelihood 
Ratio
12.115 1 .001
Fisher's 
Exact Test
.112 .060
Fisher's 
Exact Test
.001 .000
Linear-by-
Linear 
Associatio
n
2.812 1 .094
Linear-by-
Linear 
Associatio
n
11.866 1 .001
N of Valid 
Cases
361
N of Valid 
Cases
361
Male
Female
Total
Chi-Square Tests
Total
Chi-Square Tests
Have you ever responded to 
a social media message 
that you suspect was an 
attempt to get your personal 
details
Total
Gender
Have you ever received a 
social media message 
that you suspect was an 
attempt to get your 
personal details
Total
Gender Male
Female
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% within 
Gender 20.0%   20.0% 40.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 2   1 3 1 7 
% within 
Gender 28.6%   14.3% 42.9% 14.3% 100.0% 
Indian Gender Male Count 4 1 5 13 23 46 
% within 
Gender 8.7% 2.2% 10.9% 28.3% 50.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 1 1 2 6 20 30 
% within 
Gender 3.3% 3.3% 6.7% 20.0% 66.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 5 2 7 19 43 76 
% within 
Gender 6.6% 2.6% 9.2% 25.0% 56.6% 100.0% 
White Gender Male Count 0   1 0 2 3 
% within 
Gender 0.0%   33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 100.0% 
Female Count 1   0 1 7 9 
% within 
Gender 11.1%   0.0% 11.1% 77.8% 100.0% 
Total Count 1   1 1 9 12 
% within 
Gender 8.3%   8.3% 8.3% 75.0% 100.0% 
Do not 
wish to 
answer 
Gender Male Count         1 1 
% within 
Gender         100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count         1 1 
% within 
Gender         100.0% 100.0% 
Total Gender Male Count 13 5 18 38 87 161 
% within 
Gender 8.1% 3.1% 11.2% 23.6% 54.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 17 13 16 49 105 200 
% within 
Gender 8.5% 6.5% 8.0% 24.5% 52.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 30 18 34 87 192 361 
% within 
Gender 8.3% 5.0% 9.4% 24.1% 53.2% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX H: LANGUAGE EDITING CERTIFICATE 
 
 
 
